Reminiscences of Herbert Spencer (1903)

 
Spanish translation & annotations
Previous/ Next

Ladies & Gentlemen,

Since we last met Herbert Spencer has gone, and you have read his characterism by Prof. James, which neglects no side of the philosopher or the man, and which contains no word that is not true.

[deleted] I do not know that Spencer's inconsistency in the matter of religion is not marked a little bit too heavily; because it seems to me that is none of us from the Pope to Huxley who is not about as inconsistent on that subject as Spencer; and from the point of view of real religion theoretical inconsistencies afford the only way we have as yet for seeing two

sides of the truth. What is said of the man's personal character is a very wonderful thing to be so true. As to that I have heard many authentic anecdotes and can report two small from my own experience.  I was in London in 1871 a young man, more obscure if possible than I now am. Spencer heard of my been there and being, on the board of the Athenaeum Club, set me down as one of the twelve non-members who are admitted at one time. There was not possible motive for his doing so except his desire to encourage as sincere inquirer. I thus came to meet him daily during that season, meeting him daily [il.] most of the leading men of science and literature. Unfortunately I do not play billiards; although my not playing prevented my seeing as

 

much of him as I desired. [deleted]. Besides he strongly objected to talking upon any subject that might excite his brain. It was the only way in which, with his constitution, he could get his book written, -The same fact which also explains his small reading in philosophy.

Ten years latter when he came to this country, and I was the same obscure individual. I cannot imagine what he could have remembered about me unless it was that I used to tell him he was not a thorough [deleted: my telling him in the Athenaeum that my objection to his system was that he was]

 

going evolutionist [deleted]: and the Spencerian central coterie in New York had several times given rather curious marks of a disposition decided this inclination to ignore anything that might come from me.

Yet Spencer again showed the breath of his sympathies by writing to me and asking me to see him and renew acquaintance. These two little facts are worth mention as showing the spirit of the man.

When philosophy becomes an adult science, as it will before the twentieth century is have over, the first question to be asked in weighting the importance of any philosopher will be what important truth did he prove, in the sense in which truths of philosophy can be

 

proved. But philosophy is, as yet, not a science in that strict sense. It is merely what this man and that man is in claim to think; and Herbert Spencer himself in declining a nomination as one of the Foreign Associates of the Paris Academy of Science, put his declination on the ground that his work had not been scientific work.

For the present, then, the questions that we ask in order to estimate a man's greatness in philosophy are. First, What great conceptions did he introduce into philosophy? Second, what line of thought did he follow out so far and so consistently as be very instructive either as showing the great power

 

of that way of thinking or its fatal insufficiency? For the merit of some very great philosophers such as the Hedonists and Nominalists has been that they have carried out their principles with such severe logic as virtually to reduce them to absurdity.

Spencer's followers and, no doubt, Spencer himself imagined that he was the father of evolutionism, but almost great philosophers have had a theory as to how the Cosmos came about, a theory lying near the heart of their systems. Such a theory must either suppose the Cosmos eternal and immutable or it must be and evolutionary theory. For ever a system of Emanation is akin

 

of evolutionism.  The majority of great philosophers have been evolutionists and not emanationists. The distinguishing peculiarities of Spencer's Evolutionism were two. In the first place, he supposed an eternal and immutable law of the persistence of force, and the principle of Evolution was for him a mere secondary result of the action of that Immutable Law. In the second place, Evolution for him, as he states in the distinctness language in a paper printed in Collin's Synopsis of Synthetic Philosophy, was only one of two alternating movements which he regarded as analogous to a vibration and like a vibration to be governed by the

 

one over-ruling principle of the persistence of force. Such a philosophy does not belong to the class of philosophies fundamentally evolutionary.

Other conceptions, however, were introduced in philosophy by Spencer; such was the doctrine that Innate Ideas are, in some sense, and by some means, hereditary, and were their first appearance empirical. This idea was put forth in the fifties in Spencer's Principles of Psychology, a book long antedating Fechner's most celebrated work; and I should have supposed that Spencer had some claim to be considered as the Father of Modern Psychology, but since Prof. James who knows a hundred times

 

more than I do about that, say no such thing, it is plain that I must have been mistaken about that.

I do not know what other great ideas Spencer originated; but he certainly had extraordinary skill and ingenuity in forming theories that deserved examination. He made be studied with profit as master of abductive reasoning.

The answer to the second question, how much he taught the world by following out his own line of thought, is very difficult to make sure of for the reason that great historical forces were turning many powerful intellects to the study of

 

social and biological development; so that Spencer was only one of many who were following out lines of research which have resulted in giving to the idea of evolution a government over all our opinions to an extent that it never had before.

Spencer certainly took up this line of thought before anybody else did. It was as thoroughly original with him, as any thought ever is with anybody, an his works certainly did in the beginning influence a collection of men as remarkable for their intellect as for their great numbers, and influence them to such a degree that all their subsequence opinions were built upon that basis.

 

 


Transcription by Jaime Nubiola and Izaskun Martínez (2015)
Una de las ventajas de los textos en formato electrónico respecto de los textos impresos es que pueden corregirse con gran facilidad mediante la colaboración activa de los lectores que adviertan erratas, errores o simplemente mejores transcripciones. En este sentido agradeceríamos que se enviaran todas las sugerencias y correcciones a sbarrena@unav.es
Proyectos de investigación: "Charles S. Peirce en Europa (1875-76): comunidad científica y correspondencia" (MCI: FFI2011-24340), "Charles S. Peirce en Europa (1875-76): comunidad científica y correspondencia" (PIUNA 2012-2015)
Fecha del documento: 28 de julio 2015
Última actualización: 3 de agosto 2015
[Main Page]