

MR2382230 (2008m:03012) 03A05

Priest, Graham

The paradoxes of denotation.

Self-reference, 137–150, *CSLI Lecture Notes*, 178, *CSLI Publ.*, Stanford, CA, 2006.

This paper deals with those paradoxes of self-reference that deploy the notions of denotation, reference and related notions, which are rarely singled out for special treatment. It is often assumed that if one can provide a method for solving other semantic paradoxes of self-reference, it will dispose equally of these. “This tendency has been accentuated in recent years by logicians’ obsession with the liar paradox. Solve that, and the rest will take care of themselves. This is, in fact, far from the case.”

After a careful revision of the paradoxes of denotation and some lessons that might be learned from them, the author concludes that those “paradoxes have distinctive features that make the applicability of a number of standard consistent solutions to the other semantic paradoxes highly problematic when applied to them. Nor do these features appear to give other satisfactory avenues for consistent solutions. A dialethic solution is the only simple and uniform solution to all the paradoxes in question.”

The paper has the following sections: (1) Introduction; (2) Standard examples and their general features; (3) Berry’s paradox in more detail; (4) General solutions; (5) Solutions concerning descriptions; (6) A paradox of Hilbert and Bernays; (7) Conclusion; and Appendix: Another solution to the paradox of Hilbert and Bernays.

{For the entire collection see [MR2382224 \(2008i:03006\)](#)}

Reviewed by *Jaime Nubiola*

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MR2276845 (2007j:03037) 03B65 (03A05)

Asher, Nicholas (1-TX)

Things and their aspects.

Philosophy of language, 1–23, *Philos. Issues*, 16, *Blackwell*, Boston, MA, 2006.

In this impressive paper a careful analysis of the semantics of sentences with “as” phrases (“Superman as Superman always gets more dates than Superman as Clark Kent does”) is provided. The study involves a discussion of the semantics of attitude contexts, predication, types theory and the properties, essential or contingent, involved in the phrases with “as”.

The author provides a sketch of a type-driven theory of predication to deal with these intriguing contexts. He concludes that “this semantic analysis of ‘as’ phrases is compositional, avoids the problems of the New Puzzle and explains why proper names behave strangely in otherwise