

no advantage of us in this respect. If realists have disproved certain arguments for the dependence of reality upon knowledge, they have not thereby established the independence of reality. If the realist be right, and idealism essentially subjectivistic, it must, to be sure, renounce its claim to a critical foundation. But it would still remain a consistent dogma, and as good as any other.

If it is taken to be the case that realism has undermined the idealist's *proofs* that the logical relations hold among reals because reality is relative to a legislative reason, still the idealistic contention is as probable as any. The realist can not disprove the assertion. He can never catch a reality out of relation to human reason, in order to discover if it still maintains its conformity to logical principles. That the logical relations are found among things does not make realism any more probable. For if to be real means to conform to certain categorical modes of thinking, then it will be an identical proposition which asserts that these principles state the relations of real things. The realist can only set up his own counter assertion and return to the business of demolishing the opponent's proofs. Thus we might conceivably be presented with dogmatic idealism and dogmatic realism as equally consistent and equally unproved doctrines; and the choice between them might, then, turn upon pragmatic considerations of workability or temperamental preferences.

If the realist can advance no direct proof that reality not only may be, but *is* independent of knowledge, that the independently real not only might not be, but *is not* altered when it enters the knowledge relation, that reality not only may be, but *is* so finely divided that analysis can never misrepresent it,—and so on for his other contentions,—then his arguments must necessarily be confined to the refutation of the proofs of other theories. In that event his case can prosper only if he turns philosophy into a Donnybrook Fair and hits every non-realistic head that shows. Even so, he will not prove his case, but only establish its possible truth,—the impossibility of proving the opposite. If this is the utmost that can be hoped from a philosophic theory, it is well that we should recognize it, and pay our respects to Hume.

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## DISCUSSION

### THE ANTILOGISM—AN EMENDATION

WHEN I wrote my paper on logic<sup>1</sup> in which I strongly urge the use of the symmetrical forms of speech and of reasoning, "no *a* is *b*," "some *a* is *b*," "is-inconsistent-with," etc., I adopted

<sup>1</sup>"Studies in Logic by Members of the Johns Hopkins University."

the plan, occasionally, as an abbreviation, of writing simply the symbol for "is excluded from," instead of "is-excluded-from *everything*." This can be safely done, because the other special term of logic, "nothing," or "the non-existent," does not occur with this copula. But I do not now approve of this device, and I write for the antilogism (inconsistent triad)

$$(a \nabla \bar{b})(c \nabla \bar{b})(a \vee c) \nabla \infty,$$

instead of the form quoted by Dr. Karl Schmidt,<sup>2</sup> in which the sign  $\infty$ , meaning "existent things" or "possible states of things" is omitted. For example, take this imaginary case of rebuttal (or inconsistency): "No priests are saints." "But some priests are martyrs, and there are no martyrs who are not saints." With this *but* it is affirmed (correctly) that these three statements can not all be true at once—that their conjunction is-excluded-from "all possible states of things," or from  $\infty$ . In terms of  $a$ ,  $b$ , and  $c$ ,<sup>3</sup> one may construct this: "Nothing that's acid is blue." "But some cold things are blue, and nothing that is cold is non-acid." This antilogism is quite as intuitively evident as the syllogism, although it contains four terms and two negative propositions. All the fifteen valid modes of syllogism can be immediately put into this form, and the rule for validity is self-evident.<sup>4</sup>

To take another example: That no human beings are immortal and no angels are mortal *precludes* any angels being human. Here the copula of the compound statement occurs farther within, and no existence-term is necessary:

$$(h \nabla \bar{m})(a \nabla m) \nabla (a \vee h).$$

The formula says: "*precludes that* any angels (some angels) are human," but rhetoric has a strong *penchant* for turning the verb of a subordinate proposition into a verbal noun.

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## REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

*The Realm of Ends or Pluralism and Theism.* The Gifford Lectures delivered in the University of St. Andrews in the Years 1907-10. JAMES WARD. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. Cambridge, England: University Press. 1911.

"These lectures are intended to serve as a sequel to the course delivered in the University of Aberdeen some ten years previously. If at that

<sup>2</sup> This JOURNAL, Vol. IX., page 668.

<sup>3</sup> See *Philosophical Review*, Vol. XXI., page 651.

<sup>4</sup> *Philosophical Review*, XXI., page 648.