Paloma Pérez-Ibuzz and Jaime Nubiola (eds.)

**Pragmatismo Hispánico**

*Anuario Filosófico*, volume XL/2, 2007

*Anuario Filosófico* is a Spanish journal published by the Department of Philosophy at the University of Navarra, which houses the internationally recognized Peirce Studies Group (*Grupo de Estudios Peirceanos*). This special issue of *Anuario Filosófico*, edited by Paloma Pérez-Ibuzz and Jaime Nubiola, is entitled “Pragmatismo Hispánico,” and is devoted to American Pragmatism’s influence on Hispanic philosophy and thought. It includes ten essays in Spanish by leading experts on Pragmatism in the US, such as Susan Haack, and by Spanish-speaking philosophers with expertise in both American Pragmatism and Spanish philosophy, such as Jaime Nubiola.

The intended audience of this volume is the Spanish-speaking philosophical world. American Pragmatism has had an international audience from its inception, and it has found philosophical adherents in all parts of the world, including Spain and Latin America. In fact, we can find successful research programs on Pragmatism in many Spanish-speaking universities. Pragmatism has also had a history of being misunderstood, particularly by foreigners, as a simplistic and vulgar philosophy that can be reduced to “what is true is what is useful.” Moreover, the misunderstandings among the different versions of Pragmatism (e.g., Peirce’s, James’ and Dewey’s) have also been widespread. Therefore, greater elucidation of the minutiae of American Pragmatism
provides an indispensable service toward the goal of avoiding further misinterpretations and misunderstandings, particularly to foreign philosophers seeking to learn more about North America’s main philosophical school of thought. In this spirit, the volume opens with Rosa M. Mayorga’s “El pragmatismo: un nombre antiguo para nuevas maneras de pensar?” (“Pragmatism: An Old Name for New Ways of Thinking?”) and closes with Susan Haack’s “La legitimidad de la metafísica: El legado de Kant a Peirce, y el de Peirce a la filosofía de nuestros días” (“The Legitimacy of Metaphysics: Kant’s Legacy to Peirce, and Peirce’s to Philosophy Today”). The remaining eight articles provide evidence that there are important historical connections between Hispanic philosophy and American philosophy.

Mayorga’s title plays on James’s subtitle to his 1907 Pragmatism Lectures, “A New Name for an Old Way of Thinking.” Her central contention is that the current trend of some 21st century Pragmatist schools of thought are headed toward a new and different direction than that laid out by the founder of Pragmatism, Charles Sanders Peirce. According to Mayorga, modern “neo-pragmatists” such as Richard Rorty have their origin in the different conceptions of pragmatism expounded by Peirce’s colleagues and friends: William James, John Dewey, and F. C. S. Schiller. To better grasp the current and future evolution of Pragmatism, Mayorga proposes that we return to its origin, tracing the seeds of these current movements to the central differences between the original Pragmatists’ conceptions.

Mayorga’s article provides Spanish-speaking audiences an excellent summation of the central differences between Peirce’s conception of pragmatism and those of James, Dewey, and Schiller. She explains three of Peirce’s most important metaphysical doctrines: realism, evolutionary cosmology, and the categories, and she underscores Peirce’s desire to construct a scientific conception of metaphysics and the importance of thirdness in his philosophy. Mayorga highlights James’ pragmatic doctrines that ushered him toward nominalism and away from the realistic conception intended by Peirce. At the same time, Mayorga provides a perspicuous description of how James’ pragmatism approximates Peirce’s, and how their views can be said to be connected by a common and general thread that bridges all conceptions of Pragmatism. Mayorga goes on to argue that Peirce was even more uncomfortable with Dewey’s instrumentalism and Schiller’s humanism as conceptions of Pragmatism, highlighting briefly where their views strongly disagree. Given the nuisances that surround contemporary pragmatic views and the confusion caused by so many and diverse “Pragmatic” philosophies, Mayorga’s clarifications of where the seeds from which these differences stem, provide an invaluable service to the future of Pragmatism in the Spanish-speaking philosophical world.
In the second article, “El punto de partida de la filosofía en Risieri Frondizi y el pragmatismo” (“Risieri Frondizi and Pragmatism on the Starting Point of Philosophical Inquiry”), Gregory F. Pappas engages the connection between Latin American Philosophy and American Pragmatism through the philosophy of Risieri Frondizi (1910–1983). Frondizi was born in Argentina and is one of the most prominent Latin American philosophers who had close ties with American Pragmatism. He studied at Harvard University under Alfred North Whitehead and C. I. Lewis, acquiring firsthand knowledge of the tenets of American Pragmatism. Pappas cogently argues that Frondizi is one of the most important connections and liaisons of American pragmatism to the Hispanic world. In addition, he argues that Frondizi adopts central pragmatic doctrines that become the foundation for his own philosophical system. Pappas focuses on two central doctrines of classical American Pragmatism: (1) its critique of modern rationalism’s (i.e., Descartes’) starting point, and (2) its view that experience is the foundation for philosophical investigation.

Pappas’ article demonstrates that there are important connections between some areas of Latin American philosophy and North American philosophy. For instance, Pappas compares and contrasts the American Pragmatists’ and Frondizi’s general description of experience, highlighting five elements that they share: (1) ontological wholeness and indivisibility, (2) the social aspect of experience, (3) experience as a process, (4) the diversity and practical aspect of experience, and (5) experience as situational. These shared elements help demonstrate Pappas’ thesis that Frondizi’s philosophy has an important historical connection with classical American Pragmatism. Pappas’ article will not only change Latin American philosophers’ conception of American Pragmatism but also motivate them to study it as an important part of the evolution of their own thought.

Fernando Zalamea in “Mariano Picón Salas: triangulaciones del lugar Americano 1030–1950” (“Mariano Picón Salas: Triangulations of American Space 1030–1950”) demonstrates that the philosophical works of the Venezuelan philosopher Mariano Picón Salas (1901–1965) amplifies the dualistic dialectic between Europe and Latin America to a triangular dialectic between Europe, the US and Latin America. According to Zalamea, this more global perspective is central to Picón Salas’ philosophical view and for the development of an authentic Latin American philosophy. Picón Salas argues that national identity requires an oscillation between local and global perspectives. In the case of Latin America, he views the triangular dialectic between Europe, Latin America and North America as the universal perspective. In addition, he argues that the consequence of an implicit or explicit dialogue between Latin America and the US is the inevitable filtration of American
pragmatic philosophical doctrines and scientific methodology into Latin American thought and culture.

Eduardo Armenteros, in “Ortega y el espíritu del 98. El pragmatismo como transfonda: Ortega, Maeztu y Baroja” (“Ortega and the Spirit of 98. Pragmatism in the Background: Ortega, Maeztu, and Baroja”), argues that the evolution of José Ortega y Gasset’s (1883–1855) philosophy was influenced by American Pragmatism, which Ortega knew through the works of William James and John Dewey. Armenteros demonstrates this thesis by analyzing Ortega’s interactions with other Spanish intellectuals of Generation of ‘98, particularly Ramiro Maeztu (1875–1936) and Pío Baroja (1872–1956). Generation of ’98 were a group of Spanish novelists, poets and philosophers who were young men or adolescents in 1898, during the Spanish-American War. They marked a resurgent intellectual flourishing in Spain that lasted until the Spanish Civil War in 1936.

Armenteros argues that Ortega frames his encounter with pragmatism in two contexts: (1) within the political and social problems of Spain, and (2) within a theory of truth. He argues that an analysis of the ongoing philosophical polemic among Ortega, Maeztu, and Baroja reveals a trend in Ortega’s philosophy from idealism toward pragmatism. Armenteros explains how Ortega’s idealism slowly metamorphoses into a brand of pragmatism, particularly within his later philosophical anthropology. For instance, in Ortega’s critique of Baroja’s anthropological pragmatism, Ortega conceives happiness and unhappiness as resting on human action and inaction, respectively. For Ortega the meaningful life becomes a life of action and not a life of contemplation, a reversal of his earlier view of the supremacy of reason over will.

The next three essays deal with the Spanish philosopher Eugenio d’Ors (1881–1954) and the influence of American Pragmatism in his philosophy. In “William James en Eugenio d’Ors” (“William James in Eugenio d’Ors”), Antonino González and Jaime Nubiola argue that of all the Spanish philosophers d’Ors was the one who most openly professed his indebtedness to American Pragmatism, particularly the pragmatism of William James. González and Nubiola critically assess d’Ors’ philosophical works, providing textual evidence of James’ influence on d’Ors’ thought. Particular attention is devoted to the encounter d’Ors had with James in 1910 in Paris. The study divides d’Ors’ work into four stages: (1) 1906–1910, (2) 1911–1921, (3) 1921–1940, and (4) 1941–1954. González and Nubiola illustrate how from the beginning d’Ors desired not only to embrace pragmatism but to overcome it in certain respects.

According to González and Nubiola, d’Ors first encounter with American Pragmatism can be traced back to 1907 while working as a correspondent for La Veu de Catalunya in Paris. At this early stage of his career, he not only acknowledges James’ pragmatism but defines him-
self as a pragmatist. In 1908 he attended the III International Philosophical Conference in Heidelberg in which pragmatism was a central topic of discussion, and he produced two articles that stem from his attendance of the conference. The first article illustrates d’Ors’ familiarity with the most prominent pragmatists of his time and in particular with James’ works *The Will to Believe* (1897), *The Varieties of Religious Experience* (1902) and *Pragmatism: a New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking* (1907). In the second article, d’Ors presents a severe criticism of James’ attempt to treat religion within the domain of the science of psychology. This article shows that d’Ors had a deep understanding of Jamesian pragmatism. Even though d’Ors, from the inception of his philosophical reflections, believed that philosophy required the overcoming of Pragmatism, James’ Pragmatism remained a springboard for his mature post-pragmatic philosophical view called *seny*. González and Nubiola uncover numerous other texts that unequivocally demonstrate d’Ors’ deep understanding of James’ pragmatism and the strong influence it had on his writings.

In the essay, “El pragmatismo en el pensamiento de Eugenio d’Ors” (“Pragmatism in the Thought of Eugenio d’Ors”), Marta Torregrosa, highlights the important texts that manifests d’Ors’ pragmatic influence, explains d’Ors’ “post-pragmatic” project, and analyzes the most relevant philosophical affinities between d’Ors’ and Peirce’s philosophy. According to Torregrosa, d’Ors embraced a version of pragmatism in which science and truth where directly linked to consequences and utility. However, d’Ors found this insufficient for explaining science, its methods, and human intelligence. He argued that there was an aesthetic dimension to scientific inquiry and human intelligence that traditional pragmatism failed to account for, and as a result misrepresented reality. He argued that this aesthetic side of human intelligence is derived from human “curiosity” (*curiosidad*) and from an instinct of playful logic that “invents and proposes new possibilities” (p. 381). This playful human curiosity can be a stronger motivator for inquiry than practical affairs, and thus can take priority over these in scientific methodology.

In the essay “La idea de ciencia de Eugenio d’Ors: un enfoque ‘post-pragmático’” (“The Idea of Science of Eugenio d’Ors: A ‘Postpragmatic’ Approach”), Paloma Pérez-Izarbe analyzes d’Ors’ philosophy of science, assessing his project’s goal of transcending positivism and pragmatism. Pérez-Izarbe begins with a brief account of the basic categories of d’Ors’ conception of science and how these help transcend a pragmatic conception of science, which d’Ors understands as having the goal of solving practical problems. First, d’Ors argues that his conception of play and curiosity can help provide a broader and more genuine conception of the goal of scientific inquiry. Second, he argues that scientific inquiry not only strives to resolve practical issues that are useful
for our survival and flourishing, but also it tries to gain a deeper understanding of the causes of things that have no advantage for our survival or flourishing. This deeper knowledge, which is sought for its own sake, is driven by the instinct of curiosity. Moreover, it is this sort of knowledge that permits science to advance and progress even when all our basic necessities are met. Third, d’Ors’ scientific method includes a conception of forming hypothesis that stems from logical as well as adventurous or speculative (aventura) considerations. The similarity to Peirce’s conception of abduction is so striking that a study of the two deserves to be explored in its own right. Fourth, d’Ors argues that justification in the sciences ought to be approached with what he calls “an attitude of irony.” The central idea behind such an attitude is that it never treats scientific conclusions as final; rather, as soon as a conclusion has been established the attitude of irony begins to attempt to disprove it. Here, too, there are some striking similarities between d’Ors’ attitude of irony and Peirce’s conception of fallibility. Finally, for d’Ors, objectivity of reality is obtained through the more creative elements of scientific inquiry and not through the more logical ones. In addition, the social character of science is indispensable for approaching objectivity. Parts of this social character are the on-going activities of dialogue and critique, which constitute important methodological elements that guide scientific inquiry toward truth.

In “El pragmatismo de Unamuno” (“Unamuno’s Pragmatism”) Izaskun Martínez presents compelling arguments that Miguel de Unamuno’s (1864–1936) philosophy was influenced by the works of the American pragmatist William James. Martínez challenges Pelayo H. Fernandez’s thesis in Miguel de Unamuno y William James: Un paralelo pragmático (“Miguel de Unamuno and William James: A Parallel Pragmatist”) that Unamuno’s pragmatism was original and was not influenced by William James’. Martínez begins by reconstructing Fernandez’s main arguments and showing that they are insufficient for supporting his thesis. For instance, one of Fernandez’s arguments is that the differences between Unamuno and James are so radical that it is unlikely that the latter could have had any influence on the former. Martínez concedes that there are significant differences between Unamuno and James, such as their national and cultural origins, their religious formation and affiliation, their personalities and character, their education, and their life experience. Nevertheless, Martínez correctly points out that these differences do not support Fernandez’s central thesis that James’s philosophy had no influence on the essence of Unamuno’s thought. Martínez argues that despite their differences, their philosophical projects dealt with similar universal subject matters such as God, belief, faith, and human existence. Martínez also offers evidence, contrary to Fernandez’s arguments, that given the dates of the publication of James’s works and development of
Unamuno’s thought, there existed ample opportunity in which the latter could have read and been influenced by the former.

Martínez does not only present negative arguments undermining Fernández’s thesis, she also provides positive evidence. Two themes that both philosophers consider essential are belief and immortality. The question of our immortality, the desire for immortality, and the anxiety of death with the possibility of overcoming it play an essential part in Unamuno’s philosophy. Martínez claims that Unamuno was influenced by James’ idea that God is the being responsible for our immortality and therefore that the belief in the existence of God has significant practical consequences for our individual lives. Martínez’s arguments are persuasive and support the thesis that Unamuno’s pragmatism was in part influenced by William James, more so than has been acknowledged hitherto. Her essay makes a substantial contribution toward research that demonstrates connections between American pragmatism and Spanish philosophy.

Carlos Ortiz de Landázuri in “Las fuentes hispanas de la noción pragmática de creencia a través de d’Ors, Ortega, Unamuno y Ganivet” (“Hispanic Sources of the Pragmatic Notion of Belief, through, d’Ors, Ortega, Unamuno, and Ganivet”) traces the development of a pragmatic notion of belief from d’Ors and Ortega (1883–1955) to Ángel Ganivet (1865–1898) and Unamuno, showing the evolutionary process of this central Spanish philosophical doctrine. A central thread that united these Spanish thinkers was their opposition toward the European anti-humanistic scientific attitude, as well as their intent to offer a different solution than that offered by Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology and hermeneutics.

De Landázuri argues that, as a response to this European anti-humanistic crisis, the Spanish philosophers of the generation 1914 (and even of the generation 1898) fostered an anthropological-cultural and historical-social transformation of the pragmatic conception of belief. De Landázuri provides a detailed analysis of how this transformation occurred, beginning with the philosophy of d’Ors and showing the latter’s dependency on the philosophy of Ortega. Moreover, De Landázuri contends that the roots of both d’Ors’ and Ortega’s pragmatic tendencies can be traced to Ganivet and Unamuno. De Landázuri argues that even though there were many foreign fountains of influence on the development of the Spanish pragmatic conception of belief (e.g., Kant, Spinoza, James, Socrates, and the Cynics) as well as similar parallel developments in other countries (e.g., James in the United States), its essential character was peculiarly Spanish, because its framing of the anti-human crisis took place within the particularities of Spanish culture.

In the final essay, “La legitimidad de la metafísica: El legado de Kant a Peirce, y el de Peirce a la filosofía de nuestros días,” is a translation of Susan
Haack’s “The Legitimacy of Metaphysics: Kant’s Legacy to Peirce, and Peirce’s to Philosophy Today,” which appeared the year before in Hans Lenk and Reiner Wiehl (eds.), *Kant Today* (Münster: LIT Verlag, 2006). In her discussion of Peirce and Kant, Haack argues that Peirce’s reply to the anti-metaphysical positivism of his day is comparable to Kant’s reply to Hume’s anti-metaphysical arguments. She goes on to argue that Peirce’s reply transcends Kant’s, insofar as Peirce offers a re-conceptualization of post-Kantian metaphysics that is scientifically rigorous enough to endure and progress as a respectable science. Haack describes Peirce’s metaphysical project as beginning where Kant left off, and like Kant and Aristotle, basing his metaphysics on logic. However, unlike Kant, Peirce’s interest focuses more on cosmological and psychological related subjects, and less on God, freedom, and immortality. Two elements are crucial for Peirce: first is the pragmatic maxim which delineates the content of a scientific conception of metaphysics; and second is Peirce’s direct realism and the elimination of representation as the immediate object of our perception. According to Peirce, what we perceive are things themselves and the events that surround us, and not sense data. These two reformation of Kant’s metaphysics usher Peirce into a view he calls “Critical Common-sensism.” Unlike Kant, Peirce’s metaphysics is a posteriori science, like the specialized sciences, except that its object of study has a general character. Its method should also coincide with the method of other sciences, employing a scientific attitude, a scientific method, experience, and reason.

Haack gives a clear and thorough presentation of the central elements of Peirce’s metaphysics, from Peirce’s purpose of making metaphysics a respectable science, to his pragmatic maxim, realism, critical common-sensism, universal categories, synechism, tychism, objective idealism, and the scientific method. Haack’s intention in expounding Peirce’s philosophy is not only to give a historical account of it but also to use it as a springboard for the future advancement of metaphysics. The metaphysical path construed by Peirce (a path that has been largely forgotten and ignored), Haack argues, is the pathway with the best chances for the future progress of the science of metaphysics. Kant’s legacy to Peirce is that metaphysics can be a valuable science, and Peirce’s legacy to us is the methodology by which to pursue it.

Overall this volume makes four important contributions to American pragmatism. First, Mayorga’s and Haack’s essays further the understanding and clarify many of the misunderstandings of what Pragmatism is and the differences among the diverse versions of Pragmatism for Spanish-speaking philosophers. Second, the remaining eight articles demonstrate that there are real, historical connections between Hispanic and American philosophy, connections that contain a wealth of knowledge about the evolution of philosophical thought in Spain and Latin America. Third, some essays have shown that some of the conceptions of prag-
matism developed in Spanish-speaking countries offered original insights and unique views, transcending the views offered by American Pragmatism. As a consequence, this volume should spark an interest for further research on Spanish and Latin American Pragmatism in its own right, and as a school of thought that can contribute to the future development of pragmatic philosophies. Finally, this volume will help promote American Pragmatism, and its future study and investigation in the Spanish-speaking world.

Bernardo J. Cantens
Moravian College
bcantens@moravian.edu