

Lecture I. The principal objects of this course of Lectures are two, of which one involves the other. The one, upon which which the majority of those present bestows but a languid and formal interest, is that of determining what a reasonable mind of our day ought to think of religion. I say there is generally but a languid interest in that because the greater part of thinking men in our day make it practically an assumption which must be granted before they will listen to any reasoning, that there is no God, or that we can know nothing of ~~any~~ such a Being; while the remainder, who have undergone ^{true} religious experience, — such as once experienced remains forever as the most real of all experiences, do not care at all about reasonings which skim the surface of the truth and which are abhorrent to them owing to their arrogant and insane pretension that God cannot expect to have a standing in their court until ~~he~~ he has proved Himself submissive to their jurisdiction.

I must confess then that between these two parties,

an innocent inquiry that really takes no side at all
in advance, must be looked on as lukewarm and
weak by almost everybody. Yet that is just my
position. Because I do not howl or ~~screech~~ screech
on either side, nor view either side with arrogant
disdain from the outset, I am a wholly insignificant
person to those who are moved only by vehemence
or by assumptions of superiority.

There are thirteen arguments, or types of arguments,
to prove the existence of a God. Each of them in being
advanced is commonly accompanied by a frank admission
that all the other twelve are fallacious; while the majority
of students of philosophy of our time who have endeavored
to make a science out of philosophy, have pronounced
to whole hakers' dozen "no good". These historians of
philosophy that have deigned to take notice of your
humble servant, - quite unnecessarily, as it seems
to me, - have set me down as a "sceptic" or a "modern
Hume". Well, the ^{quandis} opinion of this modern Hume is that
the agnostic philosophers of our time have been
dominated by a determination of the will not to
allow any argument to be good that could possibly
conclude the existence of God. And as for those
philosophers who substitute the term "Absolute" for

God, - in my opinion whether there be an Absolute or
not, it is nothing like God. For my part, I do not
think there is one of the thirteen arguments I have
spoken of which does not merit a cautious consid-
eration. I do not attach much value to men's
prepossessions one way or the other. I desire to get
at the truth of the matter, as far as I can, ⁱⁿ whatever ^{side} ~~way~~
that truth may be.

The only way is to make a calm, thorough, and systematic
examination of the strength of the modes of reasoning used;
and for this purpose it will be necessary, to make a
systematic examination of the values of all the different
kinds of reasoning; with which work therefore I shall
commence. Only that in lectures of this kind it will,
as a matter of common sense, be requisite to pass over
~~very~~ complicated ~~matters~~ reasonings, stating their con-
clusions and indicating in what manner anybody can
set himself down to the task of verifying them.

So much for the first of two purposes of this course.
The other purpose is to examine the conditions that make
reasonings trustworthy, a work which is requisite, in
any case, in order to fulfill the first purpose; but
which should be recognized as very important apart from
that purpose. For in these days, such prestige has attached
to the name of science, that an immense variety of
researches or pretended researches have claimed to be

scientific, when in fact there is room to doubt whether⁴ they are veritably of the same nature as that scientific thought to which the history of civilization has brought such immense prestige; and the question will best be put in the form of whether the proceedings of such processes of research conform to the conditions of successful research.

Thus of the two purposes of this course the second is to find the conditions of sound scientific reasoning, while the first purpose is, in view of these conditions and in view of whatever sound reasoning there maybe that is not admissible into science, to say what intellectual trust we may reasonably accord to the promptings of the religious instinct.

Of course, I necessarily begin with the second problem, that of the validity of reasonings in general. Now there are three kinds of reasoning & three only. I pass over the proof of this as I must in this course pass over the proofs of the majority of my propositions, though I shall ~~little~~ furnish hints sufficient for finding these proofs. The three kinds of reasoning may be designated by the letters A, B, C.

A is that process in which the mind goes over all the facts of the case, absorbs them, digests them, sleeps over them, assimilates them, dreams of them, and finally is prompted

I deliver them in a form, which, if it adds something to them,
does so only because the addition serves to render ~~the~~
~~it~~ intelligible what without it, is unintelligible. I have
hitherto called this kind of reasoning which issues in
explanatory hypotheses and the like, abduction, because
I see reason I think that this is what Aristotle intended
to denote by ~~the~~ corresponding Greek ~~term~~ term
Ἀναγωγή in the 25th chapter of the 2nd Book of his Analytics
although the text as it stands, owing as I conjecture to a
blunder at its first blundering editor Apellicon, in sub-
stituting ^{a single} ~~one~~ wrong word for ~~all~~ word rendered illegible
by the work of insects, gives Ἀναγωγή a totally different meaning.
But since this, after all, is only conjectural, I have on reflection
decided to give this kind of reasoning the name of retroduction
to imply that it turns back and leads from the consequent
of an admitted consequence, to its antecedent. Observe, if
you please, the difference of meaning between a consequent
the thing led to, and a consequence, the general fact by virtue
of which a given antecedent leads to a ~~given~~ certain consequent.
This distinction between consequens and consequentia was
invariably observed by the strict logicians of the Middle
Ages. The consequent is what follows from the antecedent.
The consequence is the general state of things by virtue of which
that particular consequent ^{logically} follows from that particular antecedent
state of things. The eternal principle that if a woman be
well dressed her soul will be serene is the consequence
the serenity of any well dressed woman is the consequent
derived from it. The process of reasoning by which