

For the purposes of this inquiry a Sign may be defined as
a Medium for the communication of a Form. It is not ^{logically} neces-
sary that anything possessing consciousness, that is, feeling
of the peculiar common quality of all our ~~cases~~ feeling should
● be concerned. But it is necessary that there should be two,
if not three, quasi-minds, meaning things capable of varied deter-
mination as to forms of the kind communicated.

As a medium, the Sign is essentially in a triadic

relation, to ~~its~~ Object which determines it, and to its Interpretant which it determines. In its relation to the Object, the Sign is passive; that is to say, its ~~not~~ correspondence to the Object is brought about by an effect upon the sign, the Object remaining unaffected, ~~a circumstance otherwise expressed~~
 ● ~~by saying that the Object is real~~. On the other hand, in its relation to the interpretant the sign is active, determining the interpretant without being itself thereby affected.

But at this point certain distinctions are called for. That

which is communicated from the Object through the Sign to the Interpretant is a Form; that is to say, it is nothing like an existent, but is a power, ~~is~~ is the fact that something would happen under certain conditions. This Form is really embodied in the object, ^{meaning that the conditional relation which constitutes the form is true of the object} ~~but it is only~~ in the Sign ^(it is embodied) only in a representative

● sense, ^{-meaning} ~~that is~~ that ^{whether by virtue of whether} ~~by virtue, it may be~~ of some real modification of the Sign, or ~~maybe~~ otherwise, the Sign becomes endowed with the power of communicating it to an interpretant. It may be in the interpretant directly, as it is in the Object, or it may

be in the Interpretant dynamically, as ~~something like~~ the behavior of the Interpretant (this happens when a military officer uses the sign "Halt!" or "Forward march!" and his men simply obey him, perhaps automatically) or it may be in the Interpretant ~~also~~ ^{likewise} only representatively. In existential graphs the Interpretant is

● affected in the last way; but for the present, it is best to consider only the common characters of all signs.


which is communicated from the Object through the Sign to the Interpretant is a Form, ~~that is to say~~. It is not a singular thing; for if a Singular thing were first in the Object and afterward in the Interpretant outside the Object, it must thereby cease to be in the Object. The Form that is communicated does not necessarily cease to be in one thing when it

comes to be in a different thing, because its being is the being of a predicate. ^{The Form is} ~~The being of a form consists in the truth of a conditional proposition.~~ ^{Under given circumstances, something would be true.} ~~To say that it is in the Object,~~ ^{one may say, entitatively meaning} that that conditional relation, or following of consequent upon reason, which constitutes the Form is literally true of the Object. In the Sign, the Form may or may not

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be embodied entitatively, but it must be embodied representatively, that is,
that is, in respect to the Form communicated, the sign produces upon the
interpretant an effect similar to that which the Object itself would under
favorable circumstances.

¹⁰ rank, when the subjects are expressed by selectives, their order is a matter of consequence, thus,

~~"any man praises some horse to any woman"~~ is
 any man & any woman praises some horse






"any man praises to any woman some horse"

$\Pi_i \Sigma_k \Pi_k$
 $m_i + p_{ijk} \cdot h_j$

is a man

$m_i + (w_k + p_{ijk}) \cdot h_j$



is a man
promises to is a woman
is a horse

is a man
pr
is a horse

is a man
promises to is a woman
is a horse

11 might define a sign thus:

A sign would be a *Primum Secundum* to something termed its Object and if anything ~~is~~^{were to be} in a certain relation to the sign called ~~into~~ being Interpretant to it, the Sign actively determines the Interpretant to be itself in a relation to the same Object, corresponding to its own.

[illegible]

^T *Schedes*

variation of known necessarily variation often fusion	variation of general necessarily variation of objects
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A Sign is anything, A, in a genuine triadic
relation to something, B, called its 'Object'
^{to a purely relative sign}

(1)

and to

A Sign is anything, A, ~~which is in a relation~~

to other characters of its own, ⁽²⁾ stands in a

dyadic relation ^{active} to a purely ~~active~~ ^{active} cor-

relate, B, and is also in a triadic

relation to B for a purely ^{passive} ~~passive~~ cor-

relate, C, this triadic relation being such as

to determine C to be in a relation, g, to B,

the relation g corresponding in a neces-

sary way to the relation r. In the ^{medium of signifying that} which

stands, B is said to be ^{active} in the ^{stand}

stand, ~~that~~ the characters ^{of B} which are ^{immedi-}

~~stand~~ ^{are essential to} its ~~stand~~ in the dyadic relation to A would

be long ^{just the same even if A did not exist}

* In instance, ~~the~~ the sentence "let ~~be~~

"Socrates of Melipolis" be our designation of the ~~phenon~~

we may regard either variously regard as B, either the

phenon or the writer's solemnization, etc. In any case

however which is essential to the relation of between the

sentence and B is the writer's solemnization of mind to

have the ~~phenon~~ called the ~~sign~~ of Melipolis. This

denotation would be the ~~sign~~ however whether

expressed in the sentence or not. And the subsequent

" might define a sign as follows:

A "Sign" is a genuinely genuine Tertian. It would generally be Priman in some characters, called its "Material Characters." But in addition, it is essentially (if only formally) Second to something termed its "Real Object," which is purely active in the Secundarity, being immediately unmodified by this Secundarity; and the characters of the Real Object which are essential to the identity of the Sign constitute an ens rationis called the "Immediate Object." Moreover, the Sign is conceived adapted to being Third to its Immediate Object for an ens rationis constituted thereby in the same (generic) relation to that Object in which the Sign itself stands to the same; and this Third is termed the "Intended Interpretant;" but the

11 might define a sign as follows:

A Sign would be in some respects Primary, and its determinations as Primary are called its Material Characters, But in addition it is ~~Secundum~~ ^{to what is termed its Real} ~~to a purely active~~ Object, which is altogether ^{active, and} immediately undetermined and unmodified by this Secundarity, and ^{in so far as the Sign is second to it, it determines the Immediate Object} ~~this Secundarity is such that the Sign is intended or adapted as virtually or supposedly adapted to determining~~

~~something to be and to be~~ The Sign is Third conceivedly adapted ^{in so far} to being Third to its Immediate Object for something ^{termed its} Intended Interpretant; and the Sign only functions as such so far as the Intended Interpretant is Second to it for an actual Interpretant which thus becomes adapted ^{become} to be a sign of the Immediate Object [?] for a further intended Interpretant, and in so far as the Interpretant is such Third it is termed the Reflex Interpretant.

tant to be in a corresponding relation thereto it does not
 thereby itself cease to be in that relation to its object. But
 we must distinguish the Object as it is represented, which is called
 the Immediate Object, from the Object as it is in itself. The latter is
 purely active in the representation. That is, it remains in all
 respects exactly as it was before it was represented. It is true
 that the purpose of representing an Object is usually, if not
 always, to modify it in some respect. But by the Object itself ^{or}
 ● the Real Object, i.e.
 I mean the Object in so far as it is not modified by being repre-
 sented.

I formerly defined Logic as the study of the general conditions of
 the reference of Symbols to their Objects (i.e. their Real Objects)
 But I now think, in the first place, that it is better to give the sub-

11 might define a sign as follows:

A "Sign" would be in some respects *Priman*, and its determinations as such are called its "Material Characters." But in addition, it is *Second* to something termed its "Real Object," which is purely active, being immediately unmodified by this *Secundarity*; and in so far as the sign is *Second* to it, it is termed the "Immediate Object" thereof. The Sign is conceivedly adapted to being *Third* to its Immediate Object for something which should thereby be brought into the ^(generically) same dyadic relation to that Object in which the Sign itself stands to that Object; and this *Third* is called the "Intended Interpretant"; but the Sign functions as such only in so far as the Intended Interpretant is *Second* to it and is *Third* to it for an existent termed the "Actual Interpretant," the modes of

fect the slight extension needed to make it cover all kinds of signs. I called the study of the ~~real~~ reference of symbols to their meanings Speculative Grammar, which is only a generalization of what has otherwise been so called a Trivium. I called the study of the reference of signs to their Interpretants Speculative Rhetoric. But since ~~the~~ the whole Speculative Trivium calls at present for the study of pretty much the same problems, and since many of the best German logicians chiefly combine them ~~belong~~ to Speculative Grammar, I think instead of calling it Trivium as I did it is better to call it Logic and to call the special branch I called Logic by the name of Logical Critic.

Now what is the difference between the Object of a Sign and its Interpretant?

Ma se le mie parole esser den' seme !

Then one might make such words as temar, terant, and there are the roots of $\Phi\eta\mu'$, far, affanice, with my word phaneron prophecy (which might suggest phesy) fabulation, and Anglo-Saxon banas. Also answer, swear, etc. Also testimony, witness, constatation, statement; and in short the wealth of stems about disposal is so prodigious that I have been treating them with mild prodigality.

● To signify that a person puts forth a sign whether vocal, ~~per~~ ocular, or by touch, — and conventional signs mostly are of one or other of these three kinds or by taste, smell, and the senses of temperature which are the media of many natural tests and symptoms, — I like the word utter. For that.

idea—
The transmission of thought potentiality ~~would make for~~ without any
conveyance of it into anything but ^{symbols} ~~signs~~; namely, into
action or ~~habit~~ ~~habit~~ habit of action, would not be signs
at all, since they would not, in the least, fulfill the
function of signs; and that, without embodiment in
something beside ~~signs~~ symbols, there could, according
to the principles of logic, ^{never} ~~not~~ be ^{the least} ~~any~~ growth of the
idea-potentiality.

which need not ^{have} ~~be~~, like the proposition, ~~of~~ the mode of being of
a general type. Thus a portrait of Frederick the Great with
Frederick's name written below it is a dicisign; but it is not a propo-
sition. ~~It is~~ The whole discussion of the logical nature of

- The different kinds of possible signs makes up the first
division of Logic, or Speculative Grammar. The second division,
Cyrtic, discusses the relation of signs to their objects, that is,
their Truth. The third division, Methodentic, discusses the
relations of signs to their interpreters, that is, their knowledge-
producing value.