On the Logical Nature of the Proposition.
By C. S. Peirce.

Mrs. Franklin's pointing out, in her lucid manner, that one and the same proposition may receive many forms of statement rejoices me, not only as a logician, but as a lover of logical English.

A statement is, properly, an act or the result of an act performed with a proposition. But the word 'statement' is not only, as Mrs. Franklin says, often applied to the proposition itself, but this noun, as well as the verb 'to state,' are currently, still worse abused to signify an act or the product of an act performed with a statement (in the proper sense); Namely, in such lingo 'statement' and 'state' are synonyms of assertion and assert. These distinctions are not 'minor points' in logic. For the question of what constitutes a proposition (in the logical sense — of the meaning of a statement,) is today perhaps the most actively disputed of all questions of logic. Now this is a problem of no little difficulty, at best; but it becomes a great deal more so when a proposition is confounded either with a statement, with an assertion, with a psychical act of judging, or with an act of assent. Some German logicians there are, notably Herbartians, who distinctly attach to the word Urtheil the signification that English logicians (after the scholastics) properly attach to the term word 'proposition'; but the majority of German logicians confound the Urtheil in that sense with the act or product of the act signified by the verb urtheilen. The effect of this is to blur the question of the essence of the proposition and to render it almost

meanwhile.

In order to show that the distinctions mentioned do facilitate the solution of this problem, as well as because the matter ~~may~~ is interesting in itself, I propose to state, as ~~briefly as~~ intelligibly can, my own opinion of the essence of the proposition. It would require too much space to set forth my reasons for adhering to it; and still less could I here notice all the objections to my theory which ~~that~~ I have taken into consideration. As to the theory itself, it seems to me quite likely that further studies will show that it is too simple; but I believe it to be a rough sketch of the true state of the case.

A sign is an object ~~which~~ capable of determining in a mind a cognition of an object, called the object of the sign. A sign is a species under the genus representamen. A representamen is an object, A, in such triadic relation to an object, B, for an object, C, (the italicized prepositions merely indicating a difference between the ~~two~~ dyadic relation of A to B, and that of A to C) that A is fit to ~~determine C to bring in the~~ create C by the determination of something, so that C shall be in the same triadic relation to A, and thereby (such is the peculiar nature of this triadic relation) to B, for some third object, C', determinable in the same manner, and so on ad infinitum.

X   In order to show that the distinctions mentioned facilitate the solution of that problem, and partly as matter interesting in itself, I will briefly state my own opinion as to the essence of the proposition. I could not, in a limited space, set forth my reasons for adhering to it; much less could I give the answers to the various objections to it which I have taken into consideration. As to the theory itself, I think it more likely than not that further studies will show that the matter is not so simple as I make it to be; but I believe that, as a rough sketch of the truth, it is correct.

pretant
        A sign is an object capable of determining in a mind an inter-cognition of an object called the object of the sign. A sign is a representamen; and the definition of a representamen does not refer to a mind. A representamen is an object, A, in such triadic relation to an object, B, for an object, C, (the italicized preposi-tions merely indicating a difference between the two relations) that it is fit to determine C to being in the same triadic relation to A, and thereby (owing to the peculiar nature of this triadic relation) to B, for some third object, C', determinable in the same manner, and so on ad infinitum. [In this definition I have employed the word "relation" for the sake of its familiarity. But I have always endeavored, as far as convenience allowed, to limit the word "relation" to a character of a set of subjects which may all be of the same category of being, and so I have found it advisable to confine my own studies