

INTRODUCTION.

§1 Impressions.

Intuition is a term, which by the consent of philosophers stands for immediate cognition; but what immediate cognition stands for is not quite so well settled. In its most approved sense, however, it means any mental representation which does not represent its object by representing another conscious representation of ^{the latter} it; in other words, it is that knowledge between which and the thing no other representation in consciousness intervenes. Unfortunately, this definition turns on the word consciousness, — ^{a saddle} ~~as a saddle~~ ^{an} equivocal expression, itself. Still, the modest acceptance of this term, to include the presentative character of all that is within us, is to be preferred both on the ground of usage and because it is the only way we have of expressing that most important conception. Thus interpreted, immediate cognition is the same as what is otherwise termed an ultimate fact; that is, a premise not itself a conclusion, an empirical constituent of knowledge not itself ^{containing} composed of non-empirical parts, in short, an impression.

Whether there be any such ultimate premises is a difficult question. It amounts, however, merely to this; whether the boundary of consciousness ~~is~~ in consciousness or out of it. In whichever way it be decided, the employment of a word to denote that boundary is legitimate.


No one can know what sort of an impression is like, in itself; for a recognized difference between two impressions would be a difference, be-

between them as compared, that is as mediately known, and not between them in themselves. An impression in itself is an uncomprehended impression, ^{absence} ~~therefore~~, an undifferentiated ^{sensation} ~~feeling~~, like the feeling of our heart's motion. Colour is sometimes given as an example of an impression. It is a bad one; because the simplest colour is almost as complicated as a piece of music. Colour depends upon the relations between different parts of the impression; and, therefore, the differences between colours are differences between harmonies; and to see this difference we must have the elementary impressions whose relation makes the harmony. So that colour is ~~far from~~ ^{not} being an impression, ~~but~~ ^{only} an inference.

Whatever part impressions play in our knowledge, ~~all must admit that~~ they ^{need} ~~require~~ to be reduced by the understanding to the unity of consistency and therefore to be combined, ^{not that} ~~not~~ by chaotic aggregation but in a determinate form. This form or way of combining impressions is an element of cognition not given in the impressions combined, but added to them in order to reduce them to the requisite unity. It is, therefore, a hypothetically adjoined element; for a hypothesis is something assumed in order to reduce an otherwise incomprehensible datum to unity. This element of cognition is termed conception.

We have, then, first an infinite manifold of points of impression upon the circumference of consciousness. Second, these are embraced into different groups by conceptions, and these conceptions by others until one conception is universal and embraces all. Third, if this conception

Has any manifoldness, it is itself subjected to another, and so on untill
Fourthly, all are subjected to the unity of consistency, or I think which is the
centre of consciousness.



[Note. §2 should come
after §4.]

§2. Precision, ~~and~~ Discrimination, & Dissociation.

Precision and abstraction are two terms for the same process; and are
now limited not merely to separation by the mind, but, to a particular
kind of mental separation, namely, that by attention to one point and neg-
lect of another. That which is attended to is said to be precinded; and that
which is neglected is said to be abstracted from. This definition should
be strictly adhered to, however narrowly it may limit the application of
the terms. Attention is a definite conception or subposition of one element of
consciousness, without any positive apprehension of the other.

Abstraction, therefore, ^{subposes} ~~requires~~ a greater distinction between its members
than discrimination which is the mere ^{recognition} ~~apprehension~~ of the difference
between the presence or absence of an element of cognition; but it exp-
poses less distinction than dissociation which is the consciousness of
one thing ^{necessarily} without the simultaneous consciousness of the other. Thus, I
can discriminate, red from blue, space from colour, & colour from space; but
not red from colour. I can precind, red from blue, and space from colour (as

is manifest from the fact that I actually believe that there is an uncoloured space between my face and the page, but I cannot prescind colour from space, nor red from colour. I can dissociate red from blue, but I cannot dissociate space from colour, colour from space, nor red from colour. In the following table O shows what I can hold and X what I cannot hold.

	blue without red	space without colour	colour without space	red without colour
By discrimination	O	O	O	X
By precision	O	O	X	X
By dissociation	O	X	X	X

If A can be discriminated or dissociated from B, B can also be separated from A, in the same ^{mode} way. But this precision is not thus reciprocal; ~~it seems~~ ^{but} on the contrary, ~~to be a general rule~~ ^{it is frequently the case.} that ~~if~~ ^{though} A cannot be prescinded from B, B can be prescinded from A. This ^{circumstance} ~~one-sidedness~~ is easily accounted for. Elementary conceptions only arise upon the occasion of experience; that is they ~~are produced~~ ^{are produced first time} ~~only arise~~ according to a general ~~rule~~ ^{law} the condition of which is the existence of certain impressions. Now if ~~the~~ conception ~~does~~ not reduce the impressions which it accompanies to unity, it would be a mere arbitrary addition to these ^{latter}, for there is no other ^{condition} ~~law~~ for the production of a conception except that it ^{shall} ~~make~~ ^{impressions} ~~certain~~ comprehensible. Now if the impressions

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Could be definitely conceived without the conception, the conception would not reduce them to unity. But attention is definite conception; therefore the impressions (or more immediate conceptions) cannot be attended to, to the neglect of an ^{elementary} ~~simple~~ conception which reduces them to unity. On the other hand, when such a conception has once been obtained, there is no reason why the premises which have occasioned it should not be neglected, and therefore the more immediate explaining conception may abstract from the more immediate ones and from the impressions.

§3. Substance.

Impression in general or as such, is itself by virtue of its generality not an impression but a conception. An impression does not so much as conceive itself to be an impression. It is an undifferentiated feeling whose vagueness is feebly shadowed forth by that ^{sense} feeling of dyspepsia which tinges our sentiments with melancholy without being directly noticed. Any reflection upon an ^{impression} ~~concept~~, since it is a step towards bringing it to ^{the} unity of consistency, is a conception. To say, therefore, that this or that is an ultimate fact or even that it is present or is a fact, begins to go beyond the immediate fact itself and to be a hypothesis. Hence the predicate of such a statement ^{or} what is present in general, is a hypothetical conception; that is, it cannot be applied to a subject without hypothesis. This predicate is the conception of the subject

as ~~proposition~~. The hypothetic character of that predicate, however, consists merely in the impressions being viewed subjectively or reflected upon as being present. Now this reflection does nothing more than enable ~~us~~ to ^{discriminate} the ~~character~~ of the fact from the fact itself; and therefore to say that "A is, ^{immediately} present" is merely to say that A can have attached to it a predicate, real or verbal. But as this predicate is left entirely indeterminate, and therefore what has been said of A is an empty form. It has, therefore, the form of hypothesis without its matter; it is the starting-goal of all hypothetic thought. This ~~conception~~ ^{conception} of the immediately present as such, since it implies merely that A is the subject of a proposition but not the predicate (since predicates are mediate determinations) is properly indicated by the term substance.

§4: Being.

When we can make a proposition, we understand the subject of it so far as the predicate indicates. Thus, when we say "man is intelligent," we have an understanding of man in respect to his mind. This is undoubtedly very confused in this instance, but the fact that it can only be made more distinct by predicating still more of man, shows that the unity to which the understanding reduces impressions is the unity of a proposition. This unity consists in the connection of the predicate with the subject; and introduces the conception of being, or that which is implied in the copula. The copula has two meanings, actually is and would be, as in the two

expressions "There is no griffin;" and "A griffin is an orange quadruped." But as both these propositions afford a ^{understanding} ~~comprehension~~ of their subjects, the meanings of the copulas should be comprehended under being.

Being introduces nothing into the thought; for "A griffin is or would be" means nothing. Hence, this conception is not materially hypothetical, ~~but~~ ^{it} is rather the end of all hypothesis - the accomplishment of that unity for which hypotheses are instituted. If we say, "The ink is black," the ink is the substance, from which its blackness has not been differentiated; ^{and} ~~the~~ ^{is} while it leaves the substance just as it was seen, explains its confusedness by the application of blackness to it, as a ^{hypothetical} predicate.

Though being does not affect the subject, it implies an indefinitely determinability of the predicate. ^{For} ~~thus~~, if one could know the copula and predicate of a proposition; as "... is a tailed-man," ~~it~~ ^{he} would know that the predicate applied to something ~~possible~~, at least. Accordingly, we have propositions whose subjects are entirely indefinite as "There is a beautiful ellipse," where the subject is something merely. But we have no propositions whose predicate is entirely indeterminate. For it would be quite senseless to say "It has the common characters of ^{all things} ~~members of the summum genus~~," since there are no such character. Hence, to say that a quality has being or finds being, means something; but to say that substance has being is absurd for it must cease.

to be substance before being or non-being, in the present sense, are applicable to it.

Thus substance & being are the two poles of thought. Substance is the beginning, being the end of all conception. Substance is inapplicable to a predicate, being is equally so to a subject.

§5 Method of Searching for the Categories.

Every conception is introduced for the purpose of bringing the manifold to unity; and in the case of an elementary conception this function is a condition of the possibility of the conception's arising. A universal conception is one which is applicable to every aggregate of impressions. ^{The end of such a conception is either} ~~it is~~ to unite the manifold of substance in general or to conjoin to ^{the latter} ~~substance~~ some conception necessary to its being brought to unity.

These facts afford the basis for a mode of ^{discovering all} searching out the universal ^{the manifold} conceptions which reduce substance to the unity of being. For if we begin with being and ask what it ^{conjoins} ~~unites~~ to substance, the answer will be easily obtained by ^{observing} ~~considering~~ the occasions of the introduction of being. Then the application of this conception to substance, which being joins to it, is the immediate ^{& condition} justification of the introduction of being, and is, therefore, the first conception in order in passing from being to substance. Now we may treat this conception in the same way in which we have treated being. That is, we may ask 1st what is the occasion of the introduction of this conception. 2nd What conception ^{which is joined} besides substance is required in such a state of cognition, ~~and~~

to substance by the given conception. Then this second conception is the next conception in order in passing from ~~being to substance~~. And we may repeat this process until we get to a conception which does not unite anything to substance but only brings the manifold of substance itself together, and, this will be the last conception.

These conceptions between being & substance are termed accidents; and universal conceptions are termed categories.

Categories	{	Being	{	Quality
		Accidents		Relation
		Substance		Representation.

It ^{should} be noticed that throughout this process of finding the ^{categories} ~~needed~~ as well as throughout the book, introspection is never resorted to. Nothing is assumed respecting what is thought which cannot be securely inferred from admissions which the thinker will make concerning external facts.

§ 6 The Ground.

The conception of being arises upon the formation of a proposition. A proposition always has, besides a term to express the substance, always has another to express the quality of that substance; and the function of the conception of being is to unite the quality to the substance. Quality, therefore, is the ^{first} ^{in order} conception ~~which comes first after being~~ in passing from being to substance.

Quality, at first sight, like every other elementary conception, seems

In the words of a philosopher of the 12th Century "cum dicitur
'Socrates est rationalis' hic est sensus 'Socrates est unus de sub-
iectis huius formae quae est rationalitas.'" Embodying rationality
defines rational.

to be given in the impression. Such results of introspection should not be are untrustworthy.

A proposition asserts the applicability of a ~~mediate~~ conception to a more immediate one, - asserts, that is, that the former affords a means of reducing the latter to unity. Since this is asserted, the more mediate conception is clearly regarded independently of this circumstance, for otherwise the two ^{conceptions} ~~assertions~~ would not be distinguished, but one would be thought through the other, without this latter being an object of thought, at all. The mediate conception, then, ^{in order to be applicable to be applied to the other} must be ~~first~~ considered first ^{without regard to} ~~independently~~ ^{of its applicability to} ~~another~~. This circumstance, and taken immediately. But, taken immediately it transcends ^{what is given} the ^{more} immediate conception, and its applicability to the latter becomes hypothetical. Take, for example, the proposition "Ink is black." Here, ^{the conception} ink is the more immediate conception; black is the more mediate, which to be predicated of the former must be discriminated from it and considered in itself, not as applied to an object but simply as embodying a quality, Blackness. Now this Blackness, is a pure Species or abstraction, and its application is entirely hypothetical.

We mean the same thing when we say "the ink is black" as when we say "there is blackness in the ink;" embodying blackness defines ^{black} ink. The proof is that these conceptions are applied differently to precisely the same facts. If, therefore, they were different; the one which was first applied would ~~for~~ fulfill every

function of the ~~other~~ ^{other} ~~other~~; so that one of them would be superfluous. But now a superfluous elementary conception is impossible; for ^{a superfluous conception} it would be an arbitrary fiction, whereas elementary conceptions arise only upon the requirement of experience. Moreover, the conception of a pure abstraction is indispensable; because we cannot comprehend ^{an} agreement of two things except as an agreement in some respect, and this respect is such a pure abstraction as blackness.

The pure abstraction ^{reference to} which constitutes a quality may be called a ground, of the character of the substance which has the quality. Reference to a ground, then, is the first accident. It cannot be prescindend from being, but being can be prescindend from it.

§7 The Correlate.

*This should be enlarged
a little*

All students of philosophy know that we can become aware of any quality only ^{by} ~~by~~ ^{through} ~~putting~~ the relation of its subject of inherence to something else; and it is an equally familiar fact that no relation can have place without a quality or reference to a ground. The occasion of the introduction of reference to a ground, therefore, is generalization or contrast.

In generalization and contrast, the primary substance has annexed to it a reference to a correlate. Reference to a correlate, then, is the next conception, in order after reference to a ground. This conception is so easy to seize that no elucidation of it is needed. It cannot

be prescindend from reference to a ground, although this latter can be prescindend from it.

§ 8. The Interpretant.

Reference to a correlate is clearly justified and made possible solely by comparison. Let us inquire, then, in what comparison consists. Suppose we wish to compare I and T; we shall imagine one of these letters to be turned over upon the line on which it is written as an axis; we shall then imagine that it is laid upon the other letter and that it is transparent so that we can see that the two coincide. In this way, we shall form a new image, which mediates between ^{the two letters} I and T, in as much as it represents one ^{other} letter turned over to be an exact likeness of the other. Suppose, we think of a murderer as being in relation to a murdered person; in this case we ^{conceive} ~~imagine~~ the ^{act} ~~fact~~ of the murder, and in this conception it is represented that corresponding to every murderer, there ^(as well as to every murder) is a murdered person; ~~and~~ thus we resort again to a mediating representation which represents the relate so standing for a correlate with which the mediating representation is itself in relation. Suppose, we look out the word homme in a French dictionary; we shall find opposite to it the word man, which, so placed, represents homme as representing the same two-legged creature which man itself represents. In a similar way, it will be found that in every comparison requires, besides the related thing, the ground & the correlate, also a mediating ^{representation} ~~conception~~ which represents the relate to be a representation of the same correlate.

which this mediating representation itself represents. Such a mediating representation, I call an interpretant, because it fulfills the office of an interpreter who says that a foreigner says the same thing which he himself says.

Every reference to a correlate, then, unites to the substance a reference to an interpretant; which is, therefore, the next conception in the order we have adopted.

It must not be supposed that in giving a definition of interpretant, we admit at all that reference to an interpretant is a compounded conception. This definition is only a verbal one; for the conception of representation which it introduces itself contains that of reference to an interpretant. Reference to an interpretant, is simply the addressing of ~~the~~ impression to a conception. To address or appeal to, is ^{an act} what we, in fact, suppose everything to perform, whether we attend to the circumstance or not. It is unanalysable, I think; though it may be expressed, ^{more perspicuously} by ^{an} periphrases, as above.

It may perhaps be objected; that since an interpretant is necessarily a correlate, reference to an interpretant is merely a particular determination ^{the conception of} of reference to a correlate, and should not be co-ordinated with the latter. But an interpretant is not referred to as establishing a relation to a correlate, in so far as it is a correlate; it is not therefore quatenus ipsum a correlate.

Reference to an interpretant is rendered possible and justified by that which renders possible and justifies comparison. But this is clearly the diversity of impressions. It is plain, that if we had but one impression, this impression would not require to be reduced to unity, and would, therefore, not need to be thought of as ^{referred} to an interpretant and the conception of reference to an interpretant would not arise. But the moment ~~there~~ are several impressions, that is a manifoldness of impression, we have a feeling of complication or confusion, which leads us to differentiate this impression from that, and they require to be brought to unity. Now they are ^{not} brought to unity ~~the moment~~ ^{until} we conceive them together as being ours, that is, until we refer them ~~to one of them~~ to an conception as their interpretant. Thus the reference to an interpretant arises after the holding together of diverse impressions, and therefore it does not join a conception to the substance, as the other two references do, but unifies directly the manifold of the substance, itself. It is therefore the last conception in order, in passing from being to substance.

§9 Formal Objects.

We have found between the unity of being and the manifold of substance, three universal and necessary ^{universals} (de omni) conceptions; namely

Reference to a ground

Reference to a correlate

Reference to an interpretant.

A ground is that pure abstraction, the embodiment of which makes a quality. A correlate is a second substance with which the first is in comparison. An interpretant, is a representation which represents that that which is referred to it is a representation of the same object, which it does itself represent.

These three conceptions are all we require to erect the edifice of logic. Why they should be three is unknown; although a reason can be given for every other logical division. But this number may indicate an anthropological fact.

In the section on precision, it was shown that more immediate conceptions cannot be prescindend from elementary conceptions which explain them; while there is no such impossibility of prescindend the more mediate from the less mediate. Hence, as the order in which we have taken the three references proceeds from the more mediate to the less mediate, it follows that no reference to an interpretant can abstract from reference to a correlate; nor any reference to a correlate from reference to a ground; whereas reference to a ground may be of such a kind that it can be prescindend from reference to a correlate; and reference to a correlate may be such that it can be prescindend from reference to an interpretant. Thus the three references give three prescindible objects; namely

- 1 Single reference to a ground,
- 2 Double reference to ground and correlate,
- 3 Triple reference to ground, ~~correlate~~, and interpretant.

These ~~are in fact~~ ^{may be termed} Quality, Relation, and Representation & the objects to which they belong as characters, may be called Quale, Relate, and Representamen.

The quale, the relate, and the representamen may be termed formal objects because the prescindend conceptions of them contain no reference to variously determinable ^{impressions} ~~substances~~.

§10. Subdivision of Formal Objects.