

1 A SKETCH OF LOGICAL CRITICS

^{MS. B. 7. b. 6. p. 676}
~~Superseded~~ arriving in London after ~~over~~ ^{many} years' absence ~~call~~ ⁱⁿ ~~many~~ ^{hears} so many ways of using the language of the two peoples that he never ~~had~~ before ^{remembered} ~~learning~~ before, and perhaps is confident that the class of persons from whom he of John Bull would probably be ~~set~~ down accused on both sides ^{years when} did not use them twenty or thirty years before that he ^{is} in danger of reflectively of setting down John Bull as of the Atlantic with trying to out-paradox Bernard Shaw. But if decidedly given to abbreviations of speech it seems, for example, where will to support he should find himself at a loss for instances to defend his assertion, suggest.

I could furnish him with one; namely, a certain fashionable way of pronouncing and spelling the English name for the theory of how to judge the qualities and the degrees of excellence of such performances,

any particular field ^{or attained in any given performance} demand in any department of endeavour, as might call ^{the} particular attention ^{on the people} ^{introduced into our language in this sense, by Hobbes, in 1656} ~~accuses~~ ^{for an enemy} ~~introduced into our language in this sense, by Hobbes, in 1656~~ ^{as it seems to an American,} That name is, of course, "critics", or "critic", ^{which} ^{comes} ^{from} ^{the} ^{French} ^{language} and the affection.

It consists in pronouncing and spelling it as if it were French, although the earliest instances alleged ~~occurrences of it in that language~~ French writers to use it are Molière and Boileau.

Now Molière did not make his entry into French literature (I do not say his earliest)

play, of course) until 1659 in the Proceedings; and Bale Despreaux
did not come until the following year (though Regis had written previously). Add
to these facts two others; first, that Hobbes was a genuine Hellenist, whose
passion for Thucydides had led him to publish a translation of that difficult
work thirty years before, and secondly that Hobbes used the word in its plural
form, an imitation probably of ethics (where the plural, like that of metaphysics, ^{physics, and}
one naturally ^{supposing Greek and in English} topics, logistics, mechanics, politics, nachanties is due, ^{and other} to these words occurring in the
headings of Aristotle's works, in grammatical agreement with ~~the first~~ ^{in the early meaning of the word} theme ^{extend} there was
a better reason for taking mathematics ^{for its} ~~in the plural form~~ ^{form} in the early meaning of that word)
Locke preferred the singular, "critick". Of course it is proper to employ the name
of the theory, or art, to a treatise on that theory, as Kant ^{did, in borrowing} ~~after borrowed~~ the word
from Locke, ^{to make it the principal noun in the title} ~~as the name of his most epochal work, as well as of two others. But~~
~~in his preface he very properly protests with vehemence~~ ^{to which,} ~~against the words~~

3) being regarded as
not as being the same as that noun, ~~which we distinguish from~~
which we apply to a writing ^{single piece of} ~~which we distinguish from~~
cating the ^{peculiar} ^{literary} qualities of a performance. We do not call a writing
that applies logic to the examination of ^{a particular} argument "a logic";
nor do we call an examination of the morality and justice, say, of the ex-
ecution of Louis XVI, an "ethic". Similarly, it is an inconvenience and
a stumbling-block, to call a critical ^{writing} examining an individual
work "a critic", or "a critics"; and we ought to take advantage of the cir-
cumstance that such a writing is usually ~~as~~ designated on paper as a
critique, ~~as~~ and orally as a 'kritiek', and regard that as a distinct
noun. The force of good sense is in favour of this distinction; and it
is destined to prevail. Meantime, solely because the plural will not be sup-
posed to denote a single critical essay, I have preferred that form in my title to this one.

4) By "Logical Critics" then, let us understand the theory of those kinds and degrees of attainable excellence ^{which} the science of logic will enable one to attain. Now, If I were to write a complete treatise on logic, I should divide it into three books of which the central one, in every sense, would be concerned with logical critics; the final one (which I might entitle "methodology,") would show how best to attain those excellences, of which the middle book would merely have shown the indispensable requisites; ^{while} an introductory book would have endeavoured to analyze & describe the elements of the situation that concerns logic.

In my younger days I conceived of logic in a more purely ideal and abstract way than ^{I now} have come to do. I do not at present ask, considering that the theory of the soundness of reasonings is to be the central part of logic, what is it expedient that the logician

5) should, in the present state of knowledge, take as the ~~and~~ object,
~~the~~ subject, of his studies; and the conclusion to which my consider-
ation of this question has brought me is that he ought to ^{study} take the
whole theory of the nature and ~~of~~ ^{fundamental} varieties of signs; so that
my introductory book might be called "semeiotic." In this sketch,
however, I omit all that is not indispensable to establishing the & condi-
tions of validity of arguments, and for showing just what kind and degree
of assurance each kind of argument afford, except that I add some use-
ful remarks upon logical self-criticism and other ways of improving
one's reasonings, as well as a few reflections ^{that I have found useful concerning} on the logical relations between
the different sciences.'

If by a "sign" we mean anything of whatever nature that
is apt to produce a special mental effect upon a mind in which

6 certain associations have been produced, — and I invariably mean by "association" ^{use the word} as the original associationists did, to
the act of associational suggestion, then we must admit that
a musical air and a command given to a soldier by his officer
are signs, although it would seem that a logician is hardly
otherwise concerned with such emotional and imperative
signs, than that, as long as nobody else concerns himself with the
analysis of the action of such signs, ^{he did not} the logician is obliged to
assume that office in order by its contrast with the actions of
cognitional signs to define ^{perfect} this ~~it~~ accomplishes the definition of this latter.
It usually happens that sciences become narrower