

1909 Sep 8

8:30 P.M.

MEANING
PREFACE

1

PREFACE.

These essays, related to a branch of Logic, by taking "Logic" for its subject, may be said to, pretty obviously, be if his
essays, related to a branch of Logic, by taking

But this word in the sense of the theory of research of truth; the
But the title-page calls for a moment is perhaps a little enigmatical. A little pre-
order to explain why they are said to relate to Meaning, it
- statement of exposition of explaining, in a preliminary way, nothing

it will be necessary to state how the writer's views of Logic
and of how it

differs from the conception of it which has been ~~most prevalent~~
during the past half century, just at the time when Hegel

ism, — that monument of the fallibility of the German universities,
— was crumbling to its pre-destined downfall (in spite of the elements

of great truth that were mixed up in it,) the books of Lotze, Fechner, and
Wundt, gave to ^{all} the minds occupied with Philosophy, — meaning
that part of truth which ordinary unscientific experience dis-
closes, — a ~~strong~~ powerful bent toward Psychology, the science

1909 Sep 8
115 PM
MEANING
PREFACE

2

} of the properties of Mind, ^{particularly} those of "consciousness," or
Feeling, as it is called in this book. This bent has proved so
irresistible that almost all men who, since that time
have desired to study and to write about logic have been more
or less, and mostly very much, deflected into the consideration
of psychology. The majority of ^{students have,} ~~this~~, it is true, ^{is in decided} have perceived that
the stand-point of logical inquiry ^{as contrasts to that of psychology} -
~~Yet the great majority of this majority have somewhere or other made logical~~ ^{very erroneous} ~~tend to rest on psych~~
~~ical inquiry.~~ Few have gone so far as to subscribe to the ^{the often extremely acute and penetrating} ~~contents~~
● tition of Dr. Wilhelm Jerusalem that logic is a branch of
psychology; and yet they have really so much confused the
matter, that a student of the present writer's way of thinking may
well find more to applaud in the little volume put forth by Jerome-
salem in 1905 than in the two heavy tomes of the "~~pure~~ Logician".

1909 Sep 8
2:15 P.M.
MEANING
PREFACE
3

"Logische Untersuchungen" of the "pure logician" Dr. Edmund Husserl. *Foot-note: Der kritische Idealismus und die reine Logik. Von Prof. Dr. W. Jenaer. pp. 226. Logische Untersuchungen. Verneit. 1900. 252, 2nd Th. pp. 718.
(Von E. Husserl.)

"Reasoning is a mental operation in the sense of being governed by the mental instinct and body of mental habit collectively called "reason"; but from the point of view of Logic, considered as the theory of inquiry, there is no good ground for limiting it exclusively to that part of the process of inquiry ⁱⁿ for which muscular action does not participate. To do so is to fall into a confusion of the logical and psychological points of view. For example, a small boy, who has been provided with a little chemical laboratory is engaged in acquainting himself with the behaviour of lead. He puts a little of a weak solution of the acetate of that metal into a test-tube and adds little by little caustic soda solution,

1909 Sep 8

5:45 P.M.

MISANING
TRENAKE

4

The observes that, at first, a white precipitate is formed, but that this disappears when more soda is added. This strikes him as singular, and wondering how it would be with other metals, he tries the same experiment, successively substituting for the sugar of lead corrosive sublimate, zinc sulphate, manganese sulphate, nickel sulphate, blue vitriol, and tin-stone (with whose behaviour with water we will suppose him to be already familiar). He finds that zinc and tin behave like lead, but that the precipitates formed by the other metals do not redissolve; whereupon he begins to think that lead, tin, and zinc are less basic than the others.^{* Now this is a course of reasoning on his part, if reasoning is a process whereby a knowledge of some facts leads to a belief in others not directly observed. It is not worth while to engage in a logomachy, but that there is such a kind of performance, above all others ~~else~~ governed by reason, in the sense of that power}

1909 Sept
3:30 AM.

MEETING
NOTES

The eminent and paramount

which is eminently the distinction of man, each case of which possesses

5

a thorough unity of purpose, plan, procedure, and point, it is more than desirable that a student of the rationale of it should recognize, and that he should have a clear idea of it in its entirety without excluding any parts from

it because inessential peculiarities. The boy's ~~rolling~~ taking bottles off the shelf, removing their stoppers pouring from them into test-tubes and observing the results played essentially the same rôle in producing ~~his~~ the ~~the~~ ~~or~~ limited imperfect belief which he reached, as the same phenomena had been simply called up from memory of former experiences; and the muscular contractions by which these phenomena were brought to contribute to that final belief fulfilled the same function that would have been fulfilled by the slashing about of lashes of brain-cells if he had brought the same phenomena into prominence by ^{acts} ^{The only pertinent} recollection. So far as there difference was that the exper-

1909 SEP
4 AM S
MEANING
PREFACE

6

ments were much more efficient on account of their ^{superior} vividness, that is to say, on account of the greater shock to the boy's sensorium that they communicated. From this point of view, there seems to be considerable importance in insisting that reasoning is a performance of the physiological organism ^{under the governance of reason, confined to that} and not exclusively of that ens rationis called "the mind," — a sort of tertium quid between the body and the soul. Whether the reader assents to the extreme position here taken or not, the example will serve to illustrate the void meaning of the writer's first, though by no means his only, objection to the psychological treatment of logic; namely, that it introduces many idle distinctions and other impertinent matter. In consequence of so cutting up the subject, psychological logicians fail to take a sufficiently broad view of the subject and fail to perceive that not only the whole nature of Meaning but also the general nature of Signs and ^{that of} several of their ^{broadest} classes demand their attention. Moreover,

1909 Sep 11

11:15 P.M.

MEANING
PREFACE.

7

whether it be that they have more interest in the psychology of reasoning and thinking than in its rationale, or that the turn of their genius lies that way, or ~~or~~ ^{from} what other cause, certain it is that the psychological logicians sadly neglect ~~the~~ ^{such} essentials of the science as the explanation of reasoning ~~is~~ ^{that} in a certain way will lead to the truth, and that reasoning in other ways that are frequently followed will be apt sure often to lead away from it. Other objections to their method might justly be urged, were ~~they~~ ^{and would be} not for the consideration of St. Luke's ^{explanation of} reason for the non-resuscitation of Lazarus.

Psychology being an observational not a rational science, that is, resting upon the experiences of privileged persons and not open to all the world, it follows that if the proof of the validity of ~~these~~ the modes of reasoning sanctioned by logic rested ultimately upon psychology,

1909 Sep 1
2:15 P.M.
MEANING
PREFACE
8

it would follow that ^{all} reasoning would be unreliable until the science of psychology were firmly established; and this would be true of the reasoning that establishes it. Logic would be saved from falling into the bottomless abyss of falsity only by planting its feet upon the arms of psychology; while psychology would escape the same fate only by clutching the ankles of logic.

Upon what, then, are we to rely in reasoning? This question may bear either of two meanings. It may ~~not~~ be a demand for assurance as to ^{the} particular reasoning that one actually has in hand; ^{it} and that will be more ~~or~~ specifically answered in ^(an intended future publication) a book ~~upon~~ which the writer has in hand. It is answered in a general way in the present volume, so as to reduce the question to its other meaning, namely, What is the ultimate assurance of the truth of the conclusion of any rea-

1909 Sep 11

6 P.M.
MEANING
PREFACE

9

soning? I answer that it must be, as unreasoned, of the nature of a Faith; — This Faith must relate to the general character of the Universe to which ~~that~~ reasoning relates; and it must in substance be that that Universe is governed by an Active Reason correspondent to that exerted in the act of inference. The object immediately before the mind is the Real ~~object~~ object or not seems to be a question from which it is difficult to extract any clear meaning; but it quite certain that no thinking about it will at all modify the Real object, since this is precisely what is meant by calling it Real. It is sometimes an object shaped by thinking, — of which the very last sentence affords an example; but, if it be Real, it is not modified by thinking about it. Now in thinking, the object before the mind is under the thinker's control and is always modified by the action of his will.

1909 Sep 12
0:45 P.M.
MEANING
PREFACE

10

It is therefore not the Real thing, although the Real thing is ^{undoubtedly} the object he is thinking about. If this is my psychology, it engages the writer's attention only for the purpose of clearing it away, and that of showing that although logic is the theory of thinking so far as thinking conduced to the attainment of truth, yet it is no more necessary in logic to consider the psychical process of thinking than it is in the thinking process itself. When we reason, we must, no doubt, think the premisses; that is to say, we must acquaint ourselves with the real states or changes of things which the premisses express, i.e. of which they are signs; and these real states or changes being signs of the truth expressed in the conclusion, make us acquainted with it. They do so, ^{only} by virtue of the real relation which they bear to that concluded.

1909 Sep 12
2 P.M.
MEANING
PREFACE
11

and a mere relation between thinkings (unless it happens to be thinkings that one is reasoning about) would not suffice at all. Since we cannot take the real things themselves into our minds, we must use signs of them. Thoughts are signs of them, or may be; but so may ~~be~~ visible objects; and whether they are visible through the physical eye or the imagination will, in many cases, make no difference; and in cases ^{more} ~~imagination~~ thinking is ^{utterly} ~~incompetent~~ ^{inadequate}; while in others, ~~as~~ in mathematics, ^{and calligraphies,} a good power of imagination will answer, while abstract thinking ^{is} ~~is~~ entirely impotent. Physically visible objects as ~~the~~ signs used in reasoning have several advantages over any description of mental signs, excepting in the very simplest cases, of not being neither fleeting nor otherwise elusive nor costing nearly so much effort in the necessary manipulation of them. There are few educated

1909 SEP 12,
2:45 P.M.
MEANING,
PAGE

12.

persons of either sex who, having to multiply 387 by 73, which is, of course, a mere operation of pure reasoning, who will not prefer to use pencil and paper, rather than to imagine 387 groups of 73 objects each and then count the single objects, or even rather than mentally derive^(or 400 times 73)

73 giving 146, then doubling that to 292, then multiplying by 100 to get 29200, then subtracting $\frac{(10 \times 73 \text{ being } 730) \text{ to } 29200}{(390 \text{ times } 73 \text{ plus } 30)}$, then $\frac{(3 \times 73 \text{ being } 219)}{\text{subtracting } 219 \text{ from } 29200}$ to get 28500, then subtracting ~~30~~ 30 to get 28470, then subtracting 220 to get

28250, and finally adding 1 to get the product, 28251; or rather than adding 7 times 70, or 490, to

3 times 80, or 240, to get 730, and adding that to 3×7 , or 21, to get 751, and then adding 300×73 , or 21900,

to get 22651, and adding to that 70×80 , or 5600, to get 28251. But even in mental arithmetic we avail ourselves of the so called "Arabic" notation* in imagination. Indeed, neither

foot note

*So called because Fibonacci's arithmetic book, published A.D. 1202, was based on the Arabic

treatise of a man who went by the designation of Al-Khwarizmi, or "the Chavasian," i.e. the man from Chavasnia, the country about Khiva. It had already been brought from the Spanish Arabians by that great man, Geber, in the Xth century, without the 0, it is true, but that was needless as long as compute-

1909 Sep 12

4 P.M.

MEANING

Foot-note continued

tions were performed upon a board divided into vertical columns, one for each decimal place.

13

If a certain passage in the second book of the Geometry of Boethius is genuine, the best explanation of it is to suppose, as stated there, that the nine "Arabic" digits (somewhat differently shaped, of course) were, about A.D. 500, used (in Rome, presumably) by ^a certain ~~person~~ class of persons, presumably professional accountants holding the art as a trade-secret. For trade-secrets have in all states of culture remained undivulged for ages. And if so, there is much reason for believing that Pythagoras brought ~~the secret~~ ^{the secret} to Italy.

The characters and the art, by which he may have supported his brotherhood, whose secret was kept so well. The grounds will be found in this volume. The reasons that favor this conjecture will be given elsewhere, as an example of the kind of reasoning that supports it. End of Foot-note.

To the mind of a mathematician, the only science which ever can consist wholly in reasoning, and hardly at all in accidental discoveries, presents the most magnificent series of examples of marvellous reasonings achieved by means of profoundly appropriate special signs. The table of logarithms, ^{c. 1614} is one such; the differential, ^{c. 1673} the two-dimensional algebra;

1909 Sep 12

6:45 P.M.

MEANING
PREFACE

quantity, $x + yi = r e^{bi}$; quaternion quantity; the matrix, with its modulus, the determinant;

14

E_E , the enlargement; the symbolization of operations (especially unknown op-

erations,) as subjects of multiplication and addition; Riemann surfaces, are com-

plex specimens and promises. But the signs of mathematics, unless we ~~we~~ except

the Linear Associative Algebra of B. Peirce, are only special signs, in the sense that in

which all the signs of ordinary algebra ^{have just been mentioned} are regarded as variations of one sign. This is

needed. A great desideratum is a general theory of ~~the~~ all possible kinds of

signs, their modes of signification, of denotation, and of information, and their

whole behaviour and properties, so far as these are not accidental. The task of supplying this need should be undertaken by some group of investigators; and

since pretty much all that has hitherto been accomplished in this direction has

been the work of logicians, among whom may be instances indiscriminate,

in our time largely by George Boole, Mary Everest Boole, Victoria Welby, M. Couturat, Alfred Bray Kempe, Alfred Peano, Bertrand Russell, and since

1909 Sep 13
7:30 PM

MEANING
PREFACE

15

a large division of this work ought to be regarded as constituting the bulk of the logician's business; it would seem proper that in the present state our knowledge logic should be regarded as coextensive with General Semiotic, the ~~the~~ a priori theory of signs.

All these essays, as the title-page says, relate to the Meaning of Signs, generally. For just as medical men in ~~studying~~ opening up the secrets of the zymotic, or yeasty, diseases ~~found great wisdom~~ derived invaluable hints from the study of other kinds of yeast than those which make the substance of disease, so students of reasoning ^{ought to} widen their field of view so as to include anything that may come within their ken that bears any real analogy to reasoning, and must examine it ~~not only~~ in those of its features

1909 SEP 14
1 PM
MEANING
REFACE
16

wherein it agrees with reasoning, without by any means neglecting those wherein it contradicts with reasoning; since quite surely to discover that a certain feature, F, that contradicts with reasoning is quite incompatible with a property, P, is thereby to be informed that the possession of the property, P, insures the analogy of the process that possesses with reasoning in not possessing the feature, F. Indeed, if one only finds that processes that have the ~~similar~~^{unusual} feature, F, mostly lack the common property, P, we know that the majority of processes that possess P are analogous to reasoning in not having the feature, F; since if ~~process~~
~~were among~~
~~there are more~~ processes that have F more than lack it, and yet among processes that had P, as many or more that had F than lacked it, which may be expressed algebraically by $FP > EP \geq \bar{F}P$ (where a line over a letter denotes the lack of the property whose possession is signified by the letter)

1909 Sep 14

2:30 PM

MEANING
PREFACE

17

it would follow that $F\bar{P} > \bar{F}P$ or that there were more ~~possessive~~ cases of the possession of F and lack of P than cases of the possession of P and lack of F; whence, adding FP, or the cases of the possession of both F and P, to each of those classes, we should have $\overset{\text{bind}}{FP + F\bar{P} = F}$ greater than $EP + \bar{F}P = P$, that is there would be more cases of the feature F than of the property P, contrary to the condition ~~sup.~~ posed, that P is commoner compared with F; — a lengthy exposition of what the reader perhaps saw already in its first statement.

The more business (The more largely the business of a science) the more a science consists in reasoning, in contradistinction to observation (in which respect logic is second to mathematics alone), and its concordants, the more advantage there is of a broader study than its strict definition would require. The present volume, however, is merely an unsystematic reconnaissance of a part of that broader ground. It considers Signs in general, ^{a class which includes} embracing pictures, symptoms, words, sentences, books, libraries, signals, orders of command, mi-

1909 Sep 14
5:45 PM

3343 C.R.W.

MEANING PREFACE

-18

Musical concertos, performances of Mass,

~~beginning~~ from something other than itself; a more careful definition will be worked out when the method ~~of~~ carrying it out shall have been considered.

^{Perhaps the} greatest obstacle to conveying a simple statement of what
not only, ^{and especially} ~~and especially~~

? A Sign as it is here meant by a Sign is that owing to the structure of speech, must it be obtrusively figurative, it can only be set forth in figurative expression, and in this will perform its office. Now in this age of physical science, the moment you use figures, all in a definition of speech cannot attract notice, ^{not only,} ~~and~~ ^{but that distinction from other words is lost.} ~~any meaning form that can be given to it independently of the meaning of the word~~

class of young women, exclaiming 'Oh; that is poetry; tell us the truth.' They seem to consider Poetry ^{to be} little thinking that, in order to have the idea that Poetry ~~is~~ ^{per se} false, while ~~and does not see that~~ it's first requisite is to be very true. If they do not ^{know this, how can they be expected} genuine Poetry ^{to be} the genuine thing, ~~must be true, that in some~~ ^{other} cases truth is figurative ^{one} & all we can ever hope to get ~~and~~ ^{is} know this what can they know of those regions of thought where truth as it walks abroad is always

1909 Sep 16
2:45 PM

MEANING
PREFACE

19

clothed in figures of which it divests itself for none but its illuminated? ^{of oneself}
~~in a more numerous class of cases we must content ourselves with~~
Let one put up with rather than go without any, and perhaps by,
at first with figurative ideas, and with learning from them, and
one may advance to a stricter ^{a prolonged}
only advancing to logical analysis after ~~an otherwise intimate~~
~~acquaintance with, and close study of,~~ the ideas that are to be analyzed;
and to this class belongs the broadest, i.e. most inclusive, ~~prop~~ concept
of that ~~it is~~ ^{which may} properly be called a Sign. ^{The definition of it is} ^{affair} It is a delicate question; since if
one excludes from consideration any class of Signs, one will condemn
himself to a maimed understanding of them, while to include too much
is necessarily to overlook some essential character of the Sign.
To the above preliminary definition, a few remarks may conveniently be appended here, however,
One may say at the outset ^{however} that Every Sign, ^{always regarded as Real and for the most part substantial;} every sign is capable of being
is in some sort a substitute for an Object, and that it can be Inter-
preted by a mind. Must the Object be other than the Sign? In
this diverseness seems
some sense apparently it must quite essential to the idea of acting

1909 Sep 16
5:45 AM

MEANING
PREFACE

20

as a sign; an Object that merely presents itself, represents nothing. Yet a map is incontestably a sign, no matter how minutely accurate it is, and every point of it represents a corresponding position on the ground mapped. Suppose, then, that an absolutely correct and infinitely detailed map of Governor's Island in New York Harbour be laid down on the ground there and turned so that lines on the map themselves running in any direction shall represent lines running in the same directions. Then in order that the map should represent the topography and all the features at the instant time the map is lying there, the map must show the map itself lying there; it must instead show that map ^{so} that, in the map of the map, may be seen the map lying upon it, and on that map of the map of the map may again be seen the map, and so on, ad infinitum, that is, down to a mathematical point that is nothing but the map of itself, and ^{with a sufficient microscope} which will be ~~the same with the~~ every map of its own environment, unless it be ring-shaped; and it is manifest

1909 Sep 17
6 PM
MEANING
PREFACE

same with my book whose last word is Finis.

of nothing else. But hold! A mere point cannot, of itself, be said

2.1. to constitute a map. But it out, and it will not represent anything

unless it be some point, and no more one than another, — any point,

As the self-representing point was supposed to just imagined, it did

in short. ~~Not~~ stands on the map) the point does not merely represent itself;

Governor's

for it represents its relations to the other points of ~~the~~ Island. Indeed, it
represents itself only in so far as it represents those relations.

A relation is not contained in one of the terms of the relation, but only
however, comprised
and what is true of the point on the map is equally so of the word ~~Finis~~; and so it is also
in the two together; Indeed, A Relation, in the usual sense of this word, may
but a fact

be defined as a fact concerning a collection of objects regarded as re-
garded as belonging to one of them primarily and to another secondarily

some relations, particularly are Triadic, that is,

like the relation of giving, and

used in an opposed way, and perhaps to a third in a still another way, etc.,

If, out of the triad "regarded as regarded as", we put simply "regarded
in place of as", we have another sense of the word relation, but a sense probably less

of

1909 Sep 16
6:15 P.M.
MEANING
PREFACE

22

frequent occurrence among correct thinkers. The point of the map
then, nor any such ~~and~~ self-sign ^{Neither}
~~does not, therefore, simply represent itself on the map~~ ^{solely and simply,} and the
statement

first assumption, that nothing can represent itself ~~alone~~ may,
~~Yet it will doubtless be admitted that very many signs represent themselves to~~
after all, be ~~admitted~~ adhered to. ~~In other~~ It may be asserted, ~~that~~ ^{regarding} ~~new~~ objects,
~~as~~ however (vague the assertion may be), that in every case an
influence upon the Sign emanates from its Object, and that this
emanating influence then proceeds from the Sign and acts
~~irrespective of the sign~~ ^{partly at least, in a mental way,}

produces ~~the same~~ ^{action} an effect that may be called the Interpretant,

or Interpreting effect, which consummates the agency of the
Sign. The reader may hesitate to admit that the Object of the
Sign always influences the sign. ^{A New York daily, for instance, daily,} The newspaper prints a predic-
tion of what the weather in New York will be on the following day;
and this subsequent New York weather is, indisputably, the Object to

1909 Sep 17
11:15 P.M.
MEANING
PREFACE

23

which that predictive sign relates. But how, it may be asked, can the state of weather that did not yet exist have acted upon ^a sheet of paper ^{that was}, printed, sold, used, and destroyed long before that state of things existed? The ^{Bestion newspapers} ~~newspaper~~ ^{some} also prints ^{certain} promises as to the performances at the theatres ^{on} the following night; and how can those performances have acted in fluenced what would be already done, and would have caused the audiences without which the ^{the} performances would not take place? ^{the assemblies of the} ^{be given up, and not take place?} Here, in this preface, the reader can only be requested to accept the phrase as a figurative one, although ~~mean~~ when the meaning of the term word "cause" comes to be analyzed later he may come to acknowledge that it is strictly true that final causes do act mentally. He will even now admit that if ~~the~~ a given performance had not ^{in reality,} been about really

1909 Sep 17

1145 A.M.

MEANING,
PUPILAGE

24

to come off, the theatre-manager would in all probability not have had the confidence and consequent assurance to announce it; so that if the reader will only widen his conception of causation, so as to make it include logical consequences, (which are never absolutely necessary when the consequent is identically included in the antecedent,) he will be able to assent to the statement that real futurity is sometimes a mental cause of the expectation of it. But the matter shall be further considered in the sequel. It may be well, however, at once to take notice of another class of cases in which the reader may not at once see the aptitude of describing a Sign as something which being influenced by an emanation from a real Object, deflects that influence upon an interpreting mind. For suppose the Sign be the order "Ground

First note: * A Consequent, in Logic, is a fact whose truth follows from another fact, its Antecedent, while the Consequence in the conditional truth according to which the Consequent follows from the Antecedent.

1909 Sep 17
2:15 P.M.
MEANING
PREFACE

25

atoms!" What, it may be asked, is the real Object that such a Sign represents? The answer is that the order is to the soldier not only ~~as~~ a stimulus to habit ^{of going through the commanded} producing the action of his muscles, - for if it be purely physiological and spinal, and so that the mind has no part at all in the ~~order~~ action, this can hardly be considered as the Interpretant of a Sign, in the sense in which these terms will here be taken, - but the order is also for the soldier the voice of rightful authority and deity, to which he owes a hearty allegiance. If the reader objects that deity is not a real Object but only an idea, the reply is that it is ~~an~~ first of the following extract, which may, it is hoped, induce him to alter this opinion. To have that effect precisely to such minds as he to which these ~~objections~~ are most particularly addressed being especially intended to convince them that the distinction between ~~them~~ a right idea and a ~~of~~ reality is not only an error, but is an error of the gravest importance, upon which, were

1909 Sep 17
2:45 P.M.
MEANING
PREFACE

26

it consistently adhered to, as it never is, all science would go to
^{that even our day's} shipwreck, and ~~lead~~ ^{inconsistent} the almost universal half-acceptance of
^{it} which robs life of its greatest joy and often of ^{the chief part of its} chief value. That
which is not real is a figment of some individual mind or groups of
minds, and whether the soldier's conception of his duty be correct or
not, ~~get~~ ^{idea, but} duty itself, though it is an ~~idea~~ is not, a mistaken way of thinking.
Besides, ^{the phrase} "the real Object of a Sign" does not imply that the Sign
is ~~altogether~~ veracious. The word "witch" is a sign ~~with~~ ^{of} having a "real
Object" in the sense in which this phrase is used, namely to mean a
^{not the sign, and in intention or pretension not created by the sign, and consequently professedly real as}
^{far as the action of the sign is concerned.} supposedly real Object. It is real in the sense in which a dream is a real
appearance to a person in sleep, although it ^{be} not an appearance of
objects that are Real. On the other hand In contradistinction to the class of signs to which
the word "witch" belongs, - that is signs names of impossible fictions, ~~but as~~ ^{one might}

1909 Sep 17

4:15 P.M.
MEANING
PREFACE.

27

take "Vorse discoverer of a part of New England." To the present writer's mind it is so inconceivable, in view of the imaginative genius of ~~that~~
^{utterly prosaic} people, that the ~~diary~~ diary of the voyage of Eric should be a work of imagination, that were it not for the fact that some writers (very little acquainted with Icelandic literature, it must be confessed,) have believed it to be a fiction, that the ~~Vorse~~ would not be ~~taken~~ given as an example of a name whose Object is of doubtful Existence. But considering that these persons have enjoyed a high local reputation, their ^{very prosaic} opinion may be conceded to throw doubt on the truth of the narrative.

1909 Sep 7

6:15 P.M.

MEANING

PREFACE

to One Book

1 ✓

PREFACE.

Ms. A.37

If, as a general rule, the voice of propriety would suggest that the Preface in which an unknown writer introduces himself to his readers should be written in the third person may there not be countervailing considerations in the case of a work of reasoning, seeing that all reasoning, even solitary meditation, is essentially of the nature of an appeal to a person held in ^{high} respect. In reasoning with oneself, to ordinary self, which reasons, respectfully submits his views to a more careful and critical, if not a better, self

1909 CEP 8
INDEX
REVISED
MEANING
PREFACE

1

Essays on MEANING.

By a Half-Century's Student
at the same.

PREFACE.

.....

These essays relate pretty obviously to the research after truth, and so to logic; ~~but~~ ^{may be} The title-page is a little enigmatic; ~~and a brief exposition~~ ^{but began first in} ~~giving~~ ^{the setting up} ~~as the writer's small still actions, his electronic bounds or his~~ ^{of his} ~~as his small still can, how his ring is another~~ ~~or the carriers~~ ^{or the carrier} ~~of the writer's point of view of logic, showing how it differs from the one~~ ^{taken} ~~which have~~ ^{been} ~~which have~~ ^{provided to supply me} ~~that has~~ been almost exclusively chosen throughout the fifty years last past ~~to afford the needed commentary, with~~ ^{to afford} ~~it is hoped make the purpose~~ ^{tolerably from the outset.}

of the volume clear. Two different sciences study reasoning. They are as sharply distinguished from each other as are anatomy and physiology. The one describes as minutely as it well can, the different operations of the events of consciousness that take place in the course of a reasoning and shows how this series of events differs in different kinds of reasoning. This requires very sly and adroit spying indeed; because nobody

1909 Sep 14
0:30 P.M.
MEANING
PREFACE.

16

wherein it agrees with reasoning without by any means neglecting those wherein it contrasts with reasoning, quite surely since to discover that whatever has a certain feature, there may be that will always have, E, that ~~shows which makes it~~ contrasts with reasoning ~~it is also~~ to be, a certain ~~very~~ peculiar property, P, is thereby informed that whatever he may come across that has not the property, P, will be analogous to reasoning in lacking the feature, E.

$$FP \subset F\bar{P}$$