

1909 Sep. 4.
11:30 P.M.

P R E F A C E

Mar 633

MEANING
P R E F A C E
to the Volume

1:1

The next page is 1:2

Confidence that somebody will be profitably interested in these essays comes to the writer from the recollection that the first of them, which is mainly a reprint ^{verbatim} of an article first written in 1872 and published in 1876, and containing the earliest formulation of a method of logical analysis that he had had the habit of alluding to as his "pragmatism," was the tiny seed that under the culture of richer minds, grew into the goodly tree that is now known ^{of} that same appellation to ~~all the world~~ that already begins to afford a comfortable and wholesome lodge for many a soul. The remainder of the volume sets forth ^{some of} the matured ideas of a man who from boyhood to old age has longed and laboured to learn all he could of the ~~best~~ ~~very truth~~ of the right methods of ~~con~~ the conduct of thought in the

1909 Sep 5

1909 Sep 5

2:15 P.M.

MEANING

PREFACE to

1:2

The ~~1st~~ page of P.

on research of truth. Some of these ideas have been sufficiently proved. ~~Of~~ Of others he can only claim that they are provisional results of lines of investigation so conducted that they are bound eventually to approximate indefinitely to the truth, and that they are as ^{far} possible from being hasty conclusions. On the contrary, he has in all cases labored hard and long to appreciate opposing aspects of their subject-matters.

Fresh and fruitful points of view are always interesting and usually ~~profit~~ often valuable to intellectual people, even when their fruits are mostly rotten at the core. This book ~~&~~ throughout adopts two fresh ^{view-points} ~~views~~, not, indeed, by any means, ~~in the~~ original with the writer, but in the sense that they have been taken by ~~no~~ ~~hardly~~ ~~no~~ prominent writers of the present generation.

1909 Sep 5

2:30 P.M.

MEANING

PREFACE II

BOOK

1:3

The next page is 1:4

if by any at all. One of these is that logic does not rest upon psychology either much or little. It is true that in the synthetical part of logic, that is to say, in Methodic, certain psychological principles, ought to be attended to; but Methodic does not begin its work until the whole frame-work of the science has been firmly established. It is also true that the psychological analysis of our ideas is a ^{an} highly important ^{department} ~~part~~ of science; but the logical analysis of them is quite another thing than the psychological analysis, and as we shall see, ~~this~~ ^{of the two analyses} their superficial resemblance only makes it the more important that they should be kept separate. Whether ^{or not} any great injury is done to psychology by mingling them is a question ^{with which I shall} ~~which I shall~~ ^{in no way involved in}

1909 Sep. 5
4:15 P.M.
MEANING
PREFACE
to the Volume
1:4
Next page 1:

the subject of this volume.

~~not presume to meddle. Yet I have made several researches~~
~~in psychology and have followed many others and am~~

But it may be said with confidence,

~~sufficiently acquainted with that science and others to be~~
~~able to pronounce with confidence~~ ~~But the writer will be decidedly of the opinion~~ ~~is decidedly of the opinion~~

that few sciences, if any, outside of ethics and metaphysics, have such frequent and fundamental need of appeals to the science of logic as psychology has. It has to ~~be built~~ build upon a foundation of logical analytic. Now in order that it should rest secure upon this basis, it is requisite that logical ana-

lytic should not, in its turn, rest upon psychology, as all ~~writers~~ ^{logicians} of our time ~~conceive it to rest~~ ^{represent it as resting upon though they claim not to do so.}. As for logical Critic, which is the heart of the subject, being the science of what may be accepted as true, the only sciences to which it can be allowed to make appeal are those which have no need, in their turn, of appealing to it; and

1909 Sep. 5

5 P.M.

MEANING

PREFACE

of the Book.

1:5

Next Page: 6

these are only, 1st, Mathematics, the Archæan bed rock on which
all the strata of ^{the} positive sciences rest, being the only ^{science} to which
all idea of ^{categorical} ~~positive~~ truth is ^{alien} foreign; 2nd, what I call the "Phenome-
nology of Mind" borrowing Hegel's aim though none of his results; and
3rd = ^{or Esthetic} Esthetic, considered broadly as the science of the ultimately
<sup>beau, which might be called ~~esthetic~~ ^{from} esthetic, (or why not boldly ~~broadly~~ ^{boldly} ~~and say~~ ^{call it}?)
~~attractive~~; and ~~each~~ each of these Critic has to borrow.</sup>

The present writer begs to be understood (though ^{the mere expression of} his opinion can,
of course, have no weight,) as placing a high value upon much that
~~the~~ different schools of psychological logic have put forth; only he
does not value it as contributing to the art of reasoning. He once
remarked to the author of such a treatise that he feared it would
fail to make his students good reasoners. To which the professor's
reply was, "I don't teach my students to reason; I teach them
SCIENCE!" The incident is mentioned here to illustrate how ~~differe~~

1909 Sep 6
3:30 P.M.
MEANING
PREFACE
1:6
The Next page
is 1:7.

different are the aims of a pragmaticist logician and ^{those of an} ~~an~~
apragmatic high professor. The present writer must confess
to ~~no~~ having but ^{of languid} little interest in Science of the kind that does
not bear fruit in forming investigators or in a logic that does not help
men to reason.

When one reasons it is worse than useless to think about the mind,
It is better to ^{express} ~~formulate~~ ^{one's premisses or initial facts} ~~the steps of one's reasoning~~ in some kind of ~~preme-~~
~~rent symbols~~ ^{diagram, or other permanent and suitable sign, visible sign;} and to consider ^{in order} what meaning this conveys or what
● addition it requires to make it convey a meaning which shall be
pertinent to the question in hand, in the manner explained and il-
lustrated herein. An ^{valid} argument is a sign of the truth of its con-
clusion; and if we call that further sign that a given sign produces
in the mind that comprehends it, the "Meaning" of the given sign, then

1909 Sep 6

7 P.M.

MEANING

PRELIMINARY

1:7

The next page is 1:8

the conclusion of an argument is the pertinent part of its Meaning. It is true that the thought of the Argument is also a Sign, having this ^(the logician, if he has common sense,) same meaning, and ~~I~~ fully acknowledges, and would insist upon occasion, that in the case of any very simple reasoning, such as any of the syllogisms that are paraded in the logic-books, ^{and ~~the~~ many of the arguments of Euclid,} it is idle to interpose any other Sign than that between it and the conclusion, particularly ^{since} as a direct mental Sign of the conclusion will be needed in the psychical operations of impressing it upon the memory and of resolving to call it up and to act upon it on any practical occasion on which the Premiss, - the ~~Populate~~ Premiss, usually called "the premisses" occur. But in cases where the argument is not so simple or needs consideration, there are several objections to relying upon unaided thought. For objects in the mind are fleeting, and the slightest interruption may occasion ^{for most people} their obliteration, and it is difficult to embrace in thought all the details of ^{a complicated} an argument. They prefer ^{for example, to perform any multiplication of} to multiply ~~anything~~ more than three figures by two upon paper. Indeed

1959 Sep 6
10 AM

MEANING
PRELIMINARY

L:8

Next page

a Diagram, - if we use this term, as it always will be used in these pages, ~~to~~ in
~~denote~~ a broad sense, to denote not only a linear drawing but also an array
of letters or any other sensuous image presenting an instance of relations analo-
gous to those upon which an argument turns, - must be brought before a reasoner's
~~in~~ imagination, if not before one of his peripheral senses; or else ~~the~~ ^{the} operation
of his mind will not be genuine reasoning ^{where a new habit is formed,} but only the action of a habit already
formed, as will be shown in the sequel. Now a Diagram is essentially a Sign
that is both Definite (or not vague) and Determinate (or concrete ^{in the sense of not being} ~~and~~ ~~not~~ general);
● so that something more than vague abstract thought is indispensable in
genuine reasoning; and thought that is not brought down to earth by ~~a~~ a
present sensuous object is, almost ^{if not} ~~more~~ quite inevitably, both vague and general.
As to its generality ^{a pertinent} ~~there are~~ some distinctions will be drawn when the matter ~~comes~~
comes to be considered more closely.