

This great fallacy once overthrown
which governs more or less the German
logics, what does right reasoning con-
sist in? It consists in such reasoning
as shall be conducive to our ultimate
aim. What, then, is our ultimate aim?

Perhaps it is not necessary that the
logician should answer this question. Per-
haps it might be possible to deduce the
correct rules of reasoning from the
mere assumption that we have some
ultimate aim. But I cannot see how
this could be done. If we had, for
example, no other aim than the plea-
sure of the moment, we should fall back

into the same ~~as~~ absence of any logic
that the fallacious argument would lead
to. We should have no ideal of reasoning,
and consequently no norm. It seems to
me that the logician ought to recognize
what our ultimate aim is. ~~It would seem to~~
be the business of the moralist to find this out;
~~and~~^{that} the logician has to accept the the
teaching of ethics in this regard. But
the moralist, as far as I can make ^{it} touch,
merely tells us that we have a power
of self control, and that ~~no aim~~ narrow
or selfish aim can ever prove satisfactory,
that the only satisfactory aim is
the broadest, highest, and most gene-

real possible aim; and for any more definite information, as I conceive the matter, he has to refer us to the esthetician who business it is to say what is the state of things which is most admirable ~~per se~~ in itself regardless of any ulterior reason. So, then, we appeal to the esthetician to tell us what it is that is admirable ~~and beyond~~ without any reason for being admirable beyond its inherent character. Why, that, he replies is the Beautiful. Yes, we urge, ~~the~~ such is the name that you give it but what is it? What is this character? If he replies that it consists in a certain quality of feeling, a certain

bliss, I for one decline altogether to accept the answer as sufficient. I should say to him, My dear Sir, if you can prove to me that this quality of feeling that you speak of does as a fact, attach to what you call the Beautiful, or that which is admirable without any reason for being so, I am willing enough to believe you; but I cannot ~~face~~ ^{would be} without strenuous proof admit that any particular quality of feeling is admirable without a reason. For it is too revolting to be believed unless one is forced to believe it. A fundamental question like this, ^{however practical} is not like the issues of its may be, differs entirely from any ordinary practical question, in that whatever is accepted

as good in itself must be accepted without compromise. In deciding any special question of conduct it may ~~be right~~ is often quite right to allow weight to different conflicting considerations and calculate their resultant. But it is quite different in regard to that which is to be aim of all endeavor. The object admirable ~~is~~ admirable ~~in~~ ^{it is admirable in se} purpose must, no doubt, be general. Every ideal ~~purpose~~ is more or less general. It may be a complicated state of things. But it must be a single ideal; it must have unity. Because it is an idea and unity is essential to every idea and every ideal. Object utterly ~~utterly~~ ^{utterly} disparate kinds may, no doubt, be admirable, because

Some special reason ~~may~~ make each one of them so. But when it comes to the ideal of the admirable, in itself, its very ^{of its being} nature is to be a precise idea, and if somebody tells me it is either this, or that, or that other, I say to him, It is clear you have no idea of what precisely it is. But an ideal must be ~~of~~ capable of being embraced in a unitary idea or it is no ideal at all. Therefore, there can be no compromise between different considerations here. The admirable ideal cannot be too extremely admirable. The more thoroughly it has whatever character is essential to it, the more admirable it must be. ~~Non sunt~~

Now what would be the doctrine that that
 which is admirable in itself ~~is~~ a quality of
 feeling, come to if taken in all its
 purity and carried to its furthest extreme,
 - which should be the extreme of admirableness?

It would amount to saying that the one
 ultimately admirable object is the unrestrained
 gratification of a desire, regardless of what
 the nature of that desire may be. Now that
 is too shocking. It would be the doctrine that
 all the higher modes of consciousness ^{with} of
 which we are acquainted in ourselves,
 such as love and reason, are good only
 so far as they subserve the lowest of all modes
 of consciousness. It would be the doctrine
 that this vast universe of Nature which

we contemplate with such awe is good only to produce a certain quality of feeling. Certainly, I must be excused for not ~~but~~ admitting that doctrine unless it be proved with the utmost evidence. So, then, what proof is there that it is true? The only occasion for it that I have been able to learn is that gratification, pleasure, is the only conceivable result that is satisfied with itself and therefore since we are seeking for that which is fine and admirable without any reason beyond itself, pleasure, bliss, is the only object which can satisfy the conditions. This is a respectable argument. It ~~most~~ deserves consideration.

admirable in itself is any ~~fixed~~ stationary result? The explanation of the circumstance that the only result that is satisfied with itself is a quality of feeling is that reason always looks forward to an endless future and expects endlessly to improve its results. Consider, for a moment, what Reason, as well as we can today conceive it, really is. I do not mean our faculty which is so called from its embodying in some measure Reason, or ~~thought~~^{Reason}, ~~or~~ ~~thought~~^{an element} ~~ability~~, ~~or~~ ~~faculty~~ as a something ~~manifesting~~ ^{and in the history of mind's development} itself in the mind, in nature, ~~and in~~ ~~the~~ ~~the~~ What is this reason? In the first place, it is something that never can have

conceivable,

Its premise, that pleasure is the only result
that is perfectly self-satisfied, must ~~certainly~~ ^{be granted.}
~~Only,~~ ^{But} in these days of evolutionary ideas which
are traceable to the French Revolution as their
~~so~~ instigator, and still further back to Galileo's
experiment at Leaning tower of Pisa, and
still further back to all the stand~~s~~ that have
been made by Luther and even by Robert
of Lincoln against attempts to bind down
~~the human~~ human Reason to any prescrip-
tions fixed in advance, - in these days, I
say, when these ideas of ~~the~~ progress and
growth have themselves grown up ~~to such~~
~~occupy our minds~~ ^{so as} ~~importance~~ as they now do, how ~~can~~ it
~~be expected~~
~~we allow the assumption to pass that the~~

~~A little example will~~ serve to illustrate what I am
~~mean for example~~ saying. Take any ~~the~~ general term whatever. For
I say of a ~~piece of~~ ^{stone that} it is hard. That means
that so long as the stone remains hard, ~~the~~ ^{every} essay
to scratch it by the moderate pressure of a knife
will surely fail. ~~No~~ matter how often you try the
experiment, if the stone is what hard means
~~to call to call the stone hard is to~~ That innumerable
series of conditional predictions is involved in the
meaning of this lowly adjective. Whatever
may have been done will not begin to exhaust its meaning.

been completely embodied. The most insignificant of general ideas ~~need~~ ^{more than} ~~possibilities~~ always involves predictions or requires for its fulfillment that events should come to pass, and all that ever can have come to pass must fall short of completely fulfilling its requirements. At the same time, the mode of its being is such that it ~~only~~ ^{this being} is only what the very being, of the General, of Reason, is of such a mode that it consists in the Reason's actually governing events. Suppose a piece of carborundum has been made and has subsequently been dissolved in aqua regia without anybody at any time, so far as I know, ever having tried to scratch

it with a knife. Undoubtedly, I may have ~~good~~ good reason, nevertheless, to call it hard; because

some actual fact has occurred ~~as~~ such that the reason compels me to call it so, and

a general idea of all the facts of the case

requires can only be formed if I do call it

so. In this case, my calling it hard is an

actual event which is governed by that

law of hardness of the piece of carbonium.

But if there were no actual fact whatsoever which

was meant by saying that the piece of

carbonium was hard, there would ~~be~~ be

not the slightest meaning in the word

hard as applied to it. The very being of the

general, of reason, consists in its govern-

ing individual events. So, then, the ~~saying~~

essence of Reason is such that its Being
never can ~~be~~ ^{have been} completely ~~fulfilled~~ ^{perfect}. It always
must be in a state of incipiency, of growth.
This like the character of a man which
consists in the ideas that he will conceive
and in the efforts that he will make, and
which only develops as the occasions actually
arise. ~~But~~ ^{Her} in all his life long no son of
Adam has ever fully manifested what there
was in him. So, then, the Development of
Reason requires as a part of it the
occurrence of more individual events
than ever can occur. It requires too all
the coloring of all ~~modes~~ ^{qualities} of feeling, and
including pleasure, in its proper place among

the rest. This development of Reason
consists, you will observe in embodiment,
that is, in manifestation. The creation of
the universe, which did not take place,
during a certain busy week, in the year
4000 B.C. but is going on today and
never will be done, is this very develop-
ment of Reason. I do not see how one
can have a more satisfying ideal of
the ~~also~~ admirable than the development
of reason so understood. The one thing whose
admirableness is not due to an ulterior
^{Reason itself ~~the~~}
Reason is ~~the admirableness comprehended~~
in all its fullness, so far as we can
comprehend it. Under this conception, the

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the ideal of conduct will be to ~~execute~~ our little
~~part~~ function in the operation of the creation
by ~~new help~~ giving a hand toward render-
ing the world more reasonable whenever,
^{the change is,}
~~as they say,~~ it is "up to us," to do so. In
logic, it will be observed that knowledge
is reasonableness; and the ideal of
reasoning will be to follow such me-
thods as must develop ~~the~~ knowledge
the most speedily.) The logicality of
the judgment that a stone cannot be
at once hard and not hard does not
consist, as Sigmund * and other German
logicians say it does, in its satisfying
our feeling of logicality, but consists in

its being true; For everything that is true
 is logical, whether we know it or not. But
 this we know to be ~~true~~ true, not at all
 by means of any peculiar feeling it excites
 in us, & we might argue from that
 feeling, it is true, but any feeling may
 be deranged, - and we know it much more
 certainly from this, that when we say
 that it is true that
 "a stone cannot be at once hard and
 not hard" what we are talking of is ~~what~~
~~what interpretation~~ ^{not} ~~we mean~~ somebody might put upon
 that assertion, but what we mean by it.
 Now what we mean by "not" is "other than
everything that is" ^{by} "Not hard" we mean
other than everything that is hard

~~so that it would make no sense to say~~
~~that a stone was hard and other than~~
~~everything hard~~ "if ~~everythings~~"
"every proposition would be true if it were"
By "not hard" we mean "every proposi -
tion would be true if it were hard." So to say
that a stone is at once hard and not hard"
is to say that if it is hard every proposition
is true, and it is hard. Accordingly this would
be to assert that every proposition is true,
a superstitional position, - that directly
denies the distinction of truth & falsity,
which we are fully satisfied exists.

[A little book by Lady Victoria Wellesley
has lately ~~appeared~~ been published entitled "What is Meaning"

The book has sundry merits, among them that of showing that there are three modes of meaning. But the ~~best of the whole~~ ^{feature of it is} that it poses home the question "What is Meaning." A word has meaning for us in so far as we are able to make use of it in ~~speak~~^{and in writing} and in getting communicating our knowledge to others and in getting at the knowledge that these others seek to communicate to us. That is the lowest grade of meaning. The meaning of a word is more ~~precisely~~ ^{fully} the sum total of all the ~~the~~ conditional predictions which the person who uses it intends to make himself responsible for or ~~intends~~ to

deny. That conscious or quasiconscious intention in using the word is the second grade of meaning. But besides the consequences which the person who accepts a word knowingly commits himself to, there is a vast ocean of unforeseen consequences which the acceptance of the word ~~bring~~ is destined to bring about, not merely consequences of knowing but perhaps revolutions of society. One cannot tell what ^{power} ~~may~~ there may be in a word or a phrase to change the face of the world; and the sum of these consequences makes up the third grade of meaning.]

Let us now consider what the science of logic ought to embrace. Although whatever is true is logical whether we know it or not, yet it is plain that logic cannot embrace all human knowledge. The logician ^{endeavors to} assumes an attitude as if, ~~he knew~~ as logician, he had no information at all except what everybody must have to reason at all. This, however, is ~~as~~ not exactly possible. There is no exactly defined sphere of knowledge such that everybody who reasons must possess the whole of it and need know nothing else. But the logician assumed that the

meaning of language is ~~well-known~~
between himself and the person to whom
~~he~~ is imparting his doctrine, although
that meaning may not be analyzed
and all its elements distinctly recognized,
but that no other facts are known. Of
course, some others must be known, but
they are left out of account.)

The ultimate purpose of the logician
is to make out the theory of how know-
ledge is advanced. Just as there is a
chemical theory of dyeing which is not exactly
the art of dyeing, and there is a theory of
thermodynamics which is quite different
from the art of constructing heat-engines; so

Methodetic, which is the last goal of logical study is the theory of the advancement of knowledge of all kinds. But this theory is not possible until the Logician has first examined all the different ~~four~~^{elementary} modes of getting at truth and especially all the different classes of arguments and has studied their properties so far as these concern the ~~success~~^{investigation} of the power of the arguments as leading to the truth. This part of logic is called Critic. But before it is possible to enter upon this business in any rational way, the first thing that is necessary is to examine ~~the~~ thoroughly all the ways in which thought

can be expressed. For since thought has no being except in so far as it will be embodied, and since the embodiment of thought is a sign, the business of logical critic cannot be undertaken until the whole structure of signs, especially of general signs has been thoroughly investigated. This is substantially acknowledged by logicians of all schools. But the different schools conceive of the business quite differently. Many logicians conceive that the inquiry touches largely upon psychology, and depends upon what has been observed about the human mind, and would not necessarily

be true for other minds. Much of what they say ~~is~~ is unquestionably false of many races of mankind. But I, for my part, take little stock in a logic that is not valid for all minds, inasmuch as ^{the} ^{of a given argument,} logicality [as I have said] does not depend on how we think that argument, but upon what the truth is. Other logicians endeavoring to steer clear of psychology, as far as possible, think that this first branch of logic must relate to the possibility of knowledge of the real world and upon the sense in which it is true that the real world can be known. This branch of philosophy, called epistemology, or

Erkenntnislehre is necessarily largely metaphysical. But I, for my part, cannot for an instant assent to the proposal to base logic upon metaphysics; inasmuch as I fully agree with Aristotle, Duns Scotus, Kant, and all the profoundest metaphysicians that metaphysics can, on the contrary, have no secure basis except that which the science of logic affords. I, therefore, take a position quite similar to that of the English logicians, beginning with Scotus himself in regarding this introductory part of logic as nothing but an analysis of ^{kinds of signs are} what is absolutely essential to the embodiment of thoughts. I call it, after Scotus,

Speculative Grammar. I fully agree, however,
 with a portion of the English school, ~~who~~
~~now have & may observe what now has~~
~~a large and most influential scientific~~
~~affection following in Germany.~~ — I agree,
 I say, with a portion of this school without
 thereby coming into positive conflict with
 the others, in thinking that this Speculative
 Grammar ought not to confine its studies
 to those general ~~for~~ conventional signs
 of which language is composed, but that
 it will do well to widen its field of view
 so as to take into consideration also
 kinds of signs which, not being conven-
 tional, are not of the nature of language.
 In fact, as a point of theory, I am of

opinion that we ought not to limit ourselves to signs but ought to take account of certain objects more or less analogous to signs. In practice, however, I have paid little attention to these quasi-signs.

Thus there are in my view after Subject, three branches of logic Speculation, Grammar, Retic, and Methodetic.

In the next lecture I shall introduce you to a system of signs which I have invented as an aid in the study of logic.