

The argument for Pragmatism
anachronistically or rationally
stated

(0) The meaning of an intellectual concept
consists in the ^{general} manner in which it
might modify deliberate conduct.

(1) For an intellectual concept is one
that is developed in ^{the performance of} thinking.

(2) And all thinking is reasoning
^{thoughtfully} ~~deliberately~~ ^{let us think}

(2) Now ~~deliberation~~ is deliberately
performed and it will have to be
done ~~with~~ under active self-control

(3) And let anything be actively self-
controlled and it must be done with
controlled attention.

(4) Attention involves effort

(5) And ~~human action~~ ^{effort is active by definition} ~~is nothing but~~
human action is nothing but controlled
effort

(6) Besides all thinking is reasoning

(7) And the very first step in all
reasoning — which is reproduction —
consists in the manipulation of

of signs of a certain sort, and that
an attitude and observational
manipulation, self controller &
self enforcement.

(8) It is therefore conduct

(9) And the only ultimate issue
of reasoning that can be put
before is a general rule of
conduct

(10) The conclusion is the logical
interpretant

(11) and this is as much as to say
the signification

(12) The work of defining a con-
cept is eminently a work
of thinking

(13) And as such is subject to the
rules of reasoning

(14) And therefore the only
essence of the concept -
its logical interpretant - is a
generalized habit of conduct

The argument is that

- (1) Thoughts are signs
- (1') and general signs
- (2) and Thought is subjectively general
- (2') The subjectively general has the power to signify
- (3) All signs have significance
- (3') All signs have interpreters
- (4) All signs have significance
- (4') Signification is on a general kind of interpreters
- (5) and all signs have interpreters
- (5') But must be a sign which is subjectively general in order that a thought should come into a man's mind it must be conveyed to him by a sign of which it is the interpretant
- (6) and no general sign can be conveyed without a instance
- (6') But an instance is a singular sign
- (6'') And whatever is subjectively singular exists
- (7) Now existence consists in potency of action
- (7') But the potency of action is not a sign unless it is a sign

Man comes from the womb
in actuality an animal little
higher than a fish; by no
means so high as a serpent.
His humanity consists in his
destination.

He ^{becomes} not actual man until
he acquires self control and then
he is so in the measure of his
self control. Woman is lower
than man ^{in the measure of her} self control. She
is ^{inferior} as an animal (for
she has less self control).
For with feeble passions she is
more the victim of circumstances
than man is.

Man ~~becomes~~ ^{comes} to his
normal development
only through the control of
evil passions, which are
evil, only in the sense that
they ought to be controlled
and are good as the only
possible agents for
man's full development.

Personally, I believe in an
omnipotent God, and con-
sequently, I believe that the only

the only way to reach the normal state is through the control of the passions. The passions are the only agents for the development of the human mind. The passions are the only way to reach the normal state. The passions are the only way to reach the normal state. The passions are the only way to reach the normal state.

or until
 and then
 of his
 lower
^{pass}ing her
 and (for
^{and for} control. If
 and she is
 malnourished.

not be a linear function of $\log x$
 so much as a function of $\log x$
 of some higher order. The logarithm
 of x is a much better
 approximation to $\log x$ than
 $\log x$ itself. The
 logarithm of x is a
 function of $\log x$ and
 of $\log x$ is a
 function of $\log x$.

true solution of the problem of evil is that
 of Substitution & Shadowing that God delights
 in evil not per se (not because it
 is the only means in His power for
 effecting His purposes, but because He
 at together with it ^{which is necessary} wishes it to be). The
 truth is the fact commonly that we are right
 to war againstly but that does not prevent
 His own admirable per se as to God's
 mind it is, and as we ought to try to
 comprehend that it is, — which we
 can do, but only through self-control.
 It may be objected with truth that the
 control of evil passions is not genuine
 self-control but is only the substitution of
 one passion for another, just as the
 trainer of an elephant, dog, or horse only
 imposes his own control upon the animal.
 But the reply to this objection is that just
 as that animal by the process does become
 a genuine self-control & is capable of a
 genuine self-control, so though the control
 never has been taught, so though the control
 of evil passions is not itself genuine self-
 control, it leads to the development of this.

(9) The above is only pertinent only
 so far as it shows that man's existence is
^{his growing to act}
 a man's conduct solely in acting begin
 his conduct.

1. If the doctrine that the True is the Satisfactory be that these two words are synonymous, it is not a doctrine of philosophy, but only a proposition in English lexicography.

2. It seems plain, however, that it is a doctrine of philosophy, vaguely expressed, and that the assertion is that while to be True means something else, ^{yet the True} it is coextensive with that Satisfactory in cognition.

3. In that case, ~~the~~ it is indispensable to say what is meant by the True: until this is done the statement has no meaning. I suppose that by the True is meant that at which inquiry aims.

4. It is equally indispensable to ascertain what is meant by Satisfactory; but this is by no means so easy. Whatever be meant, however, if the doctrine is true at all, it must be necessarily true. For it is the

very object conceived in entertaining the purpose of the inquiry that is asserted to have the character of satisfactoriness.

5. Is the Satisfactory meant to be whatever excites a certain peculiar feeling of satisfaction? In that case, the doctrine is simply Hedonism in so far as it affects the field of cognition. For when Hedonists talk of "pleasure," they do not mean what is so called in ordinary speech but what excites a feeling of satisfaction.

6. But to say that an action or the result of an action is Satisfactory is simply to say that it is congruous with to the aim of that action. Consequently, the aim must be determined before it can be determined, either in thought or in fact, to be satisfactory. An action that had no other aim than to be congruous to its aim would have no

aim at all, and would not be a deliberate action.

7. The hedonists do not offer their doctrine as an induction from experience but insist that, in the nature of things, ^{that} ~~from the necessity of the conception, one~~ action can have no other aim than "pleasure". Now it is conceivable that an action should be disconnected from every other in its aim. Such an action, then, according to hedonistic doctrine, can have no other aim than that of satisfying its own aim, which is absurd.

8. But if the hedonist replies that his position does not relate to satisfaction but to the feeling ~~of~~ that only arises upon satisfaction, the rejoinder will be that feeling is incomprehensible, so that no necessary truth can be discovered about it. But as a matter of observation we do,  now and then,

meat with persons who very largely
behave with a view of experiencing
this or that feeling. These people, however,
are exceptional, and are wretched beings
sharply marked off from the mass of
human beings
mean kind.

9. It is, however, no doubt, true that men act, especially in the action of enquiring, as if their sole purpose were to produce of certain state of feeling, in the sense that when that state of feeling is attained, there is no further effort. It was upon that proposition that I originally based pragmatism, laying it down in the article that ~~was~~ in November 1877, prepared the ground for ^{my argument for the} ~~the~~ pragmatic doctrine (see ^{Phil. Sci. Monthly, for} ~~Jan.~~ January, 1878). In the case of inquiry, I called that state of feeling "firm belief," and said, "As soon as

a firm belief is reached we are entirely satisfied, whether the belief be true or false," and went on to show how the action of experience consequently was to create the conception of real truth. Early in 1880, in the opening paragraphs of my memoir in Vol. III. of the American Journal of Mathematics, I referred the matter to the fundamental properties of protoplasm, showing that purposive action must be action virtually directed toward the removal of stimulation.

10. My paper of November 1877, setting out ~~with~~ from the proposition that ^{the agitation of} ~~the agitation of~~ a question ceases ^{when satisfaction is attained} ~~and only~~ with the settlement of belief and then only, goes on to consider how the conception of truth gradually develops from that principle under the action of experience, beginning with wilful belief, or self-mendacity, the  most degraded

of all intellectual conditions; thence rising
to the imposition of beliefs by the authority
of organized society; then to the idea of a
settlement of opinion as the result of a
fermentation of ideas; and finally reach-
ing the idea of truth as overwhelmingly
forced upon the mind in experience as
the effect of an independent reality.