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**Charles S. Peirce, MS 280 (Fall 1905)**

### **The Basis of Pragmaticism**

In one of the two usual acceptations [sic, acceptations] of the term “philosophy”, that one in which the present writer is accustomed to employ it, [as meaning] cenoscopic, no synthetic, or positive, philosophy, [a] philosophical [explanation] is as much a logical analysis as is a philosophical definition. In the special, or idioscopic, sciences, research either consists in, or springs out of, the discovery of novel phenomena. That it is which renders those sciences special. For one cannot pick up new phenomena wherever one likes; [they are necessarily rareties [sic, rarities]; or else they would have been well-known before], but after one such phenomenon has been discovered and some of the conditions of its apparition have been ascertained, one’s next step will naturally be to formulate its laws; [proceeding] ~~and~~ after that, [to] measure the [p.2] constants of the formula. In this business some other hitherto unknown phenomenon not unusually comes to light, and the study of this will follow a similar course. For that reason, [and also because the same new art, new situation, or other new facility which brings one to light will equally serve to disclose others], novel phenomena are clustering flowers. Or we may compare them to the crowd of new experiences that foreign travel brings. In dealing with them, it is a matter of course that one should almost bid adieu, at the outset, to familiar conceptions, and drop one’s mother tongue; and nobody dreams of confining the scientist to the vocabulary of fine letters. A technical nomenclature and terminology are manifest necessities for him; and any extension of [the] vernacular to the strange objects of special science is quite needless. It is even objectionable. A physicist, for [example], could get along without any resort to the word “light”; could, that [p.3] is, if he had provided himself with a suitable technical vocabulary. If he employs that word, he will be forced to apply it in violation of its proper meaning. He will have to call invisible rays “light”; and in point of fact, a particular variety of such rays are known, in physics, by the absurd designation of “dark light.” Even an ethnologist, when he interests himself, let us say, in household utensils, considers them from a standpoint so remote from the familiar one, that he has no motive for calling them by their familiar names, except that those names are at hand. A chemist, it is true, may be given to speaking of “black lead,” “Roman vitriol,” or even “sprit of sea salt.” A suitable name for this last, such as *chlorhalid acid* would be, has never been introduced. The chemical nomenclature is, however, [so] decidedly more convenient [p.4] for the chemist’s purposes, that if he uses the prescientific styles,

one cannot help suspecting a ~~pedantic~~ bit of pedantic vanity, to show off his acquaintance with ~~an~~ ~~unfamiliar~~ a, to him, foreign lingo.

With philosophy, the case is remarkably different. It is, to be sure, indispensably [sic, indispensably] requisite to philosophy's ever becoming a healthy science, that it should clothe itself in a vocabulary of its own; and because technical words have not been supplied to it, one by one, as they were needed, philosophists will simply be forced, some day, *qui n'est pas loin*, to sit down and commit a whole glossary to memory, at once. Their modern submission to that ordinary rule of rhetoric that forbids departure from polite usage, as if it ~~were binding upon them~~ [they were not exempt from its application], is as gross a [p.5] violation of the essential principles of rhetoric as could easily be imagined, and is in the worst of bad taste. At the same time, [along with its peculiar, technical vocabulary], it is at least equally needful that philosophy should adopt into its language a body of words of vague significations with which to identify those vague ideas of ordinary life which it is its business to analyze; and for this purpose vernacular locutions, if unmistakably apt, ~~are~~ ~~the~~ will be the best. This character of its language is inseparable from philosophy, and seems to be ~~unparalleled: no other science shows a need of~~ [a peculiar property of this branch of science, *proprie proprium*, [Greek omitted], and manifests a need here of] words of two different series, the same thing being sometimes named in both lists. In no other science ~~needs terms~~ [is there a scientific need of terms] whose meanings ~~must be~~ ~~v~~ are required to be vague.<sup>1</sup>

To express the meanings of the latter set of words in terms of the former set is the chief task of philosophy, at present, and will continue to be so until, this work being done, the schooling of the queen of the sciences shall be finished, — the queen bee of the sciences, she might have been entitled, — and [until] she shall ~~be ready~~ [thus be prepared] for fertilization by new experience. ~~It is not, however~~ [This business of thus expressing the meanings of one set of words by means of the other set is far from being] a question of ascertaining the usage of language, [it is a question of] analysing ideas. [Some will certainly maintain that it is not the definite words that are to be defined in terms of ~~the~~ common words.]

What is to be the general character of this analysis, and what are to be the definite ideas into which the vague notions of instinct, tradition, and uncontrolled intellection are to be translated? Pragmaticism is an attempt to answer a part of this question. The whole ground is far too extensive to be fully [and regularly] surveyed in a single article; but something like a swift reconnaissance of so [p.7] much of it as comes within the writer's scope shall here be essayed.

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<sup>1</sup> If my memory does not deceive me, Renouvier, at the beginning of his *Essai de philosophie critique*, has some remarks about the twofold vocabulary of philosophy of somewhat similar tenor to the above [p.6].

To a student of the logic of relations the errors into which the very greatest thinkers have fallen regarding logical composition, and consequently regarding the business of logical analysis seem most extraordinary when they are first brought to light. But reflection shows that such blunders are inevitable as long as philosophical investigation is ~~carried on~~ conducted in the way it now is. They will cease when a proper method, ~~comes into~~ [to be hereinafter explained], comes to be adopted, and not before.

Kant sets out from the obvious truth that cognition is the result of the interaction of two independent agents, the mind and the real object. But thereupon, without any further reason except the criterion of universality and necessity, which [p.8] warrants no such conclusion, he jumps to the assumption that cognition has two parts; its matter, which is determined by the object; and its form, which is determined by the mind. A musical note may be produced by the interaction of a violin-string and a bow; but does it follow that the sound has two parts, the one due to the string, and the other to the bow? Or must the pain of having a tooth drawn necessarily consist of two parts, one due to the tooth and the other to the dentist's tug? The only answer possible is that the analogous division of cognition results from the criterion of universality and necessity. Kant no doubt derived that principle from the *Nouveaux Essais* of Leibniz, which was published in 1765 in ample time for Kant's first presentation of his critical [p.9] philosophy in 1770, in this *Disputatio de mundi sensibilis atque intelligibilis forma et principiis*, or, as we may nickname it, his *De mundo*. Perhaps Leibniz borrowed the criterion from Lord Herbert of Cherbury; but there were other possible sources. It is ~~directly~~ only to propositions that these writers directly apply the criterion; and of course with them the "universal" and the "necessary" are taken in their usual acceptations [sic, acceptations] of logic; only the universal proposition must have a general term for its subject, and its distribution must be extended to every possible individual under that term, or else to every individual that may come into being in the future. Such universality it a variety of necessity, and *necessity* plainly cannot be matter of sense perception. But this truth [p.10] does not furnish any *criterion*, inasmuch as the proposition to which the mode is attached, may be verifiable by experience taken by itself without the mode, *de inesse*. It is simply this single conception of necessity that is furnished by the mind. Since Kant speaks, [not merely of judgments, but] of concepts and of intuitions as "universal" and as "necessary", it is plain that he must use these terms in modified senses. These senses are sufficiently explained in the *De Mundo*. (Articles 1 and 2). By calling a term "necessary", he means that a proposition of importance of which that term is the predicate is necessary. This is no proof that the concept is purely *a priori*. As for "universal," as applied to time and space, if we disengage it from some errors of analysis, we find that it refers, not to distributive, but to collective universality. [p.11]

By saying that Space and Time are “universal,” he means that every external object of possible experience must be thought to occupy some position in Space, and that every object of internal experience has some date in Time. Such is Kant’s “universality” of Space and Time. Their “necessity” consists, not in our being forced to think that everything ~~external~~ [without us] has a place and everything within us a date, but in our thinking that the one *must* have a place, and that the other *must* have a date. It would be quite irrelevant to the present criticism to stop to inquire whether or not such universality and necessity do or do not prove that there is anything mental in Space and Time, or if so whether they have any exclusive reference to the thinker’s personal mind. Our question is whether, granting the premises, they prove that Space and [p.12] Time are *purely* mental, and not affected by both the correlates of cognition. If any such inference be justifiable, it must be by some circumstance that we have not sufficiently taken into account; and this can only be the individuality of all Space and of all Time, upon which Kant always strongly insists, as if he felt that that was ~~not~~ of vital importance to his system. As to this individuality of all Space and all Time, there seems to be a question of fact which must not be answered one way or the other without great caution. If it be a fact that we cannot think of an external object, even though we think of it as unreal and fictitious without thinking of it as placed somewhere in the one Space of the physical universe, that would indeed seem to be a powerful argument in favour of the mental pro- [p.13] venance of spatiality. But if it is only so far as we think an external object to be real that we are forced to think of it as placed in real Space, this will be sufficiently accounted for by our having learned that all real and thoroughly external objects are in the one Space of the physical universe. Several precautions have to be observed in examining into this matter experimentally. We must not, for example, confound not thinking what the place of a body or phantasm is with not thinking that it is in any real place. Nor must we overlook the point that some objects are thought to be nonexistent ~~and~~ while yet the thought is that if they were existent they would be real external objects. Any conditional sentence with an unreal protasis illustrates [p.14] this. Kant is particularly given to insisting that we can imagine empty space, or space empty except for three straight filaments cutting one another orthogonally; and so we can. But to say that doing this involves ~~supposing~~ imagining the entire physical universe, including our own bodies and senses to be annihilated, is a proposition more than doubtful. A practised mind has no difficulty in imagining non-Euclidean geometry without supposing the real universe to be so constituted; and yet there is no real place in which the figures can be. It is not difficult to imagine some magic art by which our universe should disappear and be replaced, ~~by an~~ as in a dissolving view, by another world in a space of its own, having no spatial relation to our [p.15] Space, and in imagining that we could pass at will by some appropriate means, from one space to the other. Indeed, when one is drowsy, ~~we have~~ [one

experiences] sometimes a phenomenon not unlike that. On the whole, as far as Space is concerned, the evidence seems to be dead against Kant. With Time the case may be different, but in any event the crudeness of his assumption that because cognition is the product of the reaction of two factors therefore there must be some element of it that is due to one alone ~~seems~~ is apparent.

A native logical genius of a different kind from that of Kant, but in its way unparalleled among metaphysicians since Aristotle was that of Leibniz; but his view of the composition of concepts was as crude. This earliest philoso- [p.16] phical work of any importance, written at the age of thirty-eight and some months, was his *Meditationes de Cognitione Veritate et Ideis*. We here find it laid down that every definition “*nihil aliud est quam enumeratio notarum sufficientium.*” Though this may sound commonplace today, no such statement will easily be found in any earlier work. For few even of the opponents of Aristotle had given up the distinction between the genus and specific difference; and those who did not use the predicables were not so bold as to say that the marks were all joined in one way, so that an enumeration of the would suffice. One could wish that Leibniz had illuminated his doctrine by defining *stepmother* and *mother-in-law*. If a [p.17] pragmatist could have asked Leibniz what the meaning of a concept, other than a “symbolical” one is, he would find himself treated as a foolish person. “The meaning of a concept!” the great nominalist would have exclaimed, “The concept *is* meaning.” Accordingly he says, “*Datur cognitio distincta notionis indefinibilis, quando ea est primitiva, sive nota sui ipsius, hoc est, cum est irresolubilis, ac non nisi per se intelligitur, atque adeo caret requisites.*” He evidently thinks that every indecomposable idea must necessarily be like the idea of blue or that of grief in being of such quality as it is, in itself, regardless of anything else. It is amazing that such a mind should have supposed that a simple mixture of sensations could make up any intellectual concept. [p.18] But such absurdities are simply the inevitable results of philosophizing unarchitectonically; for it is requisite to be architectonic beyond what Kant dreamed of. Five minutes’ active reflexion about a relative term would be more than sufficient to show that logical analysis, which ~~is~~ [ought to be] the chief business of a philosopher until it is fully worked out, must be something quite different from what Leibniz and Kant imagined. But seeing what were the blunders of those great minds, let not many lines be wasted in expression of astonishment at the ineffable booziness of the [old] university obscurantists [(may the young men only fulfill their promise and turn out better stuff)] who even when the [importance of the] results of the logic of relations has been reported to him in a general way extends no aid to their publication, [but prevents it by his advice], even when all the labor [of the research] has been done, [p.19] and the worker solicits journals and institutions in vain even to print a memoir on existential graphs. We won’t send out into the highways and hedges and

compel them to come in. If there had not been in England such an odd man as Edmund Halley, Newton's *Principia* might not have been printed yet.

Take any proposition and erase certain parts of it, so that it is no longer a proposition but only a blank form which after every blank had been filled by a proper name would become a proposition, however nonsensical. Such a blank form of proposition which can be converted into a proposition by filling every blank with a proper name has been called by the writer a *rheme*. There may be any integer [non-negative] number of blanks, so that ~~even~~ the term rheme is extended even to a full proposition [p. 20] when it is looked upon as having a number of blanks which happens to be gone. According as the number of blanks is 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, etc., the rheme is called a *medad* [from [Greek omitted] + the patronymic [-Greek] in the Accusative], *monad*, *dyad*, *triad*, *tetrad*, etc. Any rheme can be understood, which is as much as to say that it can be mentally conceived; and therefore there are concepts that are tetrads, triads, dyads, etc. as well as monads. But a medad can only be a mental proposition, which one may call a judgment, or *Urtheil*, provided it will be well understood that in so far as it is a medad, it need not be *asserted*, or mentally ~~accepted~~ *assented to*: it need only be understood. But neither English nor any modern language spoken west of Posen (Basque least of all) nor Latin is at all adapted to ~~making~~ [expressing clearly] the nature of [p. 21]<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> [a.p. 21, marked out] of the rheme. It might prove inconvenient to write in Ancient Egyptian; more readers would be lost than could be spared. The editor can translate the matter into Chinese, if he sees fit. Meantime the system of Existential Graphs, — the happiest discovery that has been made in logic since Boole, — a system from which those Entitative Graphs given by the writer in the Vol. VII of ~~this year~~ the *Monist* just too early for the Existential kind differ just enough to miss entirely the virtues of these, can be sufficiently explained to show what a rheme is. The grounds for the high estimate of the value of this system of logical expression could only be ~~exhibited disclosed~~ [laid bare] in a dozen pages or more. Meantime, in following the description, the more lightly the reader can take it, the more in the spirit of fun, joined to exact accuracy, just as he would listen to the rules of a new game, the more fully he will be able to seize the intellectual value of the system.

We devote a certain surface, — a sheet of paper, a black board, or a slate, — to such a use that whatever proposition is expressed upon [p. 22, marked out] it shall be understood (in make-believe, for we are only studying logic and not attaching any real importance to ~~what~~ the substance of our propositions) to be asseverated by the graphist and to be implicitly believed by the interpreter. This surface we call the *sheet of assertion*. It represents the state of mind of the interpreter, with everything that [is well understood to be] taken for granted between the two parties. The graphist writes or draws, — best say he “scribes”, — upon this sheet, whatever proposition he at the same time impresses [(in make-believe)] on the belief of the interpreter. The latter is, however, at liberty [...]

[p. 22, variant, not marked out] it shall be understood (in make-believe, you know, for we are only studying logic and not attaching any importance to the matter of the propositions which we take as examples), to have been asseverated by the graphist and to be implicitly believed by the interpreter. This surface we call the *sheet of assertion*. It is supposed, that is imagined in make-believe, to be the mirror of the state of mind of the interpreter. The

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graphist never touches it. It is the interpreter who writes or draws (best say “scribes”) upon the sheet what the graphist *permits*, but does not compel, him to say to himself, or to erase what the graphist permits him to erase saying to himself. There is a general *Code of Permissions*. Of which the first is that he may scribe on [whatever part of] the sheet of assertion ~~whatever~~ [he pleases anything] the graphist gives him special permission to scribe, and the second is that he may at any time erase any proposition scribed on the sheet of assertion. It is well [p. 23, not marked out] to imagine the sheet to be very large; and the interpreter may move it so as to carry what is written upon it far beyond the field of vision. This will mirror his putting the propositions away from his attention. The third permission is that whatever the interpreter has been permitted to scribe on the sheet of assertion he may so scribe at any time and upon any occupied part of the sheet, just as he has a logical right to recollect anything that he has been convinced is true, and to recollect it in any connection that may suit his purpose. The Graphist is really Plastic Nature, or the Artifex of Nature; and the special permissions are the experiences given to the interpreter of Nature, to the man, to which he is at liberty to attend, or not to attend at all, or to attend and immediately put out of sight, as he will. Or, although he may have neglected it at the [p. 24, not marked out] time he is at any later time, and in any connection, warranted in recalling whatever experience may have ever warranted him in believing. ~~But~~ The sheet being immense, no matter how much is scribed upon it, immensely more will be blank. What, then, is the interpretation of these vast blanks? We have already said that the sheet at the outset represented all the truth that was well-understood between Graphist and interpreter to be taken for granted, — that is especially, all innate and instinctive knowledge. Yes, that is very well; but these vast blank areas considered as places where numberless propositions might be scribed, what do they mean? If the reader puts this question, the writer can only say that he is putting words in his mouth. If he wishes them to be pronounced, they represent all the truths of Nature that have not yet been definitely divulged [p. 25, not marked out] although it has been well-understood from the outset that such truths there were, [and] innumerable, unmeasurable. That is what the *areas* represent; but now it is time the reader should be further informed that every *point* of the sheet represents an individual object of the universe; though two points do not necessarily represent two different objects of the universe. That would contradict what has already been agreed upon, as will appear below. But “Stop a bit”, some deep student may say, “Am I to understand that you consider the continuous sheet to be a collection of points?” “By no means”, so must the answer run, “whether you think it correct or not, for the purposes of this system of graphs you are to understand or feign that there are no points upon a smooth, homogeneous surface, until some point being marked, a point is thereby created there; and so likewise you [p. 26, not marked out] are to believe or feign that in Nature itself there are no individual objects until some action taking place thereby draws attention to an individual object and thereby creates it. But in the heart of Nature’s self there are no such actions and no individuals acting or suffering. That attributes a certain truth to Kant’s subjectivity of Time. Only the moment a point is marked it is there, and in so far as it might have been marked before, it ~~virtually~~ was there *in posse*; and the moment an actual event occurs in Nature, an individual subject or subjects of the action there really is or are, and *in posse* always were. Even when a point is marked (and for a reason to appear later it should be marked quite heavily) this does not show what individual object it is. Evidently, two different points may represent the same individual, since the same proposition may be ~~written~~ [p. 27, not marked out] scribed on different parts of the sheet without any difference of meaning. The point simply refers to *something*. But *one point cannot stand for two different individuals*. This is inevitable, since to say that whatever is true of A is true of A and *vice versa* is to say that A is B. Now whatever is connected with any point is connected with every point in the same place. Hence it further follows that is two points heavily marked are connected by a heavy line or continuum of heavy points, since every point of the line stands for a simple individual, all the points of the line stand for the same individual, and

the rheme. A resort to Ancient Egyptian might lose a reader; and the writer, having no turn for languages, might not be able to learn Chinese in time for the next number. But there is the system of “Existential Graphs.” The writer described a system of logical graphs, since named “Entitative Graphs,” in Vol. VIII of the *Monist*, (pp. 163-188); but the ink was hardly dry on the sheets (of [sic, or] would hardly have been so in old-fashion of printing of his youth) when he discovered the far preferable system, on the whole, of Existential Graphs, which are merely entitative graphs turned inside out, and sent the gracious Editor a paper on the subject that could have been squeezed into a single number by simply excluding everything else. But the Editor feared that ~~such~~ so swift [p. 22] the advances of exact logic seemed to be, that, before the ~~printing was~~ types were half set up, the second system might be superseded. However, eight years ~~had~~ have elapsed and one jot or one tittle has in no wise passed from the system. Seriously, it is quite the luckiest find that has been gained in exact logic since Boole. A long article would be needed to make this manifest; but there may, perhaps be room for a brief description of the essential features and of such others as illuminate the composition of concepts. The definitions shall all be given in strictly ~~pragmatistic~~ [pragmaticistic] form; that is in the form of precepts of conduct, more definitely speaking, as *permissions* to do certain things under expressed general circumstances. It will not be necessary to push the

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the line *asserts* that the individuals denoted by its extremities are one and the same. Such a line is called a *line of identity*. A capital letter may be attached to a marked point to render it a designate individual. This letter, which will be equivalent either to a proper name or to a relative pronoun, is called a *selective*.

As a singular term is represented by a marked point of the sheet, [p. 28, not marked out] so a general term must be represented by a marked continuum of points, that is, by a line or area. But a line, as we have seen, must signify identity. Hence, every other general term must be represented by a marked area, called a *spot*. Some inscription upon the area will show what the signification is. But there is a special convention in regard to this. The spot is marked off by a fine oval line, [called a *cut*], surrounding it. This cut is ~~not~~ regarded as lying on the sheet of assertion, and therefore as being asserted. But it is not considered to be a line, but to be a *cut*, which sever the area within, called the *area of the cut* from the sheet or other area on which the cut lies, which outer area is called the *place of the cut*. That which is within the area, then, is not on the sheet, and is not asserted, and being thus positively and assertorically cut [p. 29, not marked out] off from the sheet, is understood to be *denied*. For example, this (it rains) is by this special convention understood, supposing it to be scribed on the sheet of assertion, to assert “It does not rain”. Consequently, this ((It rains)) will *deny* that it does *not* rain; that is, will assert that it rains. So much for the medad spot. If a spot is not a medad it must have a determinate place on its cut, [called a *hook*], appropriated to denote each subject, a grammatical object being considered to be a subject. Thus in the proposition “Cain kills Abel”, we shall say that Cain is the “subject nominative” and Abel the “subject accusative”. We shall usually appropriate the left-most point of the cut to the subject nominative, the right-most point to the subject accusative, the lowermost point to the “subject dative” or other indirect object when there is but one such, and the upper- [p. 30, not marked out] most point to whatever other “subject” there may be. If these are more than four subjects a special convention must settle the denotations of the several hooks.



definitions for and in the present exposition finicky accuracy must yield to perspicuity. [p. 23] Let a word of counsel be pardoned as to the manner in which this and other pragmatistic writings should be studied; for this matter of existential graphs is most important, — practically important, serious, and even lofty. Owing to the great part that activity plays in pragmaticistic, and more or less in all pragmatistic, thought, the prime need for comprehending it is to be in a lively state of mind. There is an attitude of spirit that is separated only by a swordblade from fun, and yet is in ~~the~~ fullest harmony with all that is spiritual and even hungers for that which is devotional. But if the reader cannot compass this, let him read these permissions and the commentary as he would listen to the rules of a new and intricate game, very closely attentive, but wide awake to purpose of preparing [p. 24] for a lively and lightsome contest. The writer has a dear friend of most active and agile intellect, and most spiritually minded withal. Moreover, he is a pragmatist of the strait sect himself. But when he comes to hear the writer lecture, he seats himself, contracts his brow, and evidently prepares himself for a tussle. The natural result is that he does not understand one word; while if he had made up his mind that understanding the doctrine was like stepping from a floating log into the water, he would have no more difficulty than the simple have, who always understand when they are not feared. To begin then.

We single out a certain surface, be it that of a sheet of paper, a blackboard, a school slate, or what not, and agree [p. 25] to endow it with a certain quality, which is that any proposition, or sentence fit to express an assertion, when it is written on that surface we make believe it is actually asserted. [*We call that surface the sheet of assertion.*] So, it is a capital exercise in handwriting to write one's name over and over again on any odd scraps of paper; only it will be just as well to see to it that none of those scraps happen to be promissory notes; for otherwise the writing-lesson might cost more than it was worth. We do not seriously assert a sentence written on the sheet of assertion, because we are only studying logic, that is ~~the~~ [certain] relations of one assertion to another that remain the same whether one of the propositions is true or not.

To *assert* a proposition means to accept a responsibility for [p. 26]<sup>3</sup> it, so that if it turns out ill, or as Mr. Schiller says (by implication) *unsatisfactory*, in a certain way which we need

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<sup>3</sup> [a.p. 26, not marked out] its truth, to indicate the particular proposition asserted with such concomitants that if it turns out false one will experience a disagreeable consequence. A *false* proposition is one which [any] one will be thus punished for asserting; and for present purposes it is unnecessary to inquire upon what principle the punishment will be inflicted. A *true* proposition is one of which the assertion brings no such punishment. As to what a *proposition* is, it will be sufficient that it is a general form, pattern, or type of a collection of lines that may be written or drawn, we had best say *scribed*, upon a surface like the sheet of assertion, and which moreover has some [directly visible] general character the absence of which will afford positive security that no punishment can attend its being [p. 27, not marked out]

not define, but which is called proving to be *false*, he who has asserted it regrets having done so. Aristotle defines the proposition (Perihermeneias, cap.iv.17a3) as that [Greek omitted]; but being true is the absence of falsity. Propositions are usually true, and nothing in particular ~~results from~~ happens to a man in consequence of his [merely] having given true information. The ~~peculiarity of~~ peculiar characteristic of the proposition lies not in its possibly *being* false, but in its possibly *turning out* to be false, and this whether it has been positively held or merely by ~~not dream~~ suspecting the possibility of its denial. That is ~~what all progress~~ [wherein all advancement and diffusion] of knowledge consists. [p. 27]

Note that a proposition is nothing existent, but is a general model, type, or law according to which existents are shaped. Here, for instance, are half a dozen existent writings:

Solomon built him an house.

[Greek omitted]

Solomon built him a house.

Salomon aedificavit illi domum.

Solomon built a house for himself.

Solomon a adeiladodd dŷ iddo ef.

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scribed on the sheet of assertion. It is not the collection of lines that constitute the proposition by a [perceptible] general character of those lines. The meaning of this may be illustrated as follows. These three lines **t h e** do not constitute the word *the*. For these quite different lines **T H E** have the same relation to *one and the same single word*; and so do these, **thē**; and so do a pair of sounds **œf** that one might utter; and so do rattling sounds of lengths like these **\_\_\_\_\_**. These are different *modes of utterance* of one selfsame word. Three marks or three sounds which are but in a single place at a single instant of time is a *singular instance* of the word. It is not *individual*, since it is capable of further determination. The individual instance is instantaneous, as to each part of it. The following are different forms one selfsame proposition: [end of variant]

**[a.p. 26, variant, marked out]** it, so that if it turns out ill [(or as Schiller says, unsatisfactory)] in a certain way which we need not define, but which is called proving to be *false*, he who has asserted it regrets having done so. It may be mentioned, by the way, though it is hardly relevant to the present purpose, that a *proposition* was rightly defined by Aristotle as that which may be false [footnote: Aristotle says (Perihermeneias, cap.4.,17a3) [Greek omitted]] But truth is, from the point of view of formal logic, a mere negative character. Propositions are ~~gene~~ usually true, and nothing in particular happens to him who gives true information. The peculiarity of the proposition is ~~the from~~ ~~the point of view of syllogistic, is the derangement of affairs caused by its being false. All progress in knowledge consists in surprise and surprise is failing a proposition to be false.~~ [is that it may have to be corrected; and all progress in knowledge consists in correcting explicitly held or implicitly and passively assumed (in that their falsity is not dreamed of) propositions.]

But they are all existing singular<sup>4</sup> *instances* of one self-some proposition. ~~The form of propo~~ [Such a form of expression of] any proposition ~~which~~ [as] is adapted [p. 28]<sup>5</sup> to use in this system, and

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<sup>4</sup> The *individual*, [Greek omitted], is that which is in every respect determinate. It is, therefore, the instantaneous state of an existent. The *singular*, [Greek omitted], is that which has a continuity of existence in time and at each instant is absolutely determinate.

<sup>5</sup> [a.p. 28, not marked out] to use in the system of existential graphs, and is determinate in all significant respects, but is nevertheless a general type and not an existent is termed a *graph*, for short; [for] though there are chemical and algebraical graphs, a graph being properly any diagram composed of spots and lines ~~connecting spots~~ [of connection], yet there will be no danger of confusion.

[**a.p. 28, variant, not marked out**] to expression in the system of existential graphs, and is determinate in all significant respects, but is nevertheless a general type, not an existent is termed a *graph*, for short; though there are chemical and algebraic graphs. We have, therefore, to distinguish the *graph* from the *graph-instance*. When a graph-instance is made upon the sheet of assertion or other area we say that *the graph is scribed on* that area.

Two parties are concerned in the scribing of graphs. The one is called the *Graphist*, the other the *interpreter*. In one way of conceiving the matter, the latter does all the scribing; the former authorizes him to scribe a given graph or graphs and furthermore the interpreter is permitted to make transformations according to a general code of transformations. The sheet of assertion is [a.p. 29, not marked out] best conceived as if it were a portion of an immense sheet upon which [end of variant]

[**a.p. 29, variant 2, not marked out**] the mirror of the interpreter's mind, and through that it is the sign of what the Graphist authorizes. Now the graphist, as the author of truth (for we have seen that falsity is what he forbids and truth what he permits) and source of all the interpreter's knowledge must be recognized as being either Plastic Nature or the Artifex of Nature. The universe is simply ~~that~~ the collective whole of all things ~~of which~~ to the ~~predication~~ [assertion] of whose existence the Graphist interposes no veto, or extends a positive permission.

The reason why it is necessary to ~~have assume~~ [imagine] a Graphist as well as an interpreter is [that] logic cannot be successfully studied without perfectly clear ideas. Now the graphs and the sheet of assertion are represented as signs; but if they are signs, they must, [a.p. 30, not marked out] according to the principles of pragmatism, function as such. For it will be found to be a corollary from that principle that existence consists in action. The conception of the functioning of a sign, as such, is a hard one to analyze, and in this brief and semipopular paper it will be impossible to go through the discussion of it, which will unfortunately give to some of ~~the~~ [its] conclusions the air of being of that loose kind to which the metaphysicians are so much given; and that must remain the impression until the writer's seven lectures in Harvard University on the subject of the present paper can find a publisher. A critical analysis of the nature of a sign would show that the action requires a source of concepts to be conveyed, and therefore in some [a.p. 31, not marked out] sense a mind from which the ~~ideas and~~ [concepts] propositions, and arguments are conveyed to the mind of the interpreter; and the two minds must be capable of coming to an understanding and of observing it when it is reached. This supposes a power of deliberate self-controlled thinking. Now nothing can be controlled that cannot be observed while it is in action. It is therefore requisite that both minds but especially ~~that of~~ the Graphist-mind should have a power of self-observation. Moreover, control supposes a capacity in that which is to be controlled of acting in accordance with definite tendencies of a tolerably stable nature, which implies a reality in this governing principle. But these habits, so to call them, must be capable of being modified according to

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[a.p. 32, not marked out] some ideal in the mind of the controlling agent; and this controlling agent is to be the very same as the agent controlled; the control extending even to the modes of control themselves, since we suppose that the interpreter[-mind] under the guidance of the Graphist-mind discusses the rationale of logic itself. Taking all these factors into account, in a way that can here only be suggested, we should come to the same conclusion that common-sense would have jumped to at the outset; namely, that the Graphist-mind and interpreter-mind must have all the characters of personal intellects ~~endowed with~~ possessed of moral natures. But let us not be forgotten that the Graphist, whom we now speak of as a person, is such a person that the truth and being of the things that are objects of thought, consist [a.p. 33, not marked out] in his assent to their being.

To allow ourselves to be shunted from our track to pursue any theological argument that could be founded on these considerations would be a waste of space. Theological arguments, sound and fresh, glut the philosophical market ~~just now~~ [today]. A good religious argument would be more welcome; but ~~at present~~ [just now] we have the vastly more important problem of the foundations of logical analysis to deal with.

It is time to explain the standing permissions of which the interpreter is at liberty to avail himself at any time. ~~Of~~ [Among] these there are two which have no relation to the ways of scribing a graph, and which should be considered as properties of the sheet of assertion. The first of these is that when the interpreter has obtained permission to [a.p. 34, not marked out] to scribe a graph on the sheet of assertion, he can wait and avail himself of the permission at any time and can then scribe it upon any unoccupied part of the sheet, regardless of what else may stand upon the sheet. In order to insure there always being room for it, the sheet of assertion must be imagined to be *immense* this word being taken ~~of~~ in its proper sense of *spatially immeasurable*. It follows that whatever [proposition] the interpreter is empowered to scribe, he may scribe as many times as he likes.

The propositions that the interpreter is empowered to scribe are of two kinds, [on the one hand], those which he has been explicitly empowered to scribe, which represents his experience in an experimental science, or represent facts supported by direct testimony in a documentary science; and on the other hand those propositions which the interpreter [a.p. 35, not marked out] is inferentially warranted in scribing.

The *meaning* of any graph-instance is the meaning of the composite of all the propositions which that graph-instance ~~empowers~~ [would under all circumstances empower] the interpreter to scribe, over and above what he would have been authorized to scribe, if he had not been authorized, directly or indirectly, to scribe ~~that~~ the graph of that instance. Thus, [the] sheet of assertion is a graph-instance, and its meaning is the meaning of all the standing permissions of the system, together with anything else that may be [which is in all cases] well understood between the graphist and the interpreter.

The *Standing Permissions* are five in number, of which two have nothing to do with the mode of scription. One of these has been already stated; namely, that whatever graph the interpreter [a.p. 36, not marked out] may be permitted to scribe he is permitted to scribe [at] any time upon any [vacant] part of the sheet of assertion regardless of what may already be scribed. But this is not to be understood as allowing a new graph-instance to touch a graph-instance already on the sheet. [end of variant]

[a.p. 30, variant, not marked out] according to pragmatism, function as such. For it is the essence of pragmatism to make existence to consist in action. But it is impossible to get a quite clear idea of a sign except as conveying an idea, which much not only arrive at a mind but must also set out from a mind, and thus the functioning of informative signs involves two minds. However it may be in metaphysics [end of variant]

[a.p. 35, variant, not marked out] is inferentially warranted in scribing.

which not only represents a determinate proposition but represents it in a determinate way, while indeterminate as to characters which are not significant, will be termed a *graph*, for short. Properly, the word “graph” denotes any diagram composed of spots and connecting lines; but no confusion will arise from giving it, [in this system], the special sense defined. Care must be taken not to confound a *graph* and a *graph-instance*. The latter exists; the former is ~~the~~ [a] type of what may exist. When a graph-instance is created by a pen, pencil, etc. upon the sheet of assertion or upon any other area, we use the expression, *the graph is scribed upon* that area. To “scribe,” then, means to embody in an existent ~~made for the purpose with~~ [with an instrument for making marks ] made for the purpose with a ~~marking~~ [writing or drawing] instruments [p. 29]<sup>6</sup>

In our make believe, two parties are feigned to be concerned in all scribing of graphs; the one called the *Graphist*, the other the *interpreter*. Although the sheet that is actually employed

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The *meaning* of any ~~graph~~ [graph-instance] is the meaning of the sum total or aggregate of all the propositions which that graph-instance enables the interpreter to scribe, over and above what he would have been able to scribe [end of variant]

<sup>6</sup> [a.p. 29, not marked out] Two parties are, [in our make-believe], feigned to be concerned in the scribing of graphs; the one called the *Graphist*, the other the *interpreter*. Namely, although the sheet that is actually employed may be quite small, we make believe that the so-called sheet of assertion is only a particular region or area of an immense surface; ~~upon which~~ [namely, the former is that part of the latter that falls within the field of view of the interpreter. Upon the great surface] the Graphist alone has the power to scribe any graph; while he scribes what he sees fit. The interpreter, for his part, has the power, [with more or less effort], to move the graph-instances about [as he pleases], so long as he keeps them separate from one another, so that no two shall touch. In particular, he can move such ones as he likes and as many as he likes into his field of view, the sheet of assertion; or he can move them away. We further conceive that this [a.p. 30, not marked out] feigned sensible state of things is the icon or emblem of a mental state of things. Namely, the immense surface with the graphs scribed upon it is the image of the interpreter’s experience, while the sheet of assertion, his field of view is the image of his field of attention. His experience is forced upon him, while he attends to what he pleases, if he ~~make~~ puts forth sufficient effort. The Graphist must be regarded as corresponding to the “Plastic Nature” of Cudworth, or else to the Artifex of Nature.

The necessity of imagining two persons is not obvious, and cannot be rendered evident in this brief exposition; but a sketch of the argument can be given. Concepts are signs. It is a corollary from the principle of pragmatism that existence [a.p. 31, not marked out] consists in action; but there are other ways of reaching this result, as is well known. Therefore, since the signs exist, they must function as signs. The function of a sign is to convey an idea. The idea must spring from the same source or factory of ideas, which we may call a mind without begging the question of its being personal. The sign must also be interpreted; so that there must be an interpreting agent. This understands the source of ideas. The two must come to an agreement or convention. They must, therefore be of the same general nature, and we may call the interpreting agent a mind likewise. Not only must they come to an understanding but must have the power of observing when it is reached. This involves purposive, deliberate, self-controlled thinking. Now [a.p. 32, not marked out] nothing can be controlled that cannot be observed while it is in action. [end of variant]

may be quite small, we make believe that the so-called sheet of assertion is only a particular region, or area, of an immense surface, namely that it is the field of ~~view~~ [‘distinct vision’] of the interpreter. It is only the Graphist who has the power to scribe a graph, and the graphs that he scribes are true, because the truth of the true consists in his being satisfied with it. The interpreter, for his part, has the power, with more or less effort, to move the graph-instances over the sheet, ~~into~~ [out of] his field of ~~view or out of it~~ distinct vision or into it if they are not quite out [p. 30]<sup>7</sup> of his sight. It is on this part of the immense surface that the Graphist almost always prefers to scribe new graphs, on the sheet of assertion, in the interpreter’s field of distinct vision, which means of his mental vision of his attention; and although they soon steal away, fatigued by the glare, yet at the very first the newborn graphs have a strong attraction [sic, attraction] toward the sheet of assertion so that if, as seldom but sometimes happens, the Graphist scribes a new graph elsewhere, it almost leaps to that focus.

What in general is the meaning of a graph? That is just what ~~I am~~ [we are] forbidden to say as yet. It would be a *petitio principii*. But we can say that the meaning of a [new] graph, or of any proposition [for that matter], is the meaning of all that one could know, [~~meaning~~] ~~with it,~~ ~~which one could~~ knowing it, [p. 31]<sup>8</sup> that one could not know, not knowing it. The sheet of assertion is a graph-instance. Its signification is the meaning of the standing permissions of the system and of all the ~~mutual~~ secret understandings between the Graphist and the interpreter.

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<sup>7</sup> of his sight. It is in his field of distinct vision, [which means mental vision or attention], the sheet of assertion, that the graphist commonly scribes [the] graphs; but [they soon steal away] unless the interpreter makes an effort to hold them there or to bring them back as soon as they pass away. While the graphs, [which are propositions], are getting scribed by the Graphist, they are accompanied by illustrations, ~~which~~ pictures called perceptions.

<sup>8</sup> [a.p. 31, marked out] that one could not know, not knowing it. The sheet of assertion is a graph-instance. Its meaning is the meaning of the standing permissions of the system and of all the mutual and secret understandings between Graphist and interpreter. But it is the nature of a proposition that it contains a subject or subjects [each of] which denotes an individual object irrationally by virtue of being [actually] connected with that object. Such for example is a proper name. The first time we hear it we gather from the ~~connection~~ context that it stands for some person, or place. The second time we meet it, we know it by associating the fact formerly asserted with that asserted on this second occasion. It denotes the bond of [a.p. 32, marked out] irrational connexion between these two. If we hear it often, ~~we gradually come~~ association by contiguity makes it *familiar*, that is, gives us a sense of confidence that we could use it correctly, and in a very few cases ~~gives~~ [imparts] a general meaning to the name. [Two] emperors a Roman and a French, a king of Lydia, another of Pylos, another of Judaea, a Prince of Troezen, politicians of Rome and of Florence, a princess of Troy and a matron of Athens, with may fictitious characters. Two horses are to be added, a number of buildings, Babel, Bedlam, Billingsgate, the Walhalla, the Starchamber, Grub Street, ~~and~~ such ~~real~~ places as Tophet, Maghala, Brummagen, Jericho, ~~and~~ [with] some fictitious ones; also [one monument and one] article of *virtu*, the Gordian knot.

The reader will here readily pardon a single paragraph of elementary logic; for if some of these matters have passed out of his ready recollection, he will be glad to refresh his memory; ~~and~~ [while] if he has them at his fingers' ends, it will be very easy reading, and he will desire to know which side the writer takes on contested points. [These commonplace *resumes* will serve to introduce matter accurately pertinent to the subject of this paper.] As a graph-instance, the sheet of assertion expresses and asserts a proposition. Now [p. 32] a proposition consists of two parts, the *predicate*, which excites something like an image [or dream] in the mind of its interpreter, and the subject, or subjects, each of which serves to identify ~~what~~ something ~~of~~ which the predicate ~~represents~~. In such propositions as “fulget” and “pluit,” the subject is only vaguely expressed in words, since the circumstances of the occasion, say, for example, if the utterer is looking out ~~of~~ [at] the window at the moment, render greater definiteness superfluous. Of two men seated chatting by the fire, one pulls out his watch and ~~says~~ [exclaims], “It is midnight, I declare!” The sagacity of the other and his knowledge of men is so great as to assure him that the speaker did not mean [p. 33] that it was midnight for their antipodes. Words were economized, therefore, by suppressing this subject. The old logic-books limit the term “subject” to the subject nominative. But the writer of this paper, who is anything but a linguist, happens to know of no less than four languages of widely separated families, [Gaelic, Arabic, Old Egyptian, the old Adelaide Australian], in which it is quite common for a sentence not to have any subject in the nominative; and since the possession of this feature had nothing to do with his knowing enough of those languages to know whether they had that peculiarity or not, he presumes there are scores of others [at least] of which the same thing is true. In the system of existential graphs, which expresses everything with a precision that no human tongue can approach, so that ~~exercize~~ [sic, exercise] in it strengthens the mental power of apprehension [p. 34]<sup>9</sup> to a degree that only experience of it can render credible, there is no

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<sup>9</sup> [a.p. 34, marked out] to a degree that only experience of it can render credible, there is no distinction whatever between a subject nominative, a subject accusative, a subject dative, etc. ~~There is only one~~ [A single] form ~~which~~ expresses at once, these sentences:

- A gives B to C; A enriches C with the possession of B;
- C receives B as a gift from A; C owes A the possession of B;
- B is given by A to C; B is received by C as a gift from A.

Write down any proposition. Erase from it such portions that what remains is a blank form of proposition which will become a proposition (however nonsensical) as soon as ~~even~~ each blank is filled with a proper name. Such a blank form is termed a *rheme*. According as the number of blanks is 0,1,2,3,4, etc., it is called a *medad* (from [Greek omitted], nothing, and the *patronymie* [quasi-partronymic [footnote: Grammarians may demur to the termination being called quasi-partronymic, but the words (excepting, of course, [Greek omitted]) are the best of Greek; [Greek omitted], etc.]] termination [Greek omitted], in the Acc.Sing.), [a.p. 35, not marked out] a *monad*, a *dyad*, a *triad*, a *tetrad*, etc.

distinction whatever between a subject nominative, a subject accusative or direct object, a subject dative or indirect object, etc. A single form of proposition expresses indifferently ~~all such~~ [every set of] sentences such as the following: Abel gives a Bolometer to Cain; Abel enriches Cain with the gift of a Bolometer; Cain receives a Bolometer as a gift from Abel; Cain is enriched by Abel with the gift of a Bolometer; A Bolometer is given by Abel to Cain; A Bolometer is added to Cain's possession as a gift from Abel.

Write down any proposition. Erase from it such portions as to leave it a blank form of proposition which will become a proposition (however nonsensical), as soon as ~~every~~ [each] blank is filled by a proper name. Such a blank form has been termed a *rheme*. According as the number of its blanks are 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, etc. it is called a *medad* [from [Greek omitted], nothing, plus the quasi-patronymoidal\* termination [Greek omitted], in the Acc.Sing.], a *monad*, a *dyad*, a *triad*, a *tetrad*, etc. It must be explained that, in logic, a *proper name* is definable [p. 35] as a term that unequivocally designates a *singular* object. This means as object well-known to exist, ~~which is~~ [and] indeterminate only along one line of variation, ~~and whose~~ [its] being extending continuously along that line, as [so] far as it extends at all. This line of variation is usually time, in which case the singular is at any [p. 36] one instant of time *individual*, that is, is entirely determinate in every respect. But it should be said, at once, that nearly half the terms of logic denote forms which are practically almost, if not absolutely, unrealizable; and for that reason, it is convenient, when not otherwise indicated, to apply them in such loose sense that the terms are not useless. For example, it is not unusual to call a singular an individual, and a designate singular is *commonly* called a designate individual, etc. In the definition of a logical proper name, it is said to denote an object well known to "exist." Upon this two comments are called for. In the first place, the term *existence* is properly a term, not of logic, but of metaphysics; and metaphysically understood, an object [p. 37] *exists*, if and only if, it reacts with every other existing object of the same universe. But in the definition of a logical proper name, *exist* is used in its logical sense, and means merely [to be] a singular of a logical universe, or universe of discourse. Thus, an abstract form, such as inertia, does not properly, i.e. metaphysically exist, but it may be an object of a logical universe of characters, and such will be a designate individual; and such abstract terms are ~~usually~~ [for the most part]

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\* ~~I don't know what grammarians will say to my~~ [The writer does not know what reprimands from grammarians he may incur in] calling the termination of [Greek omitted], etc. *patronymoidal*. It seemed to ~~me~~ [him] that so Pythagoras would think of it. With the same notion, ~~speak~~ [he has spoken] of *artiad* and *perissid* surfaces. ~~Considering~~ [When we reflect] that a dyad, triad, or tetrad, is a collection of 2, 3, or 4 units, considered as making up a single unit, it is a striking mark of Greek subtlety of mind that they ~~could~~ [should] have such a word as [Greek omitted]. But [Greek omitted] far transcends what could be looked for in their early civilization.



logical proper names. The other comment is that in what may be called the ideally normal course of a person's acquaintance with a logically proper name, it passes successively from being an indefinite ~~indefinite~~ singular term to being a definite singular term, and ~~from thence~~ after that to being a definite general term. For on the first hearing of it, one gathers [p. 38]<sup>10</sup> that it is a singular; but

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<sup>10</sup> [a.p. 38, marked out] that it is a singular; but since the word carries no signification, ~~whatever may be asserted of its object is for the first [new] hearer merely asserted of "something". But as one meets~~ [the hearer to whom it is strange will be able to gather from any assertion he may hear made of its object nothing more than that "something" exists having the characters asserted. But as he subsequently meets] with the term again and again, ~~one learn~~ [he] gradually [comes to learn] ~~learns~~ enough about its object readily to distinguish it from all other singulars in existence. The term then functions as a proper name. Finally, when everybody in the community is perfectly familiar with the chief characteristics of the singular object, if one of these should be very prominent, there will be a tendency to use the name predicatively to signify that character. In ~~that~~ [just this] way, some dozens of proper names are now familiarly used as [English] common class-terms, definite but general. [a.p. 39, not marked out] Almost anybody will recall the names of two emperors, one Roman the other reckoned as French, that have become common nouns by that process (and one of them ~~has become the name~~ [having in addition become the] usual designation of an article of convenience, by another, still commoner process), also a king if Lydia, another of Pylos, still another of Judaea, a prince of Traezen, the opulent favourite of an emperor, the foolish controller general of a French king, bankers ancient, medieval, and modern, a writer on state-excerpt, three ancient legislators, two or three of three-odd sticks whom the Greeks ~~thought~~ [took for] philosophers, two mathematicians, a scholastic doctor, at least one ancient grammarian and a modern one, a princess of Troy and a matron of Athens. Two horses are to be added to the list — but no! One, at least, of the animals is fictitious. The genius of the novelist makes it hard to remember that he has not often seen it. The list must not omit a state heirloom with legend and a prophecy attached, a useless and unbeautiful object made famous by the rudeness of its destruction, [a.p. 40, not marked out] of erections, institutions, and parts of towns, the Colossus, the Labyrinth, Babel, the Museum, the Academy, Bedlam and Billingsgate, the Capitol, the Palatine, the Walhalla, the Star chamber, Crub Street, and perhaps a few towns and countries. The list would be far longer were fictitious persons and things included, or cases in which articles deliberately named after famous men, or if words not very familiar were reckoned.

A proper name or term filling the blank of a rheme, is a *subject* of the proposition in which it occurs, according to the writer's nomenclature. [It is *particular*, *singular*, or *universal*, according as it has the character which belongs to a proper name at the first, second, or third stage of its ideally normal developments.] The *rheme*, considered as part of a proposition, is its *predicate*. A proposition, according to any one analysis of it, has but a single predicate, but it is equally legitimate to throw any proper name or substitute for a proper name [a.p. 41, not marked out] into the predicate or to make it a subject. It is a mere question of convenience. Thus, take the following proposition:

The serpent beguiled Eve to give an apple to Adam so that he should disobey God.

This may be regarded as having a pentad predicate,

\_\_\_\_\_ beguiled \_\_\_\_\_ to give \_\_\_\_\_ to \_\_\_\_\_ so that he should disobey \_\_\_\_\_

or as having a predicate of any lesser valency. If the predicate be taken a monad, the one subject will be any one we choose of the five: "The serpent", "Eve", "some apple", "Adam", "God". Or, if desired we may increase the number of subjects by means of the fundamentally important logical operation of *hypostatic abstraction*, usually called by the present writer *abstraction* simply, for the sake of brevity, except when the single word might be ~~understood~~

since the word is without signification, the hearer to whom it is strange will be able to gather from any he may hear made of its object only that there exists something having the characters asserted. But as he subsequently meets with the term time and again, he gradually comes to learn enough about its object readily to distinguish it from all the other singulars that exist. The terms then first functions for him as a proper name. Finally, when everybody in the community is perfectly familiar with the chief characteristics of the singular object, if one of these should be very prominent, there will be a tendency to use the name predicatively to signify that character. Through just this last process have become familiarly employed as English class-terms, continuing to be definite, but now become general. Almost anybody will recall the names [p. 39] of two emperors, one of the Roman, the other of the French, that have so turned to ~~proper~~ common nouns without ceasing to be used as proper nouns, one of them having in addition become, [by another still commoner process] the usual designation of a kind of object that it is often convenient to get rid of; also a kind of Lydia, another of Judaea, and a kinglet of Pylos, a prince of Troezen, the opulent favorite of an emperor, the foolish comptroller-general of a French monarch, bankers ancient, medieval, and modern, a writer on statecraft, three ancient legislators, a few of those odd sticks who, if stories are to be believed, empersonated [sic, impersonated] the Hellenic and Alexandrian conception of a philosopher, two mathematicians, a scholastic doctor, at least one ancient and a modern grammarian, a princess of Troy and a matron of Athens. Two horses belong in the list — no! one of the animals at least is fictitious, ~~a circumstance which the~~ [though it is hard to realize] [p. 40] that the poor beast is not real. In place of that we can reckon a state heirloom, attached to which is legend about its rich possessors poor ancestors as well as a prophecy about his descendants. It is a useless and ugly article, and its chief interest is its rude distruction [sic, destruction?]. The list embraces erections, institutions, and quarters of towns, the Colossus, the Labyrinth, Babel, the Museum and Bedlom, the Academy and Billingsgate, the Capitol and the Palatine, the Walhalla, the Starchamber, Grub Street, and possibly a few towns and regions. Were creations of fancy included

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[misunderstood] in the sense of *precissive* [a.p. 42, not marked out] *abstraction*. In order to explain the effects that may be produced by abstraction, it is first to be noticed that the pentad predicate is compound. It may be regarded as composed of

\_\_\_ beguiled \_\_\_ to the effect that he or she should \_\_\_ , and  
 \_\_\_ gives \_\_\_ to \_\_\_ so that he should \_\_\_ , and  
 \_\_\_ disobeys \_\_\_.

Little or no hypostatic abstraction is involved in this analysis. The effect of this operation is to convert a part of the substance of the predicate into a subject [end of variant]

the list would be more than doubled, and there is scarce any end to the names of places applied to wares imported thence or to the grasping at a popular name as a sort of sponsor for any new pattern. But these of course have nothing to do with that ideally normal [p. 41]<sup>11</sup> evolution, according to the formula here iconized:

Stage I:	Indefinite	Individual,
Stage II:	Definite	—ditto—
Stage III:	—ditto—	General.

A proper name [in its second, or proper, stage of maturity], has, of course, no *signification*; that is, its applicability to a given object is not contingent upon that object's fulfilling this or that [general] condition, but depends solely upon the previous establishment of such a wide-spread habit of that the word or phrase is reasonably certain of being understood as ~~applying~~ to denote the [very] singular [that was actually] intended. It is important to recognize just what *signification* consists in. Like many other terms of philosophy, it is rendered more comprehensible and distinct, even in its more special applications [p. 42] by being taken in a sense that is somewhat broader than the usual one. In that broader sense *signification* consists in such characters as [by] being known to belong to objects to which a given term is applicable aid in the ascertainment of the [general] applicability of that term. Thus, when one has only met with a proper name once or twice and then casually and by the way, the characters that one has ~~heard~~ [found] attributed to its object as matter ~~indeed~~ undisputed will constitute one's whole knowledge of the name, and are thus of the nature of *signification*, although it is accidental and insufficient *signification*. Suppose, for example; one has never heard of Gordius. On first hearing the name, one infers that he is or was *some man*. Next one may gather that he was [p. 43] *some adventurer*; next that he was *some Phrygian*; next that he was *some king*, etc. But when the name has become familiar and reaches its second stage of evolution, — is, in short, used as and accepted as a true proper name, — one places Gordius in his proper place in one's mental chart of ancient history, and those predicates no longer serve as *signification*,

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<sup>11</sup> [a.p. 42, not marked out] evolution according to the formula

Indefinite	Individual
Definite	“
“	General.

A proper name has no *signification*. Its function is to identify an object and distinguish it from all others. A proposition has two parts; the one, its *predicate*, signifying something; the other, its set of subjects [furnishing the means of] identifying [the set of] objects to which that *signification* is to apply. It [end of variant]

but as information. The name now neither needs nor bears any “signification.” But if later, the [peculiar] skill of Gordius in the art of knotting ropes [in an inconvenient manner] were to become so proverbial, that one could say of a ~~certain~~ given sailor that he was a Gordius, assured of being understood, then the common noun that the word would have become would have its applicability entirely dependent upon an essential signification. [p. 44] Thus a proper name in its proper maturity is wholly devoid of signification and has for its sole function the distinguishing of a single object from all others, and this renders it particularly apt for filling a blank of a rheme and becoming a subject of a proposition. Such a subject is called a *Singular Subject*, and the proposition, if so analyzed as to have but this one subject, is termed a *Singular Proposition*. But a word or phrase which is equivalent to a possible proper name in the first stage, or in the third, may be used as the subject of a proposition. We thus have in the one case the *Particular*, in the other the *Universal, Subject and Proposition*. The utterer of ~~the~~ [a] particular proposition gives an insufficient, indefinite indication of the object to which his assertion applies. [p. 45] In thus [putting off precise specification, he] reserves to himself the ability to shift his ground in some measure. Suppose for example in ~~discussing~~ [a public debate concerning] the nature of the “philosophy and vain deceit” mentioned in the Epistle to the Collossians, he should happen to remark that this was not the first time that Phrygia had given birth to a famous tyer of hard knots. Then if an opponent should endeavour to trip him up by showing that Gordius was not a Phrygian, but a Lycian, he could, if he thought fit skulk behind the pretence that he [had had] quite another person in mind, Epictetus, for example. ~~Perfectly contrary~~ As contrary as possible to the hedging ~~caution~~ [reserve] of ~~the~~ “some,” the selective pronoun that indicates a “particular,” that is, indefinite subject, is the head-long assurance of “any,” the selective that indicates a “universal,” or distributed, subject. [p. 46]

By this the utterer of a proposition, ~~surrenders~~ [abandons] to the interpreter thereof his natural right of determining to precisely what singular his predication is to be applied; as in

Any king is somewhat deranged in mind.

Not any man is perfect, or Any man is not perfect.

“Any” is in English a better word than “every” as [for] the universal selective, because “Every man is not perfect” merely means, like Latin “*non omnis*” and Greek [Greek omitted], means merely that the sentence which should result from deleting the “not,” is not true. But there are cases in which, according to English idiom, “any” does not express the logical universal, and a different word has to be substituted. Thus, “Some man loves any woman” means that [“]Any woman is loved by some man”; but in order [p. 47] to express [unequivocally that] ~~there is some~~ some man ~~that loves an~~

there is who will be found to love any woman that can be named, we must say “Some man loves all women.” The best way, however, will be to describe [all] the selections first, and then proceed to give the predicate. In that way we distinguish without difficulty in distinguishing between, “Some man there is such that, taking any woman you please, that man loves this woman,” and “Take any woman you please, and some man there is who loves her.”

The regular “universal” of a logical subject is this distributive universal, the “any singular that you, O interpreter, please;” and those logicians err ~~in making~~ [who] allow the collective universal, “all,” to take its place. This would be proved very easily if it were permissible, in such a question, to argue from usage. For Aristotle [p. 48] and all Aristotelian logicians use [Greek omitted] or *omnis* in the singular, [Greek omitted], *omnis homo est candidus*, never [Greek omitted], *omnes homines sunt candidi*. But that proves nothing except Aristotle’s opinion; and it is hardly likely that he could have given ~~any~~ [a] sound reason to support it. The true reason is that a collection is a single object of a different kind from the objects that are members of the collection. Now a plural must be understood as denoting a collection; and the proof of this is that if the plural meant anything else, a skilful logician ought to be able to say what else it does mean. But nobody has ever succeeded in doing this.

[END OF MS 280]