



INDIANA UNIVERSITY PRESS

English and French Versions of C. S. Peirce's "The Fixation of Belief" and "How to Make Our Ideas Clear"

Author(s): Gérard Deledalle

Source: *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society*, Spring, 1981, Vol. 17, No. 2 (Spring, 1981), pp. 141-152

Published by: Indiana University Press

Stable URL: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/40319914>

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at <https://about.jstor.org/terms>



JSTOR

Indiana University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society*

English and French Versions of C. S. Peirce's "The Fixation of Belief" and "How To Make Our Ideas Clear"*

Two of Charles S. Peirce's articles — both linked to pragmatism — published in *The Popular Science Monthly*: "The Fixation of Belief" in November 1877, pp. 1-15 and "How To Make Our Ideas Clear" in January 1878, pp. 286-302 appeared in French in the *Revue philosophique*: "Comment se fixe la croyance" in December 1878, pp. 553-569 and "Comment rendre nos idées claires" in January 1879, pp. 39-57.

We know from a letter written by Peirce to Christine Ladd-Franklin in 1904 and published in *The Journal of Philosophy* in 1916, that in the course of his voyage to Europe, "between Hoboken and Plymouth", Peirce wrote "an article about pragmatism in French", "by way of practice", since he was to speak in French at a meeting of the Geodesic Association in Paris. He then translated his article "of November 1877" into French. The article which he wrote directly in French is therefore "Comment rendre nos idées claires" and that which he translated is "The Fixation of Belief".

About this pair of articles, Peirce says in a note clipped inside the volume entitled "Papers in Logic" which contained them and which he had left to the Johns Hopkins University Library: "The two French versions, which I prefer to the English of the same papers, derive their merit from the skill of M. Léo Seguin, who was killed in Tunis in 1881".

This poses two problems which are closely connected: Firstly, are the French versions of these articles better than the English versions, and secondly, what does the French of the articles published in the *Revue philosophique* owe to Léo Seguin?

It is certain that Peirce always considered the French version of "Comment rendre nos idées claires" as the authoritative text for his pragmatic thought. And it is the French version of the maxim of pragmatism that he quoted in his first lecture on pragmatism in Cambridge on March 26th, 1903:

"The Maxim of Pragmatism, as I originally stated it, *Revue philosophique* VII, is as follows:

Considérer quels sont les effets pratiques que nous pensons pouvoir être produits par l'objet de notre conception. La conception de tous ces effets est la conception complète de l'objet. Pour développer le sens d'une pensée, il faut donc simplement déterminer quelles habitudes elle produit, car le sens d'une chose consiste simplement dans les habitudes qu'elle implique. Le caractère d'une habitude dépend de la façon dont elle peut nous faire agir non pas seulement dans telle circonstance probable, mais dans toute circonstance possible, si improbable qu'elle puisse être. Ce qu'est une habitude dépend de ces deux points: quand et comment elle fait agir. Pour le premier point: quand ? tout stimulant à l'action dérive d'une perception; pour le second point: comment ? le but de toute action est d'amener au résultant sensible. Nous atteignons ainsi le tangible et le pratique comme base de toute différence de pensée, si subtile qu'elle puisse être" (5.18).

A detailed analysis of the French versions of the articles will however lead us to question the merit of "Comment se fixe la croyance" and, though to a lesser degree, those of "Comment rendre nos idées claires".

But, beforehand, we have to determine what "merit" in the French versions of these articles is actually derived from the "skill" of Léo Seguin. An active participant in the revolt of the Paris Commune, Léo Seguin was banished from France in 1871. In 1872, he fled to England where he stayed until 1876 when he went over to America. He lived in New York from 1876 to the end of 1880 at the latest. There he had several jobs one of which was teaching French. We do not know how he came into contact with Peirce, but we do know that in the Spring of 1878 Peirce recommended him for the chair of French at the University of California and that Seguin did not obtain the post. Benefiting from the amnesty which was proclaimed on May 17th, 1879, he returned to France. He became the military correspondent of *Le Télégraphe* and followed the French army to North Africa. He was wounded at Béja, Tunisia, on May 29th, 1881, by an Algerian deserter from the French army and died the next day in Tunis. Léo Seguin was only 24 when the revolt of the Commune broke out. He was a brilliant student and intended to make the army his career, but after obtaining his baccalauréat

ès-lettres and his baccalauréat ès-sciences he sat for the entrance examination to the Ecole Normale Supérieure, which he failed. His activities were many and diverse. He fenced and could read cuneiform, was interested in Indian poetry and politics. A Republican, a patriot and a Freemason, the defeat of 1870 made him a rebel and a member of the Paris Commune. On leaving France for England, he knew not a word of English and learnt the language only after his arrival in the United States, for in England he frequented mainly fellow refugees.

Such was the man from whose skill the articles published in French in the *Revue philosophique* derive their merit. In view of the facts that, on one hand, there is no reason to doubt Peirce's statement that he wrote "Comment rendre nos idées claires" directly in French, and translated "The Fixation of Belief" into French himself, and, on the other hand, that Seguin's knowledge of English was poor, it was certainly the latter's skill as a teacher of French that Peirce was calling upon when he asked him to re-read his own French versions of the pragmatic articles. Seguin must have appealed to Peirce. He was an outsider and a scientifically-trained philosopher whose independence of spirit and manners and whose brilliance must have impressed a man like Peirce.

After a careful study of all the points in which the French versions of the articles of 1878 and 1879 differ from the English versions, we can come to the following conclusions:

1. If we compare the French text of the articles of 1877 and 1878 with the other writings in French by Peirce in our possession, for example the memoir "Sur la valeur de la pensanteur à Paris" (*Comptes rendus des Séances de l'Académie des Sciences*, 1880) of which we have the manuscript and the published text, the "Notes pour un traité de logique" (October 1898, ms. 339) and the letters to Juliette,¹ A. Robert² and André Lalande,³ we can distinguish certain characteristics to be found in the French versions of the two pragmatic articles: short sentences with a minimum of conjunctive words in cases where the English sentence is far more lengthy owing to a repeated use of "but", "then", "now", "and", etc.; a systematic use of "on" where the Passive voice is used in English; the almost total absence of the first person singular and a frequent use of the more impersonal "nous".

The vocabulary also is homogeneous. To give only a few instances, "intellectuel" generally corresponds to "mental", and "intelligence" to "mind" when knowledge is referred to, but "esprit" is used to translate

"mind" in expressions like "dans notre esprit" ("in our minds"). "Investigation" is frequently used in French as well as in English in relation to the theory of inquiry.

But when one reads Peirce's uncorrected texts, one also notices his marked tendency to transpose English words into French, especially verbs⁴ and to give French prepositions their English meanings. Thus Peirce writes, in a letter to A. Robert, that "A investe C avec B", the transposition of "A invests C with B" instead of "A met C en possession de B";⁵ in his notes on logic, Peirce writes: "il n'y a le moindre avantage à gagner de [from] l'étude de la théorie du raisonnement", "la psychologie, au contraire, ne demande rien de [from] la métaphysique". Like many foreigners, Peirce makes mistakes in spelling, in gender, in agreement, in moods and in tenses. In the same notes on logic, we read: "quelque chose de nouveaux [nouveau] à laquelle [auquel] je veux fixer la date", "comment la pensée trouve-t-elle existence [existence], c'est-à-dire comment s'exprime-t-elle [s'exprime-t-elle]?", "la [le] mode d'être", "cette [ce] signe", "mais la logique n'est bornée à la psychique pas plus que la métaphysique soit bornée à la physique" [la logique ne se ramène pas plus à la psychologie que la métaphysique à la physique], "mais tout cela n'intéresse point au logicien à qui il ne fait rien qu'un raisonnement fait une gratification d'un gout logique" [mais tout cela n'intéresse point le logicien pour qui il importe peu qu'un raisonnement satisfasse notre goût logique].⁶

It is in this clearly-defined field that, to our mind, Peirce was appealing to Léo Seguin's skill, when he entrusted to him the re-reading of his manuscripts.

2. "The Fixation of Belief" was thus translated by Peirce and corrected by Seguin. What are the respective parts of Peirce and Seguin in the text which appeared in the *Revue philosophique* under the title "Comment se fixe la croyance?"

A. By and large, and taking into account Peirce's corrections of the English text in 1893, 1903 and 1910, we can say that one may attribute to Peirce a certain number of mistakes that Seguin did not correct, the title and an omission.

The mistakes left uncorrected by Seguin are mistranslations of words having similar forms in English and French: "deceived", "deceptive" (p. 7) rendered by "déçu" (p. 560) and "décevant" (p. 561), instead of "trompé" and "trompeur"; "agreeable to *his* reason" (p. 10) translated by "agréable à la raison" (p. 564) instead of "ce qui est conforme

à la raison" ou "ce qui convient à la raison". It will be noticed that Peirce did not make these mistakes when he wrote "Comment rendre nos idées claires" directly in French and then translated his text into English: "deception" (pp. 291 and 292) is used to translate "erreur" and "méprise" (p. 46),⁷ and "ce qui agréait à la raison" (p. 40) is rendered by "agreeable to reason" (p. 287). Other notable mistakes are "such and such" translated by "tel et tel", "such a formula" by "une semblable formule" and "rest on" by "se poser sur".

The title of the article "Comment se fixe la croyance" is probably Peirce's own. "Comment rendre nos idées claires", having been written before the translation of "The Fixation of Belief", the rendering of the latter's title by "Comment se fixe la croyance" was more or less a matter of course.

Amongst all the modifications introduced into the French text which we are now going to examine, only one was adopted by Peirce when he corrected his pragmatic articles: the omission of the last paragraph which he probably thought too personal.

B. The changes made by Seguin in Peirce's translation had one aim: to present a version which would be more correct in style, more precise in meaning and more easily understandable for French readers. Three sorts of modifications can be discerned: (a) improvements in style; (b) corrections of what Seguin considered to be mistakes; (c) clarifications or rather what Seguin thought to be clarifications.

(a) Improvements in style. They are undeniable, but insufficient in number, whence the unequal level of the translation which is sometimes polished and sometimes quite awkward. It is not surprising to find that awkwardness of style invariably corresponds to an incomprehension of Peirce's text.

(b) Corrections. The "twenty-two" (p. 2) irrational hypotheses successively proposed by Kepler to explain the epicycles of Mars become "vingt et une" (p. 554) in the translation, apparently for the reason that the twenty-second which was the right one, could not be irrational — a "mistake" which Peirce did not correct in the later versions of his English text.

The translation of "transubstantiation of bread" (p. 1) by "transmutation des espèces" (p. 554) can be placed in this category. It is true that it is not only the bread which is transubstantiated, but also the wine. But why "transmutation" when the proper term is "transubstan-

tiation"? It is the latter term that Peirce uses in the French text of "Comment rendre nos idées claires" (p. 47).

We may also include the omission in the translation of the passage which says that "no religion has been without one" (priesthood) (p. 9), because this is not true, Islam having no priests.

In another passage (p. 568), it is the example of Islam which has been retained ("reformed Mussulman") and the allusion to Protestantism omitted ("or to a reformed Catholic who should still shrink from reading the Bible", p. 14).

We can also include in this category the correction of a detail which had become out of date: Pius IX is replaced by Leo XIII (p. 562) in the translation of "from the days of Numa Pompilius to those of Pius Nonus" (p. 9), because between the date of writing of the English text and that of the revision of Peirce's translation, Pius IX had died and been succeeded by Leo XIII (1878). This has no implications concerning the date of Peirce's translation, as he did not modify the aforesaid detail in his later revision of the text and might well have kept the name of Pius IX in his French translation after the latter's death.

Was it also out of concern for accuracy, because he did not know himself whether Lord Bacon was Roger Bacon (p. 553) or "l'autre Bacon, le plus célèbre" (p. 554), the author of the *Novum Organum*, that Seguin did not translate, on p. 565, "In Lord Bacon's phrase" (p. 11), or did he think that Peirce had made a mistake, or more probably that the French reader would not understand the allusion?

(c) Clarifications. Few, if any, of these clarifications can be considered as improvements on the English text, even when they appear to make the translation more comprehensible. Peirce writes: "But it so happens that there exists a division among facts such that one class [...], while the others [...]" (p. 4). The translations says: "mais les faits se trouveront être divisés en deux classes" (p. 557), which is stylistically clearer, but less accurate, as the classes are not limited to two.

For those today who are more familiar with Peirce's thought, the so-called clarifications for which Seguin is responsible are more of a hindrance than a help. Let us examine three main points: the theory of inquiry, realism and the criticism of the method of authority.

The theory of inquiry. Seguin does not seem to have understood the part played by doubt in inquiry. He appears to think that the aim of inquiry is the elimination of doubt which is to be replaced by belief, without seeing that doubt is a necessary condition for arriving at a true

belief, i.e. a belief capable of directing our actions, and that one cannot reject a belief "which does not seem to have been so formed as to insure this result" only "by creating a doubt in the place of that belief" (p 6). The omission of this last sentence in the translation proves that Seguin does not see why doubt should be created in order to fix belief, since the aim of inquiry is precisely to eliminate doubt. For Seguin, inquiry means the discovery of what is already there, not the creation of something new. Seguin shared the pre-scientific conception of science of most of the French scholars of his time.

Neither did Seguin understand that inquiry is a social, cooperative and cumulative process. He conceives of it as a private, non-public affair, which is the contrary of Peirce's conception. Thus he does not understand why Peirce says that no one "can really doubt that there are realities", for this is a hypothesis that "every mind admits" "so that the social impulse does not cause me (or "men", as he says later) to doubt it" (p. 12). That is why Seguin did not translate the last sentence.

It is also to an erroneous interpretation of Peirce's theory of inquiry that we can impute the translation of "the most that can be maintained is that we seek for a belief that we *shall*⁸ think to be true" (p. 6) by "ce qu'on peut tout au plus soutenir, c'est que nous cherchons une croyance que nous pensons vraie" (p. 599), and that of "The feeling which gives rise to any method of fixing belief is a dissatisfaction of two repugnant propositions. But here already is a vague concession that there is some *one* thing to which a proposition *should*⁸ conform" (p. 12) by "Le sentiment d'où naissent toutes les méthodes de fixer la croyance est une sorte de mécontentement de ne pouvoir faire accorder deux propositions. Mais alors on admet déjà vaguement qu'il existe quelque chose à quoi *puisse* être conforme une proposition" (p. 566). The translation of "we shall think" by "nous pensons" in the first sentence, and of "should" by "puisse" in the second one transforms a dynamic conception of inquiry into a static and stereotyped pattern.

Realism. It is the social character of the process of inquiry which links the theory of inquiry to the theory of reality. Now the use of the word "réalité" to translate "fact" (pp. 2 and 11), as well as "real thing" (p. 11) and "reality" (p. 12) obscures the fact that what Peirce is defending here is the reality of universals ("generals") whose characteristics are completely independent of what we feel, believe or think. This translation makes an ontological theory of universals into an epistemological theory of the reality of the external world. It is true that

the word "reality" used by Peirce at that time was confusing, and that he was soon to replace it by the word "Real", used as a substantive (5.384) to express the nature of universals, but he never thought that the latter could be "realities" in the sense of "facts".

Criticism of the method of authority. Seguin's mistrust of the "instinct social" which is probably at least partly responsible for his incomprehension of the preceding theories, explains perfectly why, on the other hand, as a strong individualist, he enthusiastically adopts Peirce's theses on the method of authority, at the same time distorting the latter, for Peirce rejects arbitrary authority, but not that of the "communauté des chercheurs". The French text of these pages is characterized by a polished style and a resonance quite different from that of the English text, and inevitably evokes echoes of the voice of the Paris Commune.

Finally it must be pointed out that at least two mistranslations are not to be attributed either to Peirce or to Seguin, since they are printer's errors: "who originated" (p. 10) is translated by "les créatures" (p. 564) instead of "les créateurs", and "Men who pursue it are distinguished for their decision of character, which becomes very easy with such a mental rule" (p. 13), translated by "Ceux qui en font usage sont remarquables par leur caractère décidé, la décision devenant très faible avec une pareille règle intellectuelle" (p. 568), a sentence which makes sense only if one replaces "faible" (weak) by "facile" (easy).

3. With "Comment rendre nos idées claires", our work is simplified: it is a text written directly in French and not a translation. The only problems here are to identify the modifications of the corrector by comparing the text with its English translation written by the author himself, and to ascertain whether the original French version is in fact superior to the English translation, as Peirce claims.

Our answer is threefold. A. The French text of "Comment rendre nos idées claires" is unquestionably superior to that of "Comment se fixe la croyance". It is homogeneous and never distorts Peirce's doctrines. B. The English translation which is more explicit helps to clarify several points of the French version. C. The modifications of the corrector are fewer, or at least less apparent than in "Comment se fixe la croyance".

A. We shall be brief about the first point. We find none of the imprecision of vocabulary which often distorts the meaning in "Comment se fixe la croyance". "Epreuve" (pp. 40 and 48) exactly expresses the idea of "test" (pp. 287 and 294), which is translated by "criterium" in "Comment se fixe la croyance" (p. 567). A word like "engendrement"

(p. 43) of which the equivalent in the English translation is "production" (p. 290) and which might appear somewhat clumsy in fact aptly expresses the process of inquiry. There is nothing ambiguous here in the description of belief, of habit and of the part played by doubt (p. 45); nor in Peirce's idea of "reality": "l'opinion prédestinée à réunir finalement tous les chercheurs est ce que nous appelons le vrai, et l'objet de cette opinion est le réel. C'est ainsi que j'expliquerai la réalité [...]. Mais la réalité du réel ne dépend pas de ce fait que l'investigation, poursuivie assez longtemps, doit enfin conduire à y croire" (p. 56).

B. The English translation is, however, superior to the French original, which it clarifies. Whereas in the French text of "Comment se fixe la croyance", there were modifications and omissions which obscured the meaning, we have here mainly additions which complete and explain the French text. A few examples will suffice. The expression: "Les premiers principes" (p. 41) becomes the more explicit "The first principles of science" (p. 286); "Accordingly in adopting the distinction of *clear* and *distinct*, he described the latter quality as the clear apprehension of everything contained in the definition" (p. 288) is clearer than "C'est pourquoi en discernant entre les idées claires et les idées distinctes, il décrit ces dernières comme les idées dont la définition ne contient rien qu'on ne saisisse clairement" (p. 41); in the sentence: "Le résultat final de la pensée est l'exercice de la volonté, fait auquel n'appartient plus la pensée" (p. 45), the reader does not know what the word "fait" refers to, but the English translation is unambiguous: "The *final* upshot of thinking is the exercise of volition, and of this thought no longer forms a part" (p. 291); the modification of the sentence: "Cependant on peut concevoir que cela apparaisse au premier abord et qu'un homme de deux propositions présentées d'une façon analogue, puisse accepter l'une et rejeter l'autre" (p. 46) which becomes "Yet it is conceivable that a man should assert one proposition and deny the other" (p. 291), is an improvement and so is the transformation of "une qualité essentiellement mystérieuse de l'objet" (p. 46) into "a quality of the object which is essentially mysterious" (p. 292); "we deceive ourselves and mistake a mere sensation accompanying the thought for a part of the thought itself" (p. 293) is clearer than "c'est s'abaisser et prendre une simple sensation accompagnant la pensée pour une partie de la pensée elle-même" (p. 48); again, the sentence: "Il est absurde de dire que la pensée contient quelque élément qui soit sans rapport avec son unique fonction" (p. 48) is rendered clearer by the use of "meaning" instead of "élément": "It is

absurd to say that thought has any meaning unrelated to its only function" (p. 293); even the expression of the maxim of pragmatism is better in English than in French: "effects [having] practical bearings" (p. 293) being more precise than "effets pratiques" (p. 48).

C. The modifications of Seguin are difficult to identify. Thus if we compare: "Lorsqu'on a mis en face de l'absurdité d'une telle vue certains philosophes, ils ont imaginé une vaine distinction entre des conceptions positives et des conceptions négatives, dans un effort pour donner à leur idée une forme moins manifestement saugrenue" (p. 52) with "The truth is, there is some vague notion afloat that a question may mean something which the mind cannot conceive; and when some hair-splitting philosophers have been confronted with the absurdity of such a view, they have invented an empty distinction between positive and negative conceptions in the attempt to give their non-idea a form not obviously nonsensical" (p. 297), we shall find that the English text is more down-right: "some hair-splitting philosophers" translates "certains philosophes"; "non-idea", "idée vide"; "nonsensical", "idée saugrenue". Was it Peirce who exaggerated the antiphilosophical tone of this paragraph, or was it Seguin who watered down Peirce's French text in order to avoid offending French philosophers?

Is it to Peirce or to Seguin that we must attribute the style of the following French sentence: "un trajet est déterminé par la direction que prend et par la distance que franchit un point qui le parcourt depuis son origine" (p. 51) which is better than the English: "a path is determined by the varying direction and distance of the point which moves over it from the starting-point" (p. 296)?

It was certainly Peirce who wrote that the Cartesian theory, "ce joyau de la logique", is "assez jolie", but that "il est grand temps de reléguer au musée des curiosités cet antique bijou" (p. 41), if we may judge from the English translation in which "ornament of logic" is in inverted commas and *bijou* in italics, not to speak of the expression "our cabinet of curiosities" (p. 288).

In the same way, we can be fairly sure that Peirce was responsible for the transposition of a situation concerning the payment in French money (*pièce d'argent*, billion), of an "emplette" in the French text (p. 43) and the payment in American money (nickel, copper) of a "fare" in the English text (p. 288).

Can one be as certain that the expression "dans tous les genres de culture intellectuelle" (p. 42), translated in the English version by "in

every branch of mental acquirement" is Peirce's? And who is responsible for the rendering of "microscope moral" (p. 43) as "mental microscope" in English (p. 289)?

When we have in the French version "arrangements d'idées" (p. 49) and in the English version "arrangements of facts" (p. 294), is this a mistake made by Peirce or one of Seguin's corrections? For here it is in actual effect a question of "faits" and not of "idées", and this is confirmed by the French version which, a few lines further on, also uses the expression "arrangements de faits".

Did Peirce use the terme "certitude" to express the idea of "infallibility" (p. 287)? He might have done so in order not to offend his Catholic readers. But Seguin might have done just the same.

As for the parenthetical clause, typical of Peirce's writing, which figures in the English version, but not in the French: "but if mathematics are unsupportable to him, pray let him skip three paragraphs rather than we should part company here" (p. 295), is this a case of an addition made by Peirce for the English text or of an omission by Seguin?

Finally it is highly improbable that Peirce should have written in French and afterwards omitted, the end of the article in which he announces the other articles of this series the publication of which was not scheduled for the *Revue philosophique*.

One last point on which the French version is authoritative: after alluding to the ideas to which some men dedicate their lives and which, one fine day, vanish like "Melusine, la belle fée", Peirce goes on: "J'ai connu moi-même un de ces hommes.⁹ Qui pourrait compter tous les quadrateurs de cercle, métaphysiciens, astrologues, que sais-je encore, dont les annales de la vieille Allemagne pourraient nous redire l'histoire?" (pp. 42-43). The shorter English version: "Who can tell how many histories [...] may not be told in the old German story" (p. 289) misled the editors of the *Collected Papers* who thought Peirce was referring to the story of Melusina which was French and not German, and who placed after the word "German" the comment "French" in brackets with an exclamation mark: [French!] (5.393).

What conclusion can we draw from this analysis? Peirce loved France, its language, its wines, its liberalism and its culture. There can be no other reason than this blind love to account for the fact that Peirce preferred the French versions of his articles on pragmatism to the English versions, for the French version of "Comment se fixe la croyance", apart from several well-written passages and a few elegantly-turned

phrases, is positively bad, and that of "Comment rendre nos idées claires", although unquestionably superior to "Comment se fixe la croyance", lacks the clarity and precision of the English translation.

Université de Perpignan

NOTES

- * Translated from the French by Janice Deledalle Rhodes.
- 1. Ms. L. 340, all the letters in French.
- 2. Ms. L. 378, cf. Gérard Deledalle; Charles S. Peirce, *Ecrits sur le signe*, Paris, Editions du Seuil, 1978, pp. 192-199.
- 3. Ms. L. 240, letter of November 22, 1905, in *Revue philosophique*, Jan.-March 1969, p. 37.
- 4. Whereas he is scrupulous in the choice of nouns, in conformity with his own ethics of terminology.
- 5. G. Deledalle, *op. cit.*, p. 198.
- 6. Ms. 339, October 1-4, 1898.
- 7. Although, unlike "deception" in English, "erreur" and "méprise" are not intentional.
- 8. The italics are ours.
- 9. This man was himself and "Mélusine, la belle fée", who, one day, disappeared, was his first wife: Harriet *Melusina Fay*, who left him in 1876.