

tur.] Und zwar [ist] *Er* blindlings die Gott setzt[ende] Natur.⁷

Der Mensch [ist] urspr[ünglich] das Band zwischen Gott und <der obj[ektiven]> Natur, so daß er Gott nur setzt, inwiefern er die *Einheit* der Natur ist.⁸

Dies ist der letztlich auf den Menschen zentrierte Kontext, in dem Schelling Gott denkt und in dem er die äußere Welt auf den so verstandenen Gott bezieht – auch den Staat. 1810 zieht er – das Sündenfall-Motiv erneuernd und auf *Freiheit* orientierend – folgende Bilanz seines anti-staatlichen Staatsverständnis:

Die Natureinheit, diese zweite Natur über der ersten, zu welcher der Mensch nothgedrungen seine Einheit nehmen muß, ist der *Staat*, und der Staat ist daher [...] eine Folge des auf der Menschheit ruhenden Fluchs. [...] Es ist bekannt, wie viel Mühe man sich, besonders seit der Französischen Revolution und den Kantischen Begriffen gegeben hat, eine Möglichkeit zu zeigen, wie mit der Existenz freier Wesen Einheit vereinbar, also ein Staat möglich sey, der eigentlich nur die Bedingung der höchstmöglichen Freiheit sey. Allein dieser ist unmöglich. (171 f.; SW VII, 461 f.)

In der Georgii-Nachschrift folgt eine noch schärfere Staatskritik unmittelbar auf Äußerungen über die „Wirkung des menschlichen Falls auf sein Inneres“:

Nichts beweist mehr, daß der Mensch, als Geist, zu einem physischen Wert herabgesunken ist, als die Construction des Staats. Die Vielheit der Menschen verlangt nach einer Einheit. Die Einheit freyer Wesen ist nur Gott: seitdem diese verlohren gieng, suchen die Menschen eine Natur Einheit. [...] So entsteht der Staat, der eine bloße Folge der Deteriorisation des Menschengeschlechts ist. [...] Die wahre Republic kann nur in Gott seyn. (173 f.)

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Elize Bisanz (Hg.), Charles S. Peirce, *The Logic of Interdisciplinarity. The Monist-Series (= Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie, Bd. 20)*, Berlin: Akademie 2009, 455 S., ISBN 978-3-05-004410-1.

This is an impressive volume with all the texts (in English) that the founder of pragmatism, Charles S. Peirce (1839–1914), published in the American journal *The Monist* over a span of 18 years. Peirce published his first paper „The Architecture

of Theories“ opening the second issue of *The Monist* in January 1891; his last article, „Some Amazing Mazes. A Second Curiosity“, dealing with some card tricks, appeared in January of 1909, in the volume 19 of the journal edited by Paul Carus. In Bisanz's book, a total of 22 papers are collected – 15 papers published by Peirce in *The Monist* during those years and 7 other related texts –, although there is no clear continuity of purpose between all of them.

With „The Architecture of Theories“ (1891), Peirce started a series of five papers, which was called by the editors of *The Essential Peirce*, „The Monist Metaphysical Series“. It includes, besides „The Architecture of Theories“ (1891), the following papers: „The Doctrine of Necessity Examined“ (1892), „The Law of Mind“ (1892), „Man's Glassy Essence“ (1892) and „Evolutionary Love“ (1893), which is usually considered the last paper of that series. The sixth text included in the volume is Peirce's long „Reply to the Necessitarians. Rejoinder to Dr. Carus“ (1893), in which Peirce replies carefully to Paul Carus, the editor of *The Monist*, who had published the year before two replies to Peirce: „Mr. Charles S. Peirce's Onslaught on the Doctrine of Necessity“ (July, 1892, II:4, 560–582) and „The Idea of Necessity, its Basis and its Scope“ (October, 1892, III:1, 68–96). It is a lively discussion about necessity and the laws of nature, and perhaps the current volume would have increased its value if both of Carus' papers were also included.

In any case, the two next papers that Peirce published in *The Monist* and included in the collection have no clear relationship with the previous ones. Three years have passed and in „The Regenerated Logic“ (1896) and „The Logic of Relatives“ (1897) Peirce is reviewing with enthusiasm Schröder's Vorlesungen über die Algebra der Logik, which had appeared in 1895. Peirce considers Schröder as a champion of the method of modern science, „that method which puts great stress upon cooperation and solidarity of research even in the early

⁷ TGB, 69. In den *Sämtlichen Werken* findet sich die These der Setzung Gottes durch den Menschen erst weit später in der *Historisch-kritischen Einleitung in die Philosophie der Mythologie*: dass „der Mensch in seinem *ursprünglichen* Wesen keine andere Bedeutung hat, als die, die Gott-setzende Natur zu seyn, weil er ursprünglich nur existirt, um dieses Gott-setzende Wesen zu seyn“ (SW XI, 185). Vgl. *Philosophie der Mythologie*, SW XII, 119 ff.

⁸ TGB, 74 f.

stages of a branch of science, when independence of thought is the wholesome attitude, and gregarious thought is really sure to be wrong" (170).

Peirce did not publish any papers in *The Monist* between 1897 and 1905, an interval of 8 years. His next paper was „What Pragmatism Is“ (1905), which was supposed to be followed by two additional papers „The Consequences of Pragmatism“ and „The Evidences for Pragmatism“, but this plan – according to the editors of *The Essential Peirce* (II: 331) – „metamorphosed over the following two years, and even though two more papers appeared, the series was never concluded“. These two additional papers are „Issues of Pragmatism“ (1905) and „Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmatism“ (1906).

The description already given of the volume might suggest an impression of academic artificiality for this collection. This impression is in part enhanced by the inclusion of the transcription of six manuscripts that aspire to fill the blank spaces in the intended *Monist* series: „The Basis of Pragmatism“ (MS 283, 1905–06), „The Real Meaning of Pragmatism“ (MS 1338, 1905), „Consequences of Pragmatism“ (MS 289, 1905), „Phanerescopy“ (MS 298, 1906), „The First Part of an Apology for Pragmatism“ (MS 296, 1908) and „The Bed-Rock Beneath Pragmatism“ (MS 300, 1908). In fact, Peirce only published in *The Monist* his short reply „Mr. Peterson's Proposed Discussion“ (1906) and the three papers on game cards under the general title of „Some Amazing Games“ (1908, 1909).

A special mention should be made of the paper by Kenneth L. Ketner, „Charles Sanders Peirce: Interdisciplinary Scientist“ (35–57) included in the introductory portion of the current volume, which aspires to give sense to the suggestive general title of the volume „The Logic of Interdisciplinarity“. Ketner highlights that „Peirce was not a dilettante in science, but a master scientist“ (42) and stresses the key role in Peirce's thought of the classification of sciences. „He perceived science principally in terms of its methods, the basic point of departure for understanding Peirce's thought is method. The alternatives to science are non-scientific methods ...“ (44), not philosophy, which is a part of science. „The most fundamental science is mathematics, which proceeds by means of observation of, and experimentation upon, diagrams. The next is phanerescopy, followed by the normative sciences of esthetics, ethics and Semeiotic [logic]“ (44). Ketner concludes that „Peirce's system is a profound analysis of the nature and genesis of scientific method (scientific modes of thought), coupled with a vigorous attempt to carry the re-

sults of that analysis into every corner of human endeavor – even what we now refer to as The Humanities and Arts“ (44–45).

The editor has written a three-page preface explaining the genesis of the book at the Institute for Studies in Pragmatism in Lubbock, Texas (9–11) and a general introduction (12–34), both in German, but the editorial selection of the manuscripts is not clearly explained in any of them. Eliza Bisanz has worked almost silently throughout the volume, adding only two or three notes to most of the papers. For the curious reader it might be insufficient. To give one example, in *The Monist* papers of 1906 onwards Peirce starts to add the middle name „Santiago“ between „Charles“ and „Sanders Peirce“ (290, 342, 403, 445, 451), but no explanation is provided of that. In fact, we do not know Peirce's reason for this practice, although it has been said traditionally that it was Peirce's way of honoring the support of his friend William James. Another example (in which the reviewer is also mentioned) can be seen on p. 356, where the editor provides a long note about the Spanish neuroanatomist Cajal and alludes to Peirce's review of „Cajal's long set of lectures“ in Clark University: as is explained in my book – mentioned in the editor's note – the „long set“ was a series of three lectures. In a similar vein, the index of names is extremely poor, not including the names mentioned in Ketner's paper or in most of editor's notes and with several grave errors (for instance, „Aristotles“ besides „Aristotle“, one entry for „Duns“ and another for „Scotus“ and so on).

For the growing international Peirce scholarship a book like this one is always good news. Although most of the texts included are well known by scholars and are available in several places (*The Monist*, *Collected Papers*, *Essential Peirce*) the volume is really welcome. Moreover, it provides easy access to six valuable manuscripts of the still immense Peirce Nachlass, corresponding to the late years 1906–1908, of which only one manuscript had been previously published in *The Essential Peirce* (MS 283, 1906).

Literatur:

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