This essay is an investigation of the contemporary status of the controversy between Fregeans and Russellians concerning how the content of propositions about individuals ought to be individuated and semantically represented. The thesis of the author is that “if we accept the arguments of the causal theorists about reference determination, then we need both Fregean and Russellian conceptions of propositional content in a comprehensive semantic account”. The reason for this lies in the double role that propositions play, one in philosophy of language as the truth-conditional content expressed with a statement, the other, primarily for the philosophy of thought, as the content grasped by an agent who believes a statement to be true. The paper, masterfully written, shows clearly that there is no one semantic entity appropriately suited to playing both of these roles.

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[References]
Note: This list, extracted from the PDF form of the original paper, may contain data conversion errors, almost all limited to the mathematical expressions.


