

**MR1276756 (96d:03013)** 03A05 03B65

**Soames, Scott** (1-PRIN-Q)

**Donnellan's referential/attributive distinction. (English. English summary)**

*Papers presented at the American Philosophical Association Pacific Division Meeting 1993. Philos. Stud.* 73 (1994), no. 2-3, 149–168.

In this paper the author deals with Donnellan's distinction between referential and attributive uses of definite descriptions and its importance for the philosophy of language. A careful study of texts from Donnellan is presented and some historical background on this distinction is provided. The fact that the distinction was a key factor in the causal theory of reference developed by Kripke is, perhaps, not given sufficient weight.

The author's view is that Donnellan's distinction "is not a distinction within semantics, but rather is a pragmatic distinction about the uses speakers make of certain pieces of language", and he favours a pragmatic account of the phenomenon of true assertion rather than a semantic one.

{Reviewer's remarks: This reviewer feels that such a strict breach between semantics and pragmatics is too theory-laden, and prefers to stress the close links between these two routes to understanding how language really works.}

{For the entire collection see MR1276752 (94m:03010)}

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