

The Key Role of C. Hookway in the Contemporary Reception of C. S. Peirce in Europe

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[Draft Oral Text]

I am very grateful to Carlos Moya and Tobies Grimaltes for having invited me to take part in this homage to my admired friend Christopher Hookway. I have learnt a lot from Chris during many years and it is a pleasure and an honor to be here to testify to my debt and to try to express my gratitude. As Emily Dickinson said to her mentor, "Gratitude is the only secret that cannot reveal itself."¹

My presentation today will begin, first, with a remembrance of my personal relationship with professor Hookway. Secondly, following in the footsteps of Chris, I will make a plea for a recovery of Peirce in analytic philosophy, and thirdly, I will try to make a contrast between Hookway and Rorty in relation to Peirce in order to highlight the key role that Chris has had in Europe in the present recovery of the figure and thought of Charles S. Peirce. My claim is that Hookway's presentation of Peirce as an analytic philosopher *avant la lettre* has been extremely influential in Europe for the recovery of Peirce, comparable to the influence that Rorty has had for the general resurgence of pragmatism.

1. A Personal Remembrance of Chris Hookway

The first time I met Chris was in Oxford in April 1992, almost twenty years ago. I was attending an interesting conference in Christ Church on computers and humanities. In those days Chris Kloesel, the director of the Peirce Edition Project and general editor of the *Chronological Edition* of Peirce's writings, was worried about the slow pace of production of the volumes and was studying, together with Joe Ransdell and Mary Keeler, how in a digital world all Peirce's manuscripts could be made available on-line. Chris Kloesel invited me for a meeting in a delightful Oxford pub with them and Hookway: he was interested in receiving the Hookway's feedback on their project of a Peirce Electronic Consortium. In that first meeting, I was impressed by Chris Hookway's prudence and wisdom and particularly by the high esteem and consideration he received from leading American scholars of Peirce like Kloesel and Ransdell.

If my memory is correct, that impression of respect for Chris' scholarship was fully confirmed in our second meeting. That happened three years later in Cerisy-La-Salle in the summer of 1995 when we stayed for several days in an old abbey in Normandy celebrating

¹ Thomas H. Johnson and Theodora Ward (eds.), *The Letters of Emily Dickinson*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1986, p. 474.

one hundred years of American philosophy². In that memorable meeting I saw how luminaries of American philosophy like Hilary Putnam, Ruth Barcan Marcus, Richard Rorty, Donald Davidson, Stanley Cavell, or Susan Haack always received with great attention and consideration all Hookway's questions and comments. And it seems to me that the main reason was that Chris was the author of the first comprehensive account of Charles S. Peirce's philosophy palatable for analytic philosophers: his excellent 1985 book on *Peirce* in the collection of "The Arguments of the Philosophers" in Routledge & Kegan Paul Press. In fact, almost thirty years later it still stands as a genuine milestone in Peirce scholarship. As Chris wrote in the Preface of his book:

I have set myself the task of writing the book which I had looked for when I started to read Peirce —hopefully, a clear presentation of his views on the topics of principal concern to him, and an explanation of how the whole is supposed to fit together. While I have not eschewed criticism, the main focus throughout has been upon providing a guide that will enable people to read Peirce's works with an understanding of what he is up to and why he presents his doctrines as he does.³

Hookway succeeded greatly in his task, and his Routledge book became the presentation card of Peirce's thought in the analytic philosophical scene. As a contrast, let me recall Rorty's relation with Peirce. I will do that in a personal vein, since a few days later after the meeting in Cerisy-La-Salle, I went to Stanford as a visiting scholar at the Center for the Study of Language and Information, where I spent all summer writing a book on research methodology in philosophy. One day in early August, I went at 2 p.m. to the stunning Green Library, which houses nearly 3 million books in the humanities and social sciences. The heat was relentless in the open air; though the library was very comfortable thanks to the air conditioning, it was deserted. I was looking for a bookshelf and I ran head-on into Rorty, who was with his suitcase filled with books. We greeted each other politely and he invited me to visit him at his home of visiting professor on campus.

By telephone we arranged the meeting and I visited him a few days later. We spent about an hour talking about his habits as a writer and his more general ideas about research in philosophy. At some point I told him I was studying Peirce and with great simplicity and directness he replied that he believed he had wasted two years of his life studying Peirce and gave up his attempt when he read the book by Murray Murphey *The Development of Peirce's Philosophy* (1961), which made the claim that Peirce was a failure, and that in any case it is not possible to give a reasonable and consistent meaning to his texts. I told him that in a second edition Murphey had recently tried to rectify that impression and in fact I sent a few days after a copy of the "Preface" of 1993 in which Murphey writes⁴:

I have discovered, to my great surprise, that some readers of this volume have understood me as saying that Peirce was a failure as a philosopher. I do not know what has led to this misinterpretation, but I should like to take this opportunity to correct it. Charles Peirce was in my judgment the greatest American philosopher; his only rival is Jonathan Edwards. He was, I think, a philosopher of the first rank—the equal if not the superior of any other thinker of the nineteenth century. As a logician, he stands with Frege as one of the two giants of that era, but

² Cf. Jean-Pierre Cometti and Claudine Tiercelin (eds.), *Cent ans de philosophie américaine: Colloque de Cerisy, 24 juin-1e juillet 1995*, Publications de l'Université de Pau, Pau, 2003. Program available at <http://www.ccic-cerisy.asso.fr/philamericPRG95.html>.

³ Christopher Hookway, *Peirce*, Routledge, London, 1985, 1992, pp. ix-x.

⁴ Murray Murphey, *The Development of Peirce's Philosophy*, Hackett, Indianapolis, 1993, p. vi.

in philosophy generally he was the peer of any thinker in England or Europe. Let honor be given to whom honor is due.

Shortly after, I found out that Rorty said something similar in "The Pragmatist's Progress", his collaboration in the book by Umberto Eco, *Interpretation and Overinterpretation*. Eco and Rorty were united in their aspirations as code breakers, both trying to make sense of the arcane texts of Peirce:

This ambition led me to waste my twenty-seventh and twenty-eight years trying to discover the secret of Charles Sanders Peirce's esoteric doctrine of the 'reality of Thirdness' and thus of his fantastically elaborate semiotico-metaphysical 'System'. I imagined that a similar urge must have led the young Eco to the study of that infuriating philosopher, and that a similar reaction must have enabled him to see Peirce as just one more whacked-out triadomaniac. In short, by using this narrative as a grid, I was able to think of Eco as a fellow-pragmatist⁵.

I tend to think that if Chris's book (or something similar) had been available twenty-five years earlier, the evolution of Rorty's mind would have been different.

Well, coming again to my personal remembrance of Hookway, let me conclude it saying that I have been with him in at least a dozen conferences during those years all over the world: Baltimore, Philadelphia, Sao Paulo, Coimbra, and many other places. I've always learnt a lot from his lectures and papers. I want to mention also that in the banquet that most of the conferences had, I tried always to sit at Chris' side, not only because of his crystal-clear English or his easy-going style, but also because he always has interesting ideas and refreshing ways of looking at things: old philosophical topics look new when seen from his marvelous blend of British analytic philosophy and American pragmatism. I remember now the wonderful three days we spent together in Cuernavaca, México, invited by José Miguel Esteban, and the meeting in Santiago de Compostela arranged by Uxía Rivas on Hilary Putnam where I presented a paper on "Dichotomies and Artifacts. A Reply to Professor Hookway."⁶ I've learnt a lot from his calm style, his philosophical penetration and his permanent defense and example of a clear way of thinking and writing.

2. A Plea for a Peircean Turn in Analytic Philosophy⁷

Criticisms of analytic philosophy have increased in intensity in the last decades, denouncing specifically its closing in on itself, resulting in barrenness and ignorance of real human problems. According to the standard narrative analytic philosophy in the hands of European *émigrés* took over the departments of Philosophy in the American universities in the fifties of the past century, becoming the dominant philosophy of the sixties and seventies. The striking fact —as Rorty vigorously pointed out— was that that philosophy which had promised to solve all the genuine philosophical problems arising from scientific activity, thirty years later, was defined neither by a set of problems systematically studied, nor by

⁵ Umberto Eco, *Interpretation and Overinterpretation*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992, p. 93.

⁶ "Dichotomies and Artifacts: A Reply to Professor Hookway" in M. U. Rivas Monroy, C. Cancela Silva and C. Martínez Vidal (eds.), *Following Putnam's Trail: On Realism and Other Issues*, Rodopi, Amsterdam, 2008, pp. 71-80. Available online at <http://www.unav.es/users/DichotomiesArtifacts.pdf>

⁷ I use for this section several paragraphs of my Boston World Congress of Philosophy paper of 1998 available at <http://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Amer/AmerNubi.htm>

common methods of dealing with them, but only by a mere style or argumentative ability⁸. The increasing diversity of issues framed under the label of philosophy enabled Rorty to hold that "'Philosophy' in the narrow and professional sense is just whatever we philosophy professors do"⁹. This situation sprang from the failure of the foundationalist project of scientific philosophy, which left as its legacy an aggressive cultural relativism which has pervaded academic philosophy until today.

But this is not the only possible reading of the recent history of philosophy. It is also possible to identify in the analytic philosophy of the last decades the beginning of a renewal or at least the beginning of something different. Although analytic philosophy claimed to be a piecemeal philosophy, its 'motor' —as Hilary Putnam has described¹⁰— was logical positivism. With the shipwreck of the foundationalist program, analytic philosophy began to lose shape as a tendency. What nowadays analytic philosophers are trying to do is not to save the wreckage of foundationalism, but to reach an understanding of the history of its failure and of the nature of philosophical reflection itself. Philosophy might then be understood as being very similar to art, literature and history¹¹, and along these lines it might be possible to close the gap between philosophy as an academic discipline and the deepest aspirations of men and women to know and to live a 'good life'.

The overwhelming dominance of the analytic tradition in the Anglo-American world in the second half of the past century has resulted in neglect of the study of history of thought. As Hilary Putnam wrote, "The long dominance of the idea that 'philosophy is one thing and history of philosophy is another' is now visibly coming to an end"¹². The Kantian dualism between two concepts of philosophy, *Schulbegriff* and *Weltbegriff*, has probably reached its apogee in Anglo-American Universities, in which Nietzsche, Derrida and other continental philosophers have been exiled to the departments of literature. In this sense, the high tradition of analytic philosophy —which traces its roots back to the seminal writings of Frege, Russell and the Vienna Circle— can be understood as the fullest realization of the aspiration of philosophy in its *Schulbegriff*¹³. The only alternative to 'metaphysical realism', i. e., to scientism, is not some form of skepticism *à la* Rorty. Putnam's attempt to rediscover the American pragmatist tradition was for me really attractive: both concepts of philosophy are complementary aspects of a single field of activity. The philosophical enterprise can achieve full fruition when it is pursued under both aspects. The analytic tradition might recover its position of leadership in philosophy if it openly rejects "any form of metaphilosophical dualism that takes twin aspirations of rigor and human relevance as the hallmarks of two distinct and incommensurable kinds of philosophical activity"¹⁴.

A key source for this 'flashback' process, for this retrieval of 'old good philosophy', is the discovery of a continuous tradition within American thought, which has its beginnings in the debates at Harvard between Royce and James, in the work of Peirce and Dewey, and in the teaching of C. I. Lewis, and which is flourishing today. American pragmatism has

⁸ Cf. R. Rorty, *Consequences of Pragmatism (Essays: 1972-1980)*, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1982, pp. 211-230.

⁹ R. Rorty, *Consequences of Pragmatism*, p. 220.

¹⁰ H. Putnam, *Realism and Reason, Philosophical Papers III*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1983, p. 303.

¹¹ Cf. L. Wittgenstein, *Culture and Value*, G. H. von Wright, ed., Blackwell, Oxford, 1980, p. 70.

¹² H. Putnam, "A Half Century of Philosophy, Viewed From Within", *Daedalus* 126 (1997), p. 200.

¹³ Cf. J. Conant, "Introduction" in H. Putnam, *Realism with a Human Face*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1990, p. xxvi.

¹⁴ J. Conant, "Introduction", p. xxii.

commonly been seen by European philosophers—including British philosophers, with the outstanding exception of Chris Hookway—as something parochial and outside the mainstream of philosophy. Pragmatism is often understood as an 'American way' of dealing with knowledge and truth, but as something alien to the general discussion. As Rorty noted, although philosophers in Europe study Quine and Davidson, "they tend to shrug off the suggestion that these contemporary philosophers share their basic outlook with American philosophers who wrote prior to the so-called linguistic turn"¹⁵. It becomes more and more apparent that there has been a continuous development of thought from Peirce to Quine, Sellars, Putnam and so on, and that this tradition of thought—as Bernstein suggested¹⁶—"not only challenges the characteristic Cartesian appeal to foundations, but adumbrates an alternative understanding of scientific knowledge without such foundations".

A few months ago a book was released, edited by Robert B. Talisse and Scott F. Aikin, under the title *The Pragmatism Reader. From Peirce through the Present*. This anthology covers eighteen authors from Charles S. Peirce and William James to our contemporaries Cornel West, Susan Haack, Richard A. Posner, Robert Brandom, Huw Price and Cheryl Misak. The anthology is preceded by an introduction in which the editors explain the scope of the collection and their intentions: "We present pragmatism as a highly influential program within mainstream Anglophone philosophy. Moreover, one will notice that we see pragmatism as a *persistent* force throughout the twentieth century and into the present"¹⁷. Probably, the main virtue of this new anthology is the clear intention of its editors to rewrite the standard narrative about the *eclipse* of pragmatism in the United States in the twentieth century, when it was supposedly replaced by logical positivism after World War II. Consequently, Talisse and Aikin challenge this standard narrative, holding that for

(...) most of the influential figures in mainstream philosophy from the past sixty years—for example (and excluding those whose work is collected in the present volume), Ludwig Wittgenstein, Bertrand Russell, Karl Popper, John Rawls, John Searle, Daniel Dennett, Charles Taylor, Michael Dummett, and Jürgen Habermas—we find that they either explicitly acknowledge a distinctively pragmatist inheritance or take themselves to be responding critically to identifiably pragmatist arguments. Judged according to the centrality of distinctively pragmatist theses concerning meaning, truth, knowledge, and action to ongoing debates in philosophy, pragmatism is easily among the most successful philosophical trends of the past two centuries¹⁸.

Of course, I am sympathetic with this approach which defends the relative centrality of pragmatism in mainstream American philosophy: the success of analytic philosophy in the United States can be traced back to the pragmatist roots of the American philosophical scene; also, the present revival of pragmatism can be understood as a pragmatist transformation of analytic philosophy. Instead of viewing the analytic movement as representing a sharp rupture with pragmatism, the most recent resurgence on pragmatism suggests that there is a deep continuity between both movements: the later one can be understood as a refinement, as a genuine development of the earlier movement.

¹⁵ R. Rorty, "Pragmatism as Anti-Representationalism", in J. P. Murphy, *Pragmatism from Peirce to Davidson*, Westview, Boulder, CO, 1990, p. 1.

¹⁶ R. J. Bernstein, *Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics, and Praxis*, Blackwell, Oxford, 1983, pp. 71-72.

¹⁷ Robert B. Talisse and Scott F. Aikin (eds.): *The Pragmatism Reader. From Peirce through the Present*, University Press, Princeton, NJ, 2011, p. 5.

¹⁸ Robert B. Talisse and Scott F. Aikin (eds.): *The Pragmatism Reader*, p. 6.

With that anthology, the editors succeed in providing texts that exhibit the continuity of pragmatist trends throughout twentieth century philosophy. But, from a general point of view, the remaining doubt is what is the gain of making *pragmatists* of all the philosophers collected in the anthology. According to Talisse and Aikin, most mainstream American philosophers of the twentieth century were pragmatist without knowing it. In contrast, the subtitle of William James' *Pragmatism* of 1907 comes to mind: *A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking*. As Hilary Putnam answered when asked whether if he was an analytic philosopher, "Why can we not just be 'philosophers' without an adjective?"¹⁹. I am sure Chris has had to answer the same question a lot of times of whether he was an analytic philosopher or a pragmatist one. What I can answer is that he is a real philosopher without adjectives, taking the best from all traditions.

The figure of Charles S. Peirce has an ever-increasing relevance in very different areas of knowledge: in astronomy, metrology, geodesy, mathematics, logic, philosophy, theory and history of science, semiotics, linguistics, econometrics, and psychology²⁰. In all these fields Peirce has been considered a pioneer, a forerunner or even a 'father' or 'founder' (of semiotics, of pragmatism). It is very common to find general evaluations like Russell's "beyond doubt ... he was one of the most original minds of the later nineteenth century, and certainly the greatest American thinker ever"²¹ or Umberto Eco's "Peirce was ... the greatest American philosopher of the turn of the century and beyond doubt one the greatest thinkers of his time"²². Even among academic philosophers it has become a commonplace to say that Peirce is the most original philosophical mind that the United States has yet produced²³ and his seminal role in a wide range of philosophical problems has been alluded to by many philosophers: Popper described Peirce as "one of the greatest philosophers of all times"²⁴ and Putnam called him "a towering giant among American philosophers"²⁵.

Factors which have increased the growing interest in Peirce's thought are his personal participation in the scientific community of his time, his valuable contribution to the logic of relatives, and his sound knowledge of the philosophy of Kant as well as of the Scholastic tradition, in particular Duns Scotus. For these reasons —and owing to his deep original and creative mind— it seems to me that it is possible to find in Peirce's thought a way to broaden the analytic mind. That is the greatest merit of Hookway's work. At the very root of American analytic philosophy, Peirce can provide a deeper perspective and make possible a renewal of analytic philosophy where human concerns will have a central importance.

The main difficulty in the study of Peirce was probably the aforementioned air of provincialism that still hovers around pragmatism. A second difficulty of no less importance was that the interpretation of Peirce's thought has for years provoked a wide disagreement amongst Peirce scholars, in part due to the fragmentary presentation of his work in the *Collected Papers*, and in part due to his going against the grain. The fact is that Peirce is not a philosopher easy to classify: some considered him a systematic thinker, but with four successive systems (Murphey, 1961); others see him as a contradictory thinker (Goudge,

¹⁹ H. Putnam, "A Half Century of Philosophy, Viewed From Within", p. 203.

²⁰ Cf. M. Fisch, "The Range of Peirce's Relevance", *The Monist* 63 (1980), 269-276; 64, 123-141.

²¹ B. Russell, *Wisdom of the West*, Doubleday, Garden City, NY, 1959, p. 276.

²² U. Eco, "Introduction", in C. K. Ogden and I. A. Richards, *The Meaning of Meaning*, 4th ed., Harcourt, San Diego, CA, 1989, pp. x-xi.

²³ E. Nagel, "Peirce's Place in Philosophy", *Historia Mathematica* 9 (1982), p. 303.

²⁴ K. R. Popper, *Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1972, p. 212.

²⁵ H. Putnam, *Realism with a Human Face*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1990, p. 252.

1950), or a speculative metaphysician of an idealist type (Esposito, 1980). But in more recent years a deeper understanding of the architectonic nature of his thought and of his whole evolution from his early writings in 1865 until his death in 1914 has been gaining general acceptance²⁶. In the last two decades all Peirce scholars have clearly acknowledged the basic coherence and undeniable systematization of Peirce's thought²⁷: in this process the book written by Christopher Hookway has had an essential role and its importance will never be highlighted enough.

Following Hookway, I think that the most accurate understanding of Peirce is to see him as a traditional and systematic philosopher, but one dealing with the modern problems of science, truth and knowledge from a very valuable personal experience as a logician and an experimental researcher in the bosom of an international community of scientists and thinkers. Alasdair MacIntyre has provided good arguments in defense of cooperative work in philosophy, ethics and the social sciences. The scientific exercise of reason requires learning and the flourishing of intellectual and ethical virtues, and this can only take place in the context of research communities. A century ago Peirce propounded this notion of a community of inquirers, so essential to scientific rationality (*CP* 5.311, 1868).

Most of the hallmarks of analytic philosophy are already present in Peirce. Many of the issues and insights that have emerged in recent philosophy of science, language, and action were not only anticipated by Peirce, but also explored by him with depth and originality. In recent decades his originality has been recognized, as has his almost uncanny anticipation of those problems and issues now taken to be at the heart of philosophy. According to Hookway, the best approach to Peirce seems to be to assume that he sought something similar to the analytic philosophy of language: his underlying motivation and basic ideas have much in common with it²⁸. Even Peirce —according to Wright²⁹— could be counted with Frege, Russell and Wittgenstein, as one of the founding fathers of analytic philosophy. This was the successful interpretative key of Hookway's book in order to make Peirce palatable to analytic readers: Hookway presented Peirce as an analytic philosopher *avant la lettre*.

3. Rorty and Hookway on Peirce

Fifty years ago, in his first published paper, Rorty claimed that Peirce's thought envisaged, and repudiated in advance, the stages in the development of empiricism which logical positivism represented, arriving at a group of insights and a philosophical mood much like those of the 'second' Wittgenstein in his *Philosophical Investigations*³⁰. Nevertheless, as I mentioned before, after reading Murphey's book, Rorty decided to give up: he reached the conclusion that it was not possible to make sense of Peirce's ruminations. On the contrary, Hookway wrote his wonderful book to try to make sense of Peirce's conceptions.

²⁶ Cf. C. Hausman, *Charles S. Peirce's Evolutionary Philosophy*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1993, pp. xiv-xv; N. Houser and C. Kloesel, eds., *The Essential Peirce. Selected Philosophical Writings*, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1992, p. xxix.

²⁷ Cf. L. Santaella-Braga, "Difficulties and Strategies in Applying Peirce's Semiotics", *Semiotica* 97 (1993), p. 401; K. A. Parker, *The Continuity of Peirce's Thought*, Vanderbilt University Press, Nashville, TN, 1998.

²⁸ Christopher Hookway, *Peirce*, pp. 140-141.

²⁹ G. H. von Wright, *The Tree of Knowledge and Other Essays*, Brill, Leiden, 1993, p. 41.

³⁰ Cf. R. Rorty, "Pragmatism, Categories, and Language", *Philosophical Review* 70 (1961), pp. 197-198.

In fact most of British 'high' analytic philosophy was ignorant of Peirce, with the exception of F. P. Ramsey and the sketchy account of Peirce in *The Meaning of Meaning* (1923). I love Bertrand Russell's 1946 preface to J. K. Feibleman's *An Introduction to Peirce's Philosophy*. Let us recall his last two paragraphs:

Peirce was a man of tremendous energy, producing a multitude of ideas, good, bad, and indifferent. He reminds one of a volcano spouting vast masses of rock, of which some, on examination, turn out to be nuggets of pure gold. He holds —and I confess that an examination of scientific inference has made me feel the force of this view— that man is adapted, by his congenital constitution, to the apprehension of natural laws which cannot be proved by experience, although experience is in conformity with them. "The chicken you say pecks by instinct. But if you are going to think every poor chicken endowed with an innate tendency towards a positive truth, why should you think that to man alone this gift is denied?" This is an important question, to which I do not know the answer.

Peirce was undoubtedly a great philosopher, and it is important that he should receive the respect that he deserves. Much of his system will seem to most modern readers, as it does to me, unduly metaphysical on the one hand, and on the other hand too much influenced by evolutionary optimism. But even when his general system is discarded there remain very many suggestions that, in a receptive mind, are capable of giving rise to large developments of great importance.

I like also Ayer's presentation of Peirce in his book *The Origins of Pragmatism* (1968), but one had to wait until Hookway's book of 1985 to get a comprehensive view of Peirce's philosophy. The proximity between Wittgenstein and Peirce has been studied with some detail³¹, and it seems to me that the study of Peirce's thought can shed great light on the way to better integrate the variety of piecemeal issues within the framework of contemporary philosophy. As Hookway suggests, "we find in Peirce's work not just the parallel development of themes found in the work of Frege, Russell or Wittgenstein, but also the framework for an integrated theory of culture"³².

A Peircean approach to philosophy offers both deep involvement in current highly specialized and technical philosophical discussion, and the resources to participate in the general conversation of mankind. It maintains in stable equilibrium both Kantian concepts of philosophy, and is thus probably the best way in which analytic philosophy can be fully renovated and be opened to show —in Putnam's expression— a more human face.

But, let me put a final question. Was Peirce really an analytic philosopher, as Hookway's book suggests? After years of considering this question, my answer is that Peirce was first and foremost a real practitioner of science. Not only was he trained as a chemist at Harvard, but for thirty years (1861-91) he worked regularly for the U. S. Coast Survey as a metrologist and as an observer in astronomy and geodesy. As Max Fisch points out, 'Peirce was not merely a philosopher or a logician who had read up on science. He was a full-fledged

³¹ Cf. for instance, P. G. Boghossian y E. Drewniak, "Wittgenstein and Peirce on Meaning", *Diálogos* 30 (1995), pp. 173-188; J. Nubiola, "Scholarship on the Relations between Ludwig Wittgenstein and Charles S. Peirce", in I. Angelelli y M. Cerezo, eds., *Studies on the History of Logic. Proceedings of the III Symposium on the History of Logic*, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, 1996, pp. 281-294, available on line at <http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/aboutcsp/nubiola/scholar.htm>

³² Christopher Hookway, *Peirce*, p. 120.

professional scientist, who carried into all his work the concerns of the philosopher and logician'³³.

In addition to his personal experience of scientific practice, his sound knowledge of the history of science and of the history of philosophy helped him to establish a general cartography of scientific methodology. Having done research in astronomy, mathematics, logic and philosophy and in the history of all these sciences, Peirce tried all his life to disclose the logic of scientific inquiry. This was his main goal, as recorded in the opening paragraph of *Collected Papers*

The undertaking which this volume inaugurates is to make a philosophy like that of Aristotle, that is to say, to outline a theory so comprehensive that, for a long time to come, the entire work of human reason, in philosophy of every school and kind, in mathematics, in psychology, in physical science, in history, in sociology, and in whatever other department there may be, shall appear as the filling up of its details. (*CP* 1.1, c.1898)

It could be said that there is nothing more alien to the spirit of analytic philosophy than this grand narrative, but to try to understand Peirce —and to present him— as a forerunner of the analytic tradition has been the great feat of Christopher Hookway in order to make Peirce acceptable to analytic mainstream philosophers.

I have to stop, and I want to do so with two words that —as the poet Octavio Paz noted— have equivalents in all languages. These two words, Chris, are: ¡*Muchas gracias!*

³³ Max Fisch, "Introduction", in *Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition*, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1993, vol. 3, pp. xxviii-xxix.