The argument for Pragmatism may be stated.

(1) The meaning of an intellectual concept consists in the manner in which it might modify deliberate conduct.

(2) For an intellectual concept is not by itself perfectible.

(3) And all thinking in reasoning consists in deliberate conduct.

(4) Now, whatever is deliberately performed and not throw to be done under active self-control.

(5) And let anything be actively self-controlled and it must be done with controlled attention.

(6) Attention involves effort.

(7) And effort is active, self-controlled effort.

Besides all thinking is reasoning.

The very first step in all reasoning—which is deduction—consists in the manipulation of
of signs of a certain sort, and that on a definite and observational manipulation, self-controlled self-consciousness.

(5) For there is no conduct.

(6) For the only ultimate cause of reasoning that can be given, that is the general rule of conduct.

(10) The conclusion is the logical interpretation.

(11) One that is an unreal, as to say the significative.

(12) The work of defining a concept is eminently a work of thinking.

(13) And such is subject to the order of causation.

(18) For, therefore, the only essence of the concept—logical in important—is a general habit of conduct.
The argument is that

(1) Thoughts are signs
(2) and general signs
(3) and thought is subjective and general
(4) The subject is general
(5) All signs are subjective
(6) and general
(7) and subjective
(8) and general
(9) but only subjective
(10) And what happens subjective
(11) Sign
(12) Now and future consists in
(13) and the future consists in
Man comes from the womb in actuality an animal being, no finer than a fowl; by no means as high as a primate. His primary consists in his destination.

His is not a rational man until he acquires self-control. Woman is lower than man notwithstanding her superiority as an animal. Her brain is not as large as that of a man, yet she has less self-control. For with fewer passions she is more the victim of circumstances than man.

Man becomes to his normal development only through the control of the evil passions, which are evil only in the sense that they ought to be controlled and are good as the only possible agency in man's full development.
fine motion of the partments of evil is such a shadow that God delights in evil and those parts (not because it is the only means of His power for effecting His purpose, but because He is together with it as it is to be). The truth is that in every creature that we are capable to trust against it that we are not present. In reference to the presence of God's omnipotence, one ought to try to comprehend that it is, which one can do by looking at the self-control of an evil which is in the self-control of evil passions is not genuine self-control, but merely the exhibition of an institution of evil passion for another, just as the trainer of an elephant may or may not impress his own control upon the animal. But the nature of this relation is that just as the action of the means does not make the means by the process, and genuine self-control is not genuine self-control of the self-control, we have to think in connection with it. The concept of evil passion is not itself genuine self-control, but leads to the development of these.

The above is only pertinent only if it shows that many existences can be managed with safety by acting upon

natural self-conduct.
1. If the doctrine that the True is the Satisfactory be that those two words are synonymous, it is not a doctrine of philosophy, but only a proposition in English lexicography.

2. It seems plain, however, that it is a doctrine of philosophy, vaguely expressed, and that the assertion is that while to be True means something else, it is equivocal with that Satisfactory in cognition.

3. In that case, it is indispensable to say what is meant by the True: until this is done, the statement has no meaning. I suppose that by the True is meant that at which inquiry aims.

4. It is equally indispensable to ascertain what is meant by Satisfactory; but this is by no means so easy. Whatever be the meaning, however, if the doctrine is true at all, it must be necessarily true. For it is the...
very object conceived or entertained the purpose of the inquiry that is asserted to have the character of satisfaction.

5. Is the Satisfactory meant to be whatever excites a certain peculiar feeling (satisfaction)? In that case, it is declared, is simply Hedonism in so far as it affects the field of cognition. For when Hedonists talk of "pleasure," they do not mean what is so called in ordinary speech, but rather a feeling of satisfaction.

6. But to say that an action or the result of an action is Satisfactory is simply to say that it is congruous with the aim of the action. Consequently, the aim must be determined before it can be determined, either in thought or in fact, to be satisfactory. An action that had no other aim than to be congruous to its aim would have no
The Hedonists do not offer their doctrine as an induction from experience, but insist that, in the nature of things, an action can have no other aim than "pleasure." Now it is conceivable that an action should be disconnected from every other in its aim. Such an action, then, according to Hedonistic doctrine, can have no other aim than that of satisfying its own aim, which is absurd.

But if the Hedonist replies that this position does not relate to satisfaction but to the feeling that only arises upon satisfaction, the rejoinder will be that feeling is incomprehensible, so that no necessary truth can be discovered about it. But as a matter of observation we do, now and then,
meet with persons who very largely
behave with a view of experiencing
this or that feeling. These people, however
are exceptional, and are wretched beings
sharply marked off from the mass of
men kind.

9. It is, however, no doubt, true that
men act, especially in the action of
enquiring, as if their sole purpose were
to produce a certain state of feeling,
in the sense that when that state of
feeling is attained, there is no further
effort. It was upon that proposition
that I originally based pragmatism,
laying it down in the article of the
same name in November 1877, prepared for
the ground for the pragmaticalistic doc-
tine (see January 1878). In the case
of inquiry, I called that state of feeling
"firm belief," and said, \\
"As soon as
A page from a historical document that appears to discuss philosophical or scientific ideas. The text is handwritten and difficult to decipher due to the age of the document and the handwriting style. It mentions terms and concepts that are not easily legible, such as "principle," "action," and "conception." The page seems to be part of a larger treatise or essay, possibly on the nature of knowledge or empirical observation.
of all intellectual conditions, hence rising

to the imposition of beliefs by the authority

of organized society, then to the idea of a

settlement of opinion as the result of a

fragmentation of ideas; and the utterly reach-

ing the idea of truth as overwhelmingly

forced upon the mind in experience as

the effect of an independent reality.