News© Institutional Communication, 05/04/2006
Ethics can learn from Nature
The first principles are foundational truths, insofar as they are distinguished from knowledge acquired by discursive reason. But this does not imply that they are “given” beforehand or that they are not actively acquired. The first principles, in the areas both of theoretical and practical knowledge, are not innate. If they were considered to be such, naturalism would be the result. Naturalism destroys the very foundations of ethics, given that no moral qualification can be acquired in vacuum, nor be transferred in a causal manner, but rather must be actively acquired. There are no ethical goods which are purely natural nor virtues which are innate.
The first principles are original and primitive truths, because they result from the use of the theoretical and practical reason, in which this reason is identified with reality itself, and which reveals itself in the primordial differences and determinations corresponding to the most elemental prelinguistic concepts: one, other, same, different, be, not be, good and evil (…) Considered in themselves, they indicate a limit of the intelligence, further than which one cannot reach. Here resides the possibility and the necessity of both metaphysics and ethics. What we know as natural law is based on this non-naturalist opening to the nature of the human being and of the things of the world. (…) Inductive abstraction elevates that which is sensible to an intelligible level, which is only found in potency in nature.
These are the noetic principles of the classical doctrine of the natural law, which could more appropriately be called natural-rational law, since this theory is characterized by constant call to collaboration—without confusion—between reason and nature. The modern version, on the other hand, merits rather the title of rational law. This is because only reason is in possession of itself, and precisely for that reason, is possessor of nature. Only that reason which possesses itself can possess nature. (…) What is problematic, and perhaps leads to a dead-end, is the possible recourse to nature in a moral and juridical conception which sees reason as the definitive ground for all normativity. But, before proceeding to deal with this question, we must ask whether it is worth the effort. This recourse to nature was maintained, in fact, in classic ethics and legal theory. But it was accused of falling victim to the naturalist fallacy, which constitutes a much more serious reproach than that of rationalist fallacy which the modern version of natural law may well merit.
(…) It turns out, however, that at the opposite extreme from rationalism one does not find classical ethics, but rather precisely the moral position of David Hume. According to Hume, reason is impotent in the face of nature: it is only a slave of the passions, and is always at the service of whatever compulsion happens to be strongest at the moment. In other words, reason is in no way practical, it is not determinative of action, it is not active. And if Hume himself does not fall victim to the naturalist fallacy, but rather simply denounces it in the philosophies of others, it is precisely because for him there is no obligation which could derive or not derive from nature: nature is all there is. If this position were correct, it would be impossible to construct an ethics that went beyond that which in fact is done, that would prescribe something superior to or distinct from that which is done by custom or as a matter of fact, and thus which would be something more than a science de moeurs.
Natural obligation
the classical conception of the natural law does not require attaining something similar to the concept of obligation, as we understand it currently, since that which later would be called “obligation” was seen to be situated in nature. Nevertheless, this does mean that we are dealing with a naturalistic concept. The classical conception of the natural law—the natural-rational law—does not require obtaining obligation from a basis in being, nor is it merely biologistic, as is frequently misunderstood. In order to appreciate this, it must be clarified what it is that is understood, within this theory, as “nature.”
According to Thomas Aquinas, human reason views as goods—and thus as that which must be pursued—all of those things towards which the human being has a natural inclination. Thus, the order of natural inclinations is the order of the precepts of the natural law. Insofar as the human being is a living being, there is a tendency towards conserving one's own life; as a being with sense perception, there is a tendency towards reproduction and care for children; and as rational being, there manifest inclinations towards the knowledge of truth and towards peaceful coexistence with other such being.
Not merely pros and cons
We thus come to the question of the ultimate foundations of morality, and with it, to the problem of the justification of absolute prohibitions. If the only determination proceeded from the ratio, in that case there would be no place for negative unconditional mandates. In such a case, the only objective foundation of ethics would derive from a comparative weighting of goods, as indeed today not a few moralists and specialists in bioethics or business ethics will say. The result of weighing the favorable and unfavorable consequences of actions can never be a maxim of an absolute character. Thus, in this case, practical reason does not involve the weighing of advantages and disadvantages, but rather recognizing what is natural and what in unnatural. It is nevertheless objected that, from this anchoring of morality in what is in agreement with nature and that which goes against it, one can only obtain empty formulas. It is odd, nevertheless, that the postures of those who defend the natural law, in the face of challenges from relativist positions such as consequentialism, are so vigorous that the concrete dicta at which they arrive are considered at times to be oppressive and frequently provoke a certain rejection.
Nevertheless, nature is not the only criterion of morality. The label “rational-natural law” applies more to the classical conception of natural law than to the modern. Among other reasons, this is because in the classical framework, there exists what might be called a sharing of functions. Nature is the principle of delimitation for those extreme cases which can be the object of unconditional prohibitions, where reason constitutes the principle for the weighing of goods in cases which are less fundamental than those cases where life and death are at stake. Regulation by reason is also maintained in classical natural law theory from another perspective. This is because natural tendencies only have moral relevance insofar as they have a connection with the faculty of making rational choices, that is, when the person has the ability to either accept or reject the tendencies. In this area, the Aristotelian axiom applied: “natura ad unum, ratio ad opposita” . We cannot abstain from digesting, whereas we can abstain—or not—from eating (in accordance with a determination resulting from a weighting of goods), and we can also eat more or less. Natural tendencies are all good, but in a premoral sense. Only reason brings us to the dimension of morality, as implying the distinction between good and evil. Thus, the classical conception cannot be labeled as “naturalist,” in view of these considerations.
A Road to Oneself
The conflict between nature and reason is closely linked to the duality which exists between praxis and technique, that is, between moral and political activity, on the one hand, and instrumental reason, on the other. This conflict has roots deep in the history of philosophy. In my opinion, the decisive theoretical contribution comes from Aristotle, who established a close connection between the concepts of praxis and physis, insofar as both immanent activity and nature imply self-directedness, as opposed to what happens with the instrumental or technical use of reason. (…) The consequences of the action—which frequently cannot be predicted, nor are proposed nor calculated—should not become the moral criterion. (…)
He who only pays attention to reason, will have to see purpose in everything. And this applies especially to the good life, to a life which is achieved, about which practical philosophy is concerned. However, the authentically good life has no purpose. And this applies also, therefore, to the life of reason. Knowledge is not fundamentally a search for the self, but, as the Aristotelian tradition maintains, a reception (though certainly not passive) of other forms insofar as they are other. Self-knowledge is always a derived phenomenon, an epiphenomenon. Thus, a good life complies with the requirements of nature, without needing to know that it is so doing. Thus the achieved life, or happiness, is not subject to being made instrumental. On the contrary, instrumentalization is a permanent danger for every interpretation of the good life as being founded solely on reason and on the establishment of the end or goal. (…)In the classical theory of natural law, there is still preserved the original sense of the axiom natura ad unum, ratio ad opposita. “Ad unum” does not yet mean in this tradition the exterior determination which “nature” would come to signify later. And similarly, “ad opposita” does not yet refer to the self-determination of the will. In other words, the first—the ad unum—does not mean that the fundamental indetermination or contingency of nature must be overcome by a superior power, even if this were the power of nature itself. Neither is it the case that the second–the ad opposita—signifies that indecision can be overcome by the will's own power of determination.
Rethinking the connection between reason and nature is today an indispensable condition for a fecund contemporary renewal of a practical philosophy firmly linked to the first principles of praxis, and which does not convert itself—in the words of Franco Volpi—into an “ideology of a comfortable relativism of a conservative stripe.”
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