

I WORKSHOP ON VAGUENESS  
University of Navarra  
Spain

28 May 2005

Programme

10.00 Dominic Hyde, University of Queensland, Australia  
*The Prospects of a Paraconsistent Response to Vagueness*

Comments by Anna Mahtani, University of Sheffield, UK

11.30 Break

11.45 Manuel García Carpintero, University of Barcelona, Spain  
*Bivalence and What Is Said*

Comments by Paloma Pérez-Ilzarbe and María Cerezo, University of Navarra, Spain

13.15 Lunch

15.00 Pablo Cobreros, University of Navarra, Spain  
*Semantic Indeterminacy and No-ignorance*

16.00 María Cerezo, University of Navarra, Spain  
*Bivalence, Contrariety and Higher Order Vagueness*

17.00 Break

17.15 Roy Sorensen, Dartmouth College, USA  
*Truthmaker Gaps and Contingent Analyticity*

Comments by Dan López de Sa, Arche, University of St. Andrews, UK

All talks will take place in the Seminar Room of the Department of Philosophy, Edificio Antiguo de Bibliotecas, 2<sup>nd</sup> floor

Lunch will be at the self-service in the dining room in front of the Central Building of the University

For further details, contact Pablo Cobreros ([pcobrer@alumni.unav.es](mailto:pcobrer@alumni.unav.es))

## ABSTRACTS

Dominic Hyde, *The Prospects of a Paraconsistent Response to Vagueness*

Hyde (1997) argued that subvaluationism, since a dual of supervaluationism, presents a paraconsistent response to vagueness which, on the basis of reasons presented in the literature so far, is on a par with its paracomplete cousin. A defender of supervaluationism, Keefe (2000) suggests that the argument is flawed since the duality overlooks important differences between the two systems under scrutiny. I shall argue that the central difference ignores the crucial role of the multiple-conclusion consequence relation, while other alleged differences are simply not there. The original result stands.

Roy Sorensen, *Truthmaker Gaps and Contingent Analyticity*

In the final chapter of Vagueness and Contradiction I float a version of epistemicism that postulates truthmaker gaps (i. e. contingent truths that are not contingent on any portion of reality). Truthmaker epistemicism implies that the counterexample to the induction step of each analytic sorites argument is contingent yet analytic. For instance, if 'Fifteen minutes after noon is the last noonish minute' is true, then nothing makes it true (says the truthmaker epistemicist). Analyticity is merely the failure of the world to control the truth-value of the statement. But since nothing else makes the statement true, there are qualitatively identical possible worlds in which it is false. So this analytic statement is contingent. I defend this surprising implication as well as my affection for analytic sorites arguments.

Manuel García-Carpintero, *Bivalence and What is said*

According to a well-known way of tracing the semantics/pragmatics distinction semantic theories ascribe to expressions meanings that are as close as possible to what linguistic conventions settle. This thought has led writers to distinguish two notions of 'what is said', only in one of which is an immediate semantic concern to characterize what sentential expressions say. In one, saying is a speech act - roughly, the one done by default with declarative sentences; in the semantically relevant sense, saying is conveying conventionally encoded meanings. I argue that a usual argument against supervaluationist accounts of truth-value gaps fallaciously ignores that distinction.