Science, Reason and Faith in the Third Millenium
Mariano Artigas. Facultad Eclesiástica de Filosofía, Universidad de Navarra
International Congress “Christian Humanism in the Third
Millenium: the Perspective of Saint Thomas Aquinas”
Pontifical Academy of Saint Thomas and Società Internazionale Tommaso d’Aquino
Rome, 21-25 September 2003
Published in: Mariano Artigas. “Science, Reason and Faith in the Third
Millennium”, in: Proceedings of the International Congress on
Christian Humanism in the Third Millennium: The Perspective of
Thomas Aquinas, volume 2 (Vatican City: Pontificia Academia Sancti
Thomae Aquinatis, 2005), pp. 893-908.
Índice
- Abstract
- 1. Scientific realism
- 2. Science, reason and faith
- 3. Reflective capacity, science and
truth
- 4. Modalities of truth
- 5. Truth and belief
- 6. The unity of knowledge
- 7. Science and wisdom
- 8. Scientism
- 9. The assumptions of science and the impact
of its progress
- 10. Three conclusive reflections
- Notes
In the last decades of the 20th century we have
witnessed the ruin of scientism, but it has not been substituted by
an adequate perspective. In this context, the encyclical Fides
et Ratio has set up a very interesting program. In my paper I
comment on several points of the encyclical that I consider
especially important for a new harmony between science, reason and
faith. They refer to scientific realism (we will hardly be able to
argue in favor of the human capacity to know the truth in the
deepest questions if we deny it in natural science); to the
relationship between science, reason and faith (analyzing the
current scientific world-view rooted on self-organization); to the
search for truth (which has a deep anthropological meaning); to the
modalities of truth; to the relationship between truth and belief
(in order to overcome the false dilemma “authority versus
criticism”); to the unity of knowledge (we should resort to
philosophy if we want to reach the new unification of knowledge
required in our time); to science and wisdom (an organizing
principle is needed); to the assumptions of science and the impact
of its progress; to some reflections directed to those who have
responsibility of formation in the Church, to philosophers, and to
scientists.
In the first half of the 20th century, the
neo-positivism of the Vienna Circle launched a program that had a
strong impact worldwide, and set up the conditions that, in a good
extent, were followed by the philosophy of science in the next
decades. This program included as basic components an
anti-metaphysical and anti-theological attitude, as though the
empiricist criterion of meaning would disqualify metaphysics and
theology in the name of science. Nevertheless, in the last decades
of the 20th century we have witnessed the ruin of
scientism. Not that it has been substituted by an adequate
perspective. Rather, the “weak thought” so widespread
in our days presents as an alternative only local narratives that
neither aim at a universal value nor claim for truth. Thus, the
potentialities of metaphysics and theology seem destined to remain
as one more expression of the human subjectivity: surely
respectful, but without any real chance of exercising any influence
on the dynamism of history.
In this context, the encyclical Fides et Ratio has set
up, at the very end of the 20th century (September 14,
1998), a program that reinforces the role that the human reason
should play in human affairs, avoiding at the same time the
marginalization of philosophy and the thread of scientism as well.
I am going to comment on several points of the encyclical that I
consider especially important for this new harmony between science,
reason and faith at the beginning of the third millenium. The basic
scheme is completely coherent with the ideas of Saint Thomas, but
at the same time I try to introduce the new issues that emerge from
the development of modern empirical science and its philosophy.
In the beginning of the encyclical (n. 5), the Pope says that he
is going to focus on philosophy and explains the reason saying
that, “at the present time in particular, the search for
ultimate truth seems often to be neglected”. How have we
arrived at this darkening? The situation is paradoxical. A great
progress in many ambits of the human knowledge has occurred; the
Pope mentions “anthropology, logic, the natural sciences,
history, linguistics and so forth - the whole universe of knowledge
has been involved in one way or another”. Nevertheless, the
great variety of positive results have had as a consequence that
the direction towards a unifying truth has been forgotten, so that
pragmatic criteria prevail and the technical effectiveness is used
like a pattern of behavior. Thus it has happened that “rather
than make use of the human capacity to know the truth, modern
philosophy has preferred to accentuate the ways in which this
capacity is limited and conditioned”.
This diagnosis is valid for the philosophy of science in our
time. On the one hand, everybody is convinced that sciences
progress in a spectacular way, but on the other hand no consensus
exists about the very existence of scientific truth.
Scientific realism affirms that scientific truth exists and that
we can reach it. It must face difficulties that can be reduced to
two main points. On the one hand, science consists of our
constructions that are not simple photographs of reality. Specially
in mathematical physics very abstract models are formulated that,
frequently, do not have a clear correspondence with reality. On the
other hand, due to purely logical reasons, we cannot verify our
hypotheses in a definitive way, therefore they must remain always
open to further criticism and eventual change.
I have been maintaining, for years, a kind of scientific realism
according to which in empirical science we can reach a true
knowledge, with a truth that is always contextual and therefore
partial, but, at the same time, is an authentic truth. Scientific
truth is always “contextual” because it must be
interpreted within the conceptual and experimental context that we
use in each theory. Being contextual, it is also
“partial”, and it does not exhaust all that can be said
about the object we study. But, at the same time, it can be an
“authentic” truth in the classical sense of
correspondence with reality. of course, as there are many different
types of scientific constructs, there will also be different modes
of correspondence with reality. Thus, in order to establish such a
correspondence we will have to pay attention, of course, to the
concepts and data used in every case 1.
The defense of scientific realism matches very well with the
encyclical Fides et ratio. We will hardly be able to argue
in favor of the human capacity to know the truth in the deepest
questions if we deny it in the scientific knowledge of the natural
world. It is difficult, to say the least, to undertake a
metaphysical study if we do not have a suitable physical base. It
can be argued, in addition, that the dialogue between science and
faith must take place through a bridge constructed by means of a
realist philosophy that is able to connect both participants
2.
In n. 9 of the encyclical, the Pope cites the doctrine of
Vatican Council I on the distinction between the two orders of
knowledge, i.e. reason and faith, and he adds: “Philosophy
and the sciences function within the order of natural reason; while
faith, enlightened and guided by the Spirit, recognizes in the
message of salvation the ‘fullness of grace and truth’
(cf. Jn 1:14) which God has willed to reveal in history and
definitively through his Son, Jesus Christ (cf. 1 Jn 5:9;
Jn 5:31-32)”.
A generalized agreement exists about the distinction between the
perspectives of the sciences and the faith. Nevertheless, that
distinction can be interpreted in two opposed ways: sometimes
science and faith are seen as complementary, while at other times
they are seen as mutually opposed and even enemies. Both positions
exist at present.
One of the classic subjects in this ambit are the proofs of the
existence of God that start from the knowledge of nature. The Pope
alludes to them in n. 19 of the encyclical, commenting texts of the
book of Wisdom, where we read that “From the greatness and
beauty of created things comes a corresponding perception of their
Creator” (Wis 13:5). The Pope comments: “This is
to recognize as a first stage of divine Revelation the marvelous
‘book of nature’, which, when read with the proper tools
of human reason, can lead to the knowledge of the Creator. If human
beings with their intelligence fail to recognize God as Creator of
all, it is not because they lack the means to do so, but because
their free will and their sinfulness place an impediment in the
way”. In this perspective, reason is valued as an instrument
to know the God who reveals himself through nature.
Present-day discussions about the proofs of the existence of God
that start from the contemplation of nature are centered specially
around the teleological argument. In the English-speaking world
this is usually treated as the “argument from design”.
It seems that that argument, and the discussions that accompany it,
do not correspond with all property to the fifth way of Saint
Thomas who more than “design” emphasizes
“purpose”. Surely common elements to both approaches
exist: the divine government of the creation is closely related to
the concrete plans manifested in the operation of nature. But
“design” refers to an intelligent activity that
consists in ordering previously existing materials, and
“purpose”, instead, corresponds to a behavior of nature
that arises from internal principles. “Design” suggests
a Great Architect, “purpose” suggests a Creator.
The difference is clear when we consider
“self-organization”, which is the central metaphor of
the present scientific world view. If nature has surprising
capacities to self-organize itself so that successive levels of
complexity appear by means of the unfolding of natural
potentialities, the corresponding image of God is the one of the
author of nature who has placed in it the seeds that are developed
progressively.
Although there is no general agreement about these subjects, it
is significant that, far from being surpassed, they provoke a great
abundance of reflections today. A philosophy of science that used
to be centered around physics emphasized the characteristics of
inert matter. I like to highlight that the present scientific world
view, instead, rather suggests that inert matter does not exist,
and places in the center, as it happened in ancient times, the
living beings: the progress of physics and chemistry has made
possible an explosive progress of biology which, in turn, has given
rise to a new interest on the teleological dimensions of nature.
The world of biology is the world of purpose, and teleology is a
key subject in order to relate the ambits of science and theology
3.
Teleology is only a particular connection between science,
reason and faith, but a very important one. No wonder, therefore,
that it is permanently subjected to attack. I think that, as
realism is important in the ambit of knowledge, finality occupies a
central place in the study of nature, and both items play a
decisive role if we desire to connect the sciences with philosophy
and theology.
John Paul II emphasizes that man has the capacity to know the
truth, and not only particular truths, but ultimate truths that
give a meaning to our life. In n. 24 of the encyclical he writes:
“There is therefore a path which the human being may choose
to take, a path which begins with reason’s capacity to rise
beyond what is contingent and set out towards the infinite. In
different ways and at different times, men and women have shown
that they can articulate this intimate desire of theirs. Through
literature, music, painting, sculpture, architecture and every
other work of their creative intelligence they have declared the
urgency of their quest. In a special way philosophy has made this
search its own and, with its specific tools and scholarly methods,
has articulated this universal human desire”. In n. 25, the
Pope quotes the beginning of Aristotle’s Metaphysics:
“All human beings desire to know”, adds that
“truth is the proper object of this desire”, and
continues with a consideration whose importance is difficult to
exaggerate: “Within visible creation, man is the only
creature who not only is capable of knowing but who knows that he
knows, and is therefore interested in the real truth of what he
perceives... This is what has driven so many inquiries, especially
in the scientific field, which in recent centuries have produced
important results, leading to genuine progress for all
humanity”.
Afterwards, the Pope mentions Galileo. I would say that the
birth of modern empirical science was possible thanks to the
enthusiastic search of truth. Galileo would have had no problems
with the Holy Office had he limited himself to present
heliocentrism merely as a hypothesis or a tool useful for
mathematical calculations. But he thought that the theory was
something more than a hypothesis. He rightly thought that there
could not be opposition between scientific and biblical truth, and
he even provided, based on the Catholic tradition, the means to
show that such opposition did not exist. Unfortunately, diverse
circumstances were united to make fail, at the moment, his project.
The important thing here is to notice that the search for truth is
most relevant for scientific progress, and that it supposes the
existence of peculiar capacities in the human being that make it
possible. In fact, it would have no sense without the capacities of
self-reflection, argument, evidence, and interpretation. Besides,
science would make no sense if we did not admit that searching for
truth is a value that deserves to be looked for.
Therefore, the search for truth and the progress in our
knowledge of truth have a deep anthropological meaning. Some see in
the progress of science an advance of naturalistic positions that
leave less and less space for metaphysics and theology. On the
contrary, we can see that a rigorous reflection on that progress,
that includes its conditions of possibility and their meaning,
throws new light on the image of the human being as someone who has
capacities that enable to participate in the plans of God in a
conscious way. In n. 29 of the encyclical, the Pope writes:
“It is unthinkable that a search so deeply rooted in human
nature would be completely vain and useless. The capacity to search
for truth and to pose questions itself implies the rudiments of a
response. Human beings would not even begin to search for something
of which they knew nothing or for something which they thought was
wholly beyond them. Only the sense that they can arrive at an
answer leads them to take the first step. This is what normally
happens in scientific research. When scientists, following their
intuition, set out in search of the logical and verifiable
explanation of a phenomenon, they are confident from the first that
they will find an answer, and they do not give up in the face of
setbacks. They do not judge their original intuition useless simply
because they have not reached their goal; rightly enough they will
say that they have not yet found a satisfactory answer”.
The birth of modern empirical science in the 17th
century owes much to Christian ideas. Christian faith in a personal
creative God who freely creates a contingent world, and the human
being to its image and similarity with the capacity to know and to
dominate the world, provided the base for scientific research. In
that perspective, the world, as a work of God, has an order, but
this order is contingent and therefore we have to resort to
experimentation if we want to know it; and the human being is able
to know the natural order and to use it to obtain a controlled
dominion of the world. The great pioneers of modern science were
moved by those ideas.
In n. 30 of the encyclical the Pope talks about “the
different modes of truth” and writes: “Most of them
depend upon immediate evidence or are confirmed by experimentation.
This is the mode of truth proper to everyday life and to scientific
research. At another level we find philosophical truth, attained by
means of the speculative powers of the human intellect. Finally,
there are religious truths which are to some degree grounded in
philosophy, and which we find in the answers which the different
religious traditions offer to the ultimate questions”.
This is a key point in the dialogue between science and faith.
We should avoid the different kinds of “imperialism”
that try to possess the monopoly of truth, forgetting that diverse
accesses to objective truth exist, and that a sincere search for
truth demands the mutual respect among them. In the 17th
century, there was a danger of theological imperialism. Nowadays we
sometimes find the opposite attitude of those who try to solve the
deepest metaphysical problems resorting to quantum gravity or
natural selection. A fruitful dialogue between science and faith
demands that the respective perspectives be respected, and that in
each case we adopt the perspective required by the type of problem
under consideration.
In n. 31 of the encyclical, the Pope emphasizes the social
dimension of the human being, who receives a great part of
knowledge through other people: “there are in the life of a
human being many more truths which are simply believed than truths
which are acquired by way of personal verification. Who, for
instance, could assess critically the countless scientific findings
upon which modern life is based? Who could personally examine the
flow of information which comes day after day from all parts of the
world and which is generally accepted as true? Who in the end could
forge anew the paths of experience and thought which have yielded
the treasures of human wisdom and religion? This means that the
human being - the one who seeks the truth - is also the one who
lives by belief”.
Very often science and religion are represented as being against
each other: tradition and authority occupy a central place in
religion, while science is characterized by its openness to
criticism. It is easy to notice, nevertheless, that confidence and
authority also occupy a central place in science. It is difficult
to find an institution that grants more importance to mutual
confidence and to authority than science. For instance, in the
training in the sciences a limitless confidence in the authorities
of each specialty is demanded from the student.
Of course, a fundamental difference exists, since in science all
can be questioned, and nothing is considered as definitively
established. In the revealed religion, the argument of authority
occupies an irreplaceable place. But it is possible to argue that
it is reasonable to admit the religious authority.
“3Authority versus criticism” seems to
represent a crucial difference between the perspectives of religion
and science. It would be desirable to recognize that, in religion
and in science as well, the driving force must be the search of the
truth, following ways that partly agree but partly are diverse. In
addition, the mystery that we find in the religious truths has as a
counterpart that, in the light of those truths, we obtain a vision
much deeper and reasonable of the meaning of the human life.
One of our strongest aspirations of our time is the search of
the unity of knowledge. In n. 34 of the encyclical we read:
“The unity of truth is a fundamental premise of human
reasoning, as the principle of non-contradiction makes clear.
Revelation renders this unity certain, showing that the God of
creation is also the God of salvation history. It is the one and
the same God who establishes and guarantees the intelligibility and
reasonableness of the natural order of things upon which scientists
confidently depend, and who reveals himself as the Father of our
Lord Jesus Christ”.
It is in this n. 34 where we find footnote 29, in which the Pope
mentions Galileo. The Pope quotes a paragraph of his speech to the
Pontifical Academy of Sciences on 10 November 1979:
“(Galileo) declared explicitly that the two truths, of faith
and of science, can never contradict each other. ‘Sacred
Scripture and the natural world proceeding equally from the divine
Word, the first as dictated by the Holy Spirit, the second as a
very faithful executor of the commands of God’, as he wrote
in his letter to Father Benedetto Castelli on 21 December 1613. The
Second Vatican Council says the same thing, even adopting similar
language in its teaching... Galileo sensed in his scientific
research the presence of the Creator who, stirring in the depths of
his spirit, stimulated him, anticipating and assisting his
intuitions”.
Galileo’s letter to Castelli was sent to the Roman
Inquisition jointly with a denunciation that started the
unfortunate Galileo affair. John Paul II quotes this letter as a
historical testimony of the deep unity between science and faith,
as it was perceived by one of the greatest pioneers of modern
science. The deepest root of the unity of knowledge is found in
God, who is the author both of nature and revelation, and has
provided us with the means to reach the truth through both
ways.
Intellectual modesty plays an important role in the search of
the unity of knowledge. In n. 40 of encyclical, John Paul II quotes
Saint Augustine, who said that, before his conversion, “I
gave my preference to the Catholic faith. I thought it more modest
and not in the least misleading to be told by the Church to believe
what could not be demonstrated - whether that was because a
demonstration existed but could not be understood by all or whether
the matter was not one open to rational proof - rather than from
the Manichees to have a rash promise of knowledge with mockery of
mere belief, and then afterwards to be ordered to believe many
fabulous and absurd myths impossible to prove true”. The
Christian faith is a guarantee in the search of the unity of
knowledge. When the unity of knowledge is considered from an
atheistic or materialistic perspective, it is easy to end up
admitting, with a kind of irrational faith, theses that neither can
be demonstrated nor verified nor are really understood. It is
requested, for example, to admit that the universe has been able to
arise from nothing without being the work of a Creator; or that the
nature we know is the result of pure blind forces; or that the
human characteristics are merely an epiphenomenon of the underlying
biological reality.
In n. 44, Saint Thomas is presented by the Pope as a source of
illumination for the search of the unity of knowledge:
“Profoundly convinced that ‘whatever its source, truth
is of the Holy Spirit’ (omne verum a quocumque dicatur a
Spiritu Sancto est) Saint Thomas was impartial in his love of
truth. He sought truth wherever it might be found and gave
consummate demonstration of its universality. In him, the
Church’s Magisterium has seen and recognized the passion for
truth; and, precisely because it stays consistently within the
horizon of universal, objective and transcendent truth, his thought
scales ‘heights unthinkable to human intelligence’.
Rightly, then, he may be called an ‘apostle of the
truth’. Looking unreservedly to truth, the realism of Thomas
could recognize the objectivity of truth and produce not merely a
philosophy of ‘what seems to be’ but a philosophy of
‘what is’”. The role of grace is highlighted by
the Pope when he writes in the same place: “Another of the
great insights of Saint Thomas was his perception of the role of
the Holy Spirit in the process by which knowledge matures into
wisdom”.
On the other hand, in n. 45 the Pope refers to the medieval
synthesis between scientific knowledge and theology, and laments
the later separation of both in modern times. We arrive here at one
of the central issues in the encyclical. In n. 46 he writes:
“The more influential of these radical positions are well
known and high in profile, especially in the history of the West.
It is not too much to claim that the development of a good part of
modern philosophy has seen it move further and further away from
Christian Revelation, to the point of setting itself quite
explicitly in opposition. This process reached its apogee in the
last century”. And later on: “In the field of
scientific research, a positivistic mentality took hold which not
only abandoned the Christian vision of the world, but more
especially rejected every appeal to a metaphysical or moral vision.
It follows that certain scientists, lacking any ethical point of
reference, are in danger of putting at the center of their concerns
something other than the human person and the entirety of the
person’s life. Further still, some of these, sensing the
opportunities of technological progress, seem to succumb not only
to a market-based logic, but also to the temptation of a
quasi-divine power over nature and even over the human
being”.
I would dare say that the main protagonist of that separation is
philosophy, and that we should resort to philosophy if we want to
reach the new unification of knowledge required in our time. In
fact, only philosophy provides a common base to the sciences and to
theology. Certainly, in order to obtain a Christian synthesis a
realist philosophy that takes into account the light of theology is
needed.
To reach the unity of knowledge an organizing principle is
needed, which may provide a hierarchy between the particular kinds
of knowledge and fit them in a global perspective. This is what
traditionally has been denominated “wisdom”.
In n. 81, the Pope claims that philosophy should recover its
meaning as wisdom: “To be consonant with the word of God,
philosophy needs first of all to recover its sapiential
dimension as a search for the ultimate and overarching meaning
of life. This first requirement is in fact most helpful in
stimulating philosophy to conform to its proper nature. In doing
so, it will be not only the decisive critical factor which
determines the foundations and limits of the different fields of
scientific learning, but will also take its place as the ultimate
framework of the unity of human knowledge and action, leading them
to converge towards a final goal and meaning. This sapiential
dimension is all the more necessary today, because the immense
expansion of humanity’s technical capability demands a
renewed and sharpened sense of ultimate values. If this technology
is not ordered to something greater than a merely utilitarian end,
then it could soon prove inhuman and even become potential
destroyer of the human race”. And he strongly adds: “A
philosophy denying the possibility of an ultimate and overarching
meaning would be not only ill-adapted to its task, but
false”.
In n. 88 of the encyclical, the Pope offers a clear and
penetrating description of scientism, alluding to some of the forms
that it has adopted throughout history. It is interesting to
reproduce fully those reflections: “Another threat to be
reckoned with is scientism. This is the philosophical notion
which refuses to admit the validity of forms of knowledge other
than those of the positive sciences; and it relegates religious,
theological, ethical and aesthetic knowledge to the realm of mere
fantasy. In the past, the same idea emerged in positivism and
neo-positivism, which considered metaphysical statements to be
meaningless. Critical epistemology has discredited such a claim,
but now we see it revived in the new guise of scientism, which
dismisses values as mere products of the emotions and rejects the
notion of being in order to clear the way for pure and simple
facticity. Science would thus be poised to dominate all aspects of
human life through technological progress. The undeniable triumphs
of scientific research and contemporary technology have helped to
propagate a scientistic outlook, which now seems boundless, given
its inroads into different cultures and the radical changes it has
brought. Regrettably, it must be noted, scientism consigns all that
has to do with the question of the meaning of life to the realm of
the irrational or imaginary. No less disappointing is the way in
which it approaches the other great problems of philosophy which,
if they are not ignored, are subjected to analyses based on
superficial analogies, lacking all rational foundation. This leads
to the impoverishment of human thought, which no longer addresses
the ultimate problems which the human being, as the animal
rationale, has pondered constantly from the beginning of time.
And since it leaves no space for the critique offered by ethical
judgement, the scientistic mentality has succeeded in leading many
to think that if something is technically possible it is therefore
morally admissible”.
We see that John Paul II affirms that scientism is a
“philosophical current”. Nevertheless, scientism
usually presents itself as a necessary consequence of the analysis
of science or of its progress, as a reflection on science itself,
therefore as though it were a part of science. There resides its
force: it is a philosophical current that appears as guaranteed by
the prestige of science. For this reason, it has a circular
character. In fact, it denies the value of knowledge to anything
which is not science, but its basic thesis does not belong to
science: consequently, scientism is a doctrine that involves a
contradiction.
Scientism today has generally a rather pessimistic air.
Positivist scientism announced that science could eventually solve
all problems. From 6 August 1945 onwards it was evident that
science could also create new problems much more serious than the
previously existing ones, like a nuclear destruction. In addition,
philosophy of science has indicated the limits of science, that are
not few nor small. If, in spite of all this, one admits scientism
today, the limits of science will be usually recognized but, at the
same time, it will be said that science is the best thing we have.
For example, if one says that the creation of the universe is a
problem that exceeds the possibilities of physics and belongs to
metaphysics, the usual answer will be: what possibilities has
metaphysics to solve a problem that not even physics, with its
powerful conceptual and experimental instruments, can solve? We
have turned from the all-powerful scientism that apparently would
solve all kind of problem into a pessimistic scientism that
highlights the limits of science but adds that that is the best
knowledge we have.
John Paul II affirms that, in spite of the criticism to which it
has been submitted, scientism is present in our culture, often in
form of a pragmatism that denies validity to meta-scientific
instances and tries to use the scientific results without ethical
barriers of any type. In n. 91 of the encyclical, the Pope affirms
that: “it remains true that a certain positivist cast of mind
continues to nurture the illusion that, thanks to scientific and
technical progress, man and woman may live as a demiurge,
single-handedly and completely taking charge of their
destiny”.
Now I am going to briefly present a personal attempt to relate
science to religion through a philosophical bridge, overcoming
scientism. I have developed it in my book The mind of the
universe 4.
There I try to show that empirical science includes some
assumptions that are like necessary conditions of their existence
and its progress. There are three types of them: ontological
(a natural order exists, which has its own consistency),
epistemological (we have the capacity to know the natural
order in a partial, but really true way), and ethical (the
search of a knowledge that allows us to obtain a controlled
dominion over nature is a value that deserves to be cultivated).
Then I attempt to show that scientific progress exercises a
feedback on those assumptions, in that it retro-justifies,
enlarges, and refines them. And I add that the analysis of this
feedback leads to interesting perspectives on God as the source of
being and creativity, and also on the human being as endowed with a
creativity that allows him to act as God’s collaborator.
The reflection on the epistemological assumptions of science
leads to the recognition of the human singularity. A similar
reflection can be made in the other two levels, the ontological and
the ethical. In the ontological level it is possible to show that
the present scientific worldview is very coherent with the action
of a creative personal God that is immanent to the world and has
equipped it with a wonderful capacity of self-organization. In the
ethical level it is possible to argue that the scientific activity
only makes sense if we admit that the search of truth and the
service to humankind are values that deserve to be cultivated, and
that those values are very coherent with the idea that represents
the human being as created by God to its image and likeness in
order to collaborate with Him in his creative project.
In order to conclude, I will gather three considerations that
are found in the final part of the encyclical Fides et
ratio.
In n. 105, the Pope speaks to those who have responsibility of
formation in the Church: “I encourage them to pay special
attention to the philosophical preparation of those who will
proclaim the Gospel to the men and women of today and, even more,
of those who will devote themselves to theological research and
teaching. They must make every effort to carry out their work in
the light of the directives laid down by the Second Vatican Council
and subsequent legislation, which speak clearly of the urgent and
binding obligation, incumbent on all, to contribute to a genuine
and profound communication of the truths of the faith. The grave
responsibility to provide for the appropriate training of those
charged with teaching philosophy both in seminaries and
ecclesiastical faculties must not be neglected. Teaching in this
field necessarily entails a suitable scholarly preparation, a
systematic presentation of the great heritage of the Christian
tradition and due discernment in the light of the current needs of
the Church and the world”. A Christian formative work today
should pay attention to the knowledge of philosophical questions
related to the sciences.
Along this line, in n. 106 the Pope writes: “I appeal also
to philosophers, and to all teachers of philosophy,
asking them to have the courage to recover, in the flow of an
enduringly valid philosophical tradition, the range of authentic
wisdom and truth - metaphysical truth included - which is proper to
philosophical inquiry. They should be open to the impelling
questions which arise from the word of God and they should be
strong enough to shape their thought and discussion in response to
that challenge. Let them always strive for truth, alert to the good
which truth contains. Then they will be able to formulate the
genuine ethics which humanity needs so urgently at this particular
time. The Church follows the work of philosophers with interest and
appreciation; and they should rest assured of her respect for the
rightful autonomy of their discipline. I would want especially to
encourage believers working in the philosophical field to illumine
the range of human activity by the exercise of a reason which grows
more penetrating and assured because of the support it receives
from faith”. These words do not need commentary. Since I have
placed myself in the optics of the sciences and the philosophy of
science, I will limit myself to indicate that the recommendations
of the Pope obviously apply to these fields, which occupy an
important place in philosophy and in human life today.
In the same n. 106, the Pope also speaks to scientists,
“whose research offers an ever greater knowledge of the
universe as a whole and of the incredibly rich array of its
component parts, animate and inanimate, with their complex atomic
and molecular structures. So far has science come, especially in
this century, that its achievements never cease to amaze us. In
expressing my admiration and in offering encouragement to these
brave pioneers of scientific research, to whom humanity owes so
much of its current development, I would urge them to continue
their efforts without ever abandoning the sapiential horizon
within which scientific and technological achievements are wedded
to the philosophical and ethical values which are the distinctive
and indelible mark of the human person. Scientists are well aware
that ‘the search for truth, even when it concerns a finite
reality of the world or of man, is never-ending, but always points
beyond to something higher than the immediate object of study, to
the questions which give access to Mystery’ 5 ”.
Science is, first of all, a search for truth. Its progress is a
triumph of the realistic program that, in some way, has an ethical
character. It is possible to argue that science has ethical bases
and leads to the diffusion of values that, by themselves, have an
ethical character. The rigorous reflection on science is the best
antidote to oppose materialistic reductionism, and it provides
interesting bridges to communicate the world of science with the
world of religion.
(1) See this proposal
in: Filosofía de la ciencia experimental. La objetividad
y la verdad en las ciencias, 3rd ed. (Pamplona:
Eunsa, 1999).
(2) See: W. Pannenberg,
“Theologie der Schöpfung und Naturwissenschaft”,
in: N. H. Gregersen, M. W. S. Parsons and C. Wassermann, eds.,
The Concept of Nature (Geneva: Labor et Fides, 1997), part
I, p. 84.
(3) See: M. Artigas,
“Teleology as a Bridge between Nature and
Transcendence”, ibid., pp. 46-51.
(4) M. Artigas, The
Mind of the Universe (Philadelphia and London: Templeton
Foundation Press, 2000); La mente del universo (Pamplona:
Eunsa, 1999).
(5) John Paul II,
Address to the University of Krakow for the 600th Anniversary of
the Jagellonian University (8 June 1997), 4: L'Osservatore
Romano, 9-10 June 1997, 12.
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