Science and transcendence

Mariano Artigas
Communication presented in the Simposium of the Académie Internationale de Philosophie des Sciences, Fribourg (Switzerland), 1990.
Published in E. Agazzi (editor), "Science et Sagesse" (Fribourg: Éditions Universitaires Fribourg Suisse, 1991), pp. 87-101.

Summary

Which is the role, if any at all, that empirical science can play in natural theology? The epistemology of Evandro Agazzi provides an understanding of the way we reach scientific intersubjectivity, and shows that there is a methodological gap between empirical science and metaphysical questions. Therefore, empirical science leaves room for a quest directed to the study of the radical conditions of being, truth, goodness, beauty, ethical duties, and transcendence. On this basis, further analysis shows that scientific problems can be considered as boundary questions only insofar as they may be a subjective source of metaphysical problems, and that general presuppositions of science and global insights on its achievements, although they properly do not belong to the scientific discourse, are better candidates to boundary questions. Moreover, many questions usually considered as boundary can be better labelled as particular overlappings, which mainly consist in using specific pieces of scientific information within arguments of natural theology. Anyway, bridging the methodological gap requires a philosophical interpretation of the scientific methods and results. Agazzi's views on scientific truth provide a good framework to work out the quest for integration. Although this quest necessarily includes personal commitments, it can be safely stated that empirical science makes sense insofar as it is seen as a quest for truth and as a source of means for the service of mankind, and it can be argued that this view is fully coherent with the tenets of a monotheist natural theology.

Since its systematic birth in the XVIIth century, empirical science has intertwined with the classical arguments of natural theology in different ways. Between the extremes represented by bold apologetics and radical naturalism, different combinations of separation, coherence and dialogue have been proposed. The analysis of factual questions could easily lead to a great prolixity. Nevertheless, the question mark hangs mainly over the nature and value of scientific knowledge. This is the guideline of the following reflections.

1. The Methodological Gap

My epistemological views basically coincide with the realist objectivism of Evandro Agazzi (Agazzi 1969, 1978, 1986, 1987 and 1988; Artigas 1988; Rossi 1986), and I have expounded them in more detail elsewhere (Artigas 1989). Here I will concentrate on the aspects that are especially related with the problem of transcendence.

Although everyone could accept that empirical science studies natural entities, properties and laws in order to reach a knowledge that may be submitted to empirical control, differences arise when we try to evaluate the reach of this knowledge. In any circumstances, an account of scientific method should include among its basic characteristics a reference to construction and control.

Indeed, the objects that we study in empirical science are constructed according to some concrete points of view that imply the adoption of a set of basic predicates and instrumental operations. Thus we cut reality in such a way that we have a mental cross-section, and the object we study is properly the ideal system we have constructed. The meaning of scientific constructs is defined within a theoretical context that refers to reality through some accepted rules, and the basic rules can be labelled as criteria of protocollarity. Obviously, any objectivation of this kind has a historical character, as it depends on the concepts and instruments that are available at a moment in time.

It is not difficult to understand how scientific intersubjectivity is achieved in that way. Of course, the task of establishing for the first time a well defined objectivation in a new discipline is usually a very difficult one. Nevertheless, once we have it, there is no difficulty in establishing intersubjective demonstrations within it.

Therefore, scientific intersubjectivity supposes the adoption of definitions and instrumental criteria that partly have a conventional character. The problem then is how can we pass from a contextual and historical intersubjectivity to a notion of truth as correspondence with reality. I will return to this point later on. By now, what has been said about scientific objectivity is enough to show that any scientific construct must be always interpreted within a particular objectivation and that, therefore, the scientific method leaves room for a quest directed to the study of the radical conditions of being, truth, goodness, beauty, ethical duties, and transcendence. Whatever the merits of a particular piece of natural theology may be, we will always find a methodological gap between empirical science and the quest for transcendence.

According to scientific naturalism there would not be such a gap, as scientific method is seen as the only legitimate one. Ian Barbour concludes, referring to some recent views in this line, that they assume that there is only one acceptable type of explanation; that, in those cases, particular scientific concepts are extended and extrapolated beyond their scientific use, so that they are inflated into comprehensive naturalistic philosophies; and that the abstractive and selective character of science is ignored, falling into that which Whitehead calls "the fallacy of misplaced concreteness" (Barbour 1988, p. 25).

Naturalism gratuitously turns the difference of methods into contradiction, by denying the truth or correctness of any approach that does not coincide with the scientific one. Naturalism often asserts that, as a matter of fact, the arguments of natural theology are more and more pushed aside by the progress of science, so that it would be legitimate to conclude that one can get rid of transcendence. By shifting to the questions of fact, naturalism can easily find favourable exemples; nevertheless, this move leaves the methodological problem untouched. Moreover, the alleged replacement of theological explanations by scientific ones often corresponds to a lack of philosophical insight, this happens, for instance, when natural agency is seen as incompatible with that of a transcendent God.

Kurt Hübner admits that naturalism is the ontology of science, but he turns upside down the philosophy of scientific naturalism by arguing that this ontology cannot be proven and that, therefore, its acceptance hangs on subjective reasons. He concludes that it is legitimate to accept, in our scientific age, views that include a mythical structure, in that they contemplate nature as reflecting transcendent dimensions (Hübner 1985 and 1987). I would prefer to call "scientism" or "scientistic ontology" this alleged ontology of science, because actually it is a pseudo-scientific ideological view.

Till now I have stressed the methodological gap between empirical science and the questions about transcendence. Is that all? As already noted, if we consider the "quaestio facti", we will find many controversial issues. Does this mean that the methodological gap only expresses, as Barbour says, a first approximation that must be completed by considering the positive relations that exist between the two approaches? (Barbour 1988, pp. 32-33). If this were the case, how could we conceive that two mutually independent approaches may interact with one another?

Like many other theologians, Barbour thinks that the best way to characterize the relations between science and theology is that of dialogue (Barbour 1988, pp. 21 and 33-40). It is often said that science leads to boundary questions that are connected with theology (Barbour 1988, p. 33-37; Russo 1982, pp. 96-97). However, sometimes it is also stressed that natural theology should base its arguments only on metaphysics, not on science (Clarke 1988, pp. 103-105; Casanovas 1982, p. 66), and this view seems more appropriate if we do not forget what the methodological gap means. I will consider now whether the existence of boundary questions makes sense at all.

2. Boundary Questions

According to John Polkinghorne, "there are questions which arise from science and which insistently demand an answer, but which by their very character transcend that of which science itself is competent to speak" (Polkinghorne 1990, p. 88). Doubtless, these would be typical boundary questions. Let us consider them in more detail.

Polkinghorne carefully considers these questions as something related with science, when he says that they "arise from science". Therefore, they would not be, properly speaking, scientific questions. But, what does it mean that they "arise from science"? This should mean that they begin to exist as a consequence of something that is scientific, or that they are caused by it. What is then difficult to understand is how this can happen. Which kind of reasoning would allow us to bridge the methodological gap?

I will distinguish two different kinds of problems that have a very different status. The first kind includes particular scientific problems that allegedly would connect with questions about transcendence; I will try to show that they can only be a subjective source of questions about transcendence. The second kind refers to the general presuppositions of science and to general insights on its achievements, and they can be better considered as boundary questions.

2.1. Subjective Connections

Polkinghorne speaks about "a widespread feeling among practising scientists, particularly those of us who have worked in fundamental physics, that there is more to the physical world than has met the scientific eye. As a result of that feeling, we are living at a time when there is a revival of natural theology taking place, largely at the hands of the scientists rather than the theologians" (Polkinghorne 1990, p. 88). Then, to illustrate his assertion, Polkinghorne refers to Paul Davies (Davies 1983).

The reference to the book of Davies does not help very much to clarify the problem. Doubtless a competent physicist, Davies argues for some bizarre and clearly non-scientific views. He sustains a kind of pantheism that is related with the idea of a self-creating universe that would have come spontaneously into existence (ibid., pp. VIII, 38, 223). What is crucial in this context is that Davies presents his ideas as if they were generally accepted by the specialists in physics, and even as "The physicist's conception of nature", as the title of the last chapter of his book runs. There would then be a bridge between science and natural theology; according to Davies, science offers now a surer path to God than religion (ibid., p. IX). It is not clear, nevertheless, how this bridge could be constructed; actually, Davies constructs it by using a dubious philosophy that is presented as if it were a mere application or a consequence of physics (Artigas 1987; Carroll 1988; Craig 1986). Indeed, the questions discussed by Davies are the classical ones of natural theology; only, Davies uses arguments connected with science in order to answer them. Therefore, it is not clear, to say the least, that here we deal with real boundary questions.

Cosmology has been, in the last decades, a source of alleged boundary questions. Theologians usually agree that cosmological arguments can neither proof nor disprove the Christian doctrine of creation (Jaki 1982, p. 260; McMullin 1981, p. 39). But there is also an inflationary bibliography supporting the idea that "there is sufficient evidence at present to justify the belief that the universe began to exist without being caused to do so" (Smith 1988, p. 39). However, as intriguing as quantum fluctuations and quantum gravity may be, there is little rigour when the question is posed in this way: "Does spontaneous birth emerge 'out of nothing' or in a space of more dimensions or as a topological separation from an initially given empty Minkowskian space?", and it is concluded that "these unsolved questions... should stimulate further work in this maturing area of research" (Zeldovich 1982, p. 578). Indeed, one could establish a parallel between those possibilities only if the metaphysical problem of the creation out of nothing were considered as a physical one; nevertheless, then we would not be dealing with a boundary question, but with a reduction.

Polkinghorne also refers to the cosmological anthropic principle as another boundary question, even as one of the pillars of the new natural theology that is emerging now from scientific considerations (Polkinghorne 1990, p. 89). At first sight, the anthropical principle seems a good candidate to have a place as a boundary problem. Nevertheless, it seems better to see it as a new instance of a well known situation, namely the tendency that scientists have to establish a link between metaphysical questions and their scientific concerns. In this line, as scientists share every human concern with other people, we can find as many boundary questions as we desire. But this would not serve as an answer to our central question. Science may be seen as a catalyst to set off metaphysical attitudes, but this does not mean that science by itself implies any metaphysical problem at all; rather, it adopts a non-metaphysical point of view.

In short, I wonder if any specific problem that can be formulated within empirical science may be seen as a boundary question. I think that, as far as we deal with substantive questions that are properly scientific, we do not need to appeal to extra-scientific reasons; indeed, if we need non-scientific reasons in order to formulate or to solve a concrete problem, this would mean that this problem cannot be strictly considered as a scientific one.

Of course, it is true that, from the historical point of view, there have been interactions that sometimes have provoked a shift of the boundaries between science and metaphysics; this is the case, for instance, of problems related with the processual character of nature. However, this should be considered as a question of fact that does not challenge the methodological gap.

Therefore, we can safely conclude that substantive scientific problems cannot be properly called boundary problems. It is understandable that metaphysicians and theologians may consider as a positive sign the fact that scientists sometimes connect particular scientific problems with metaphysics. However, these connections are contingent and correspond to a "quaestio facti". Scientific problems, when properly formulated, have scientific solutions. Metaphysical questions do not properly arise from specific scientific achievements; they belong to a perspective that surpasses the scientific ambit, and they should be studied from the metaphysical point of view. We can speak in this context of boundary questions if we desire, but then we should keep in mind that they do not correspond to the "quaestio iuris" about the real relations between two different methodological approaches.

2.2. General Presuppositions and Insights

Polkinghorne also refers to intelligibility as a better candidate to the boundary question. "Because I do indeed believe that we live in 'One World'", says he with a significant allusion to the title of one of his books, "I also believe that the search for truth will always prove a path to God" (Polkinghorne 1990, p. 88). And he adds that one of the pillars of a new natural theology rooted in science is the appeal to intelligibility; we should then speak of "insight", that is, "of a way of looking at the totality of things which has coherence and intelligibility", and it is thus that "theism offers a more satisfying and more extensive explanation of what is going on" (ibid., p. 89). He refers to "the curious way in which modern science seems, almost irresistibly, to point beyond itself" (Polkinghorne 1986, p. 63).

General presuppositions of science are another good candidate. In Barbour's list of boundary questions, the general presuppositions of science are considered as the first one (Barbour 1988, pp. 33-34). Presuppositions refer to the foundations of science, and insight to its achievements.

We can speak about presuppositions in two different senses. First, they can be particular principles or theories which are accepted without demonstration within some concrete contexts; by themselves, these presuppositions only give rise to methodological questions. In the second sense, they refer to some conditions of the whole scientific enterprise; therefore, these general presuppositions would have a meta-scientific character.

One problem of general presuppositions is that, although they may not be properly scientific and therefore they may not have any cognitive scientific import, they should nevertheless be considered as a condition, and a necessary one, of the possibility of particular scientific achievements. In some way they would provide scientific information from outside.

General metaphysical presuppositions of science can be seen at least in three ways. First, as necessary conditions of scientific reasoning; this could be the case, for instance, of the principle of causality. Second, as very general beliefs that, although they could not be considered as necessary conditions, could nevertheless provide a foundation for particular actions; for instance, the belief in the simplicity and uniformity of nature in relation to inductive methods. And third, as motivating forces that impel the scientists to do what they do, i.e. as psychological causal conditions for the behaviour of scientists; an example would be the belief of the pioneers of modern science in a rational Creator who freely created a contingent and ordered world which could and should be studied by means of reason and experiments (Pap 1949, pp. 402-408).

These distinctions show that using general presuppositions as a way from science to transcendence requires a long journey. Indeed, it is difficult to prove that particular ideas about transcendence may be seen as necessary conditions of scientific reasoning or of particular achievements. And, even if we could conclude that there are some general metaphysical conditions of science, this could be connected with different views about their ultimate foundations.

The historical approach to these questions continues to feed interesting debates. Stanley Jaki argues that the scientific enterprise was subjected to repeated stillbirths due to the organistic and pantheist worldviews of ancient cultures, and that it found its only viable birth as a self-sustained enterprise within a Christian cultural matrix which permeated an entire culture for several centuries, providing a solid foundation for the ontological and epistemological bases that were needed if the scientific work was to have any meaning at all (Jaki 1974). Jaki also argues that these bases continue to be a condition, at least an implicit one, for any truly creative science (Jaki 1986, pp. 161-181); and further that they coincide with the realist bases of the classical proofs of the existence of God (Jaki 1978).

As far as these theses are mainly centred around the historical perspective, they refer to contingent facts. Nevertheless, they also allude to systematic problems that are a subject of debates in contemporary epistemology. The problem of realism is one of them. Larry Laudan concludes that, by now, "it can only be wish fulfilment that gives rise to the claim that realism, and realism alone, explains why science works" (Laudan 1981, p. 48). However, it seems that some realist presuppositions are crucial, at least, to the rationality of research (Leplin 1986). It is difficult to understand how an instrumentalist point of view could explain even the empirical adequacy of the scientific constructs (ibid., p. 33-44).

It can be safely assumed that empirical science presupposes a metaphysical realism, which refers to ontological features such as natural order and also to the cognitive human abilities about truth. Nicholas Rescher speaks about the retro-justification of realism by the "wisdom of hindsight" on grounds of its pragmatical and explanatory efficacy (Rescher 1987, p. 126). And here we can see how this hindsight may be connected with the insight that leads towards transcendence. Indeed, nature discloses itself to scientists as power, life, order and unity; and this provides a hint about transcendence that, in any case, must be studied under a strictly philosophical and religious point of view (Gilkey 1989). All these can be considered as genuine boundary questions, that refer to the metaphysical presuppositions of science, to their retro-justification by scientific progress, and to their ultimate foundations.

Insofar as we consider presuppositions as a bridge from science to transcendence, we must rely on some kind of insight. And although this insight about presuppositions and achievements cannot be reduced to merely formal arguments, it can be considered as a serious rational perspective.

3. Particular Overlappings

I will consider now a different kind of problem, namely the use of scientific knowledge within metaphysical arguments. Among the questions that are usually considered as boundary, many belong to this category, and they could be better labelled as particular overlappings. The most usual case of overlapping is that of pieces of scientific information that are used as a part of the proofs of the existence of God or in arguments about the attributes of God.

Theologians rightly aim to emphasize that it is unsound to argue in the line of the so called "God of the gaps" (McMullin 1988), so that "natural theology today should avoid any attempt to build its foundation on apparently unfillable gaps in the scientific picture of the universe" (Clarke 1988, p. 105). As a consequence, it is admitted that "only a radically metaphysical argument, from the very existence of a determinate world, or the existence of any dynamic order at all, has a fair chance of succeeding" (ibid.). There is a clear awareness about "the extreme fluidity whereby models of nature designed to highlight divine activity have so readily lent themselves to reinterpretation in secular terms" (Brooke 1989, p. 16). In this line, as already noted, theologians contemplate arguments such as the fine-tunning of the universe as compatible, coherent or consonant with theism, and not as real proofs of it (McMullin 1988, p. 70-71; Clarke 1988, p. 103-104).

Scientific information can be used within natural theology in the same way as any other information. However, it should be first submitted to epistemological evaluation, and this is a non trivial problem. This is why even authors who have devoted a great effort to examining the arguments of natural theology, sometimes do not use scientific information at all. Thus, when Alvin Plantinga examines in detail the cosmological and the teleological arguments, he focuses on the logical point of view (Plantinga 1967, pp. 3-25, 95-111), and only makes occasional and trivial references to scientific knowledge; for instance, speaking about the causes of existence, he refers to the case of elementary particles only to add immediately "or for that matter a full-grown horse" (ibid., p. 13). The reason is easily undertandable if we note that Plantinga, speaking about scientific acceptability, says that "the relationship between a scientific theory and the grounds for accepting it is still a black and boundless mystery", so that, if we try to use scientific information for theological arguments, "our understanding of scientific theory is too meagre to make it more than a shot in the dark" (ibid., p. 269).

Furthermore, in order to use scientific information in a theological context we should also reflect philosophically on it; indeed, only philosophy is homogeneous enough with natural theology, whereas empirical science is not. This should be kept in mind, for instance, when evolution is used against arguments for design, as if the scientific explanations of the structures and adaptation of plants and animals rendered implausible the argument for a divine design (Mackie 1982, pp. 132, 141-142). Actually, divine action conceived as that of a First Cause is absolutely compatible with the agency of natural causes, and criticisms as the just mentioned would only be effective against arguments that are lacking in philosophical insight.

When using science in the context of natural theology, the only way to achieve rigorous arguments is to consider, as Richard Swinburne does, the reach of the scientific explanations. He distinguishes what he calls full, complete, ultimate, and absolute explanations, and devotes specific attention to that which would be scientifically inexplicable (Swinburne 1979, pp. 72-79). According to his view, there are two categories of phenomena of that kind, namely those which are too odd to be fitted into the established pattern of a scientific explanation, and those which are too big to be fitted into any pattern of scientific explanation (ibid., pp. 71-72). The more interesting ones would be those of the second kind, as they lead to the posing of fundamental questions; for instance, why there are any states of affairs at all, or why the most general natural laws of all hold.

Quentin Smith argues that a naturalistic explanation of the existence and basic laws of our universe is possible (Smith 1990). He rightly says that any alleged natural cause of the universe would really be a part of the universe and thereby would be among the phenomena that need to be explained. Therefore, he proposes a statistical explanation, aiming to show that the naturalistic view is logically possible and even approximately empirically possible. However, he admits that "as before, there still are limits or stopping points of naturalistic explanation but these stopping points are pushed back further than hitherto thought possible, from the existence and basic laws of our universe to the existence and metalaws of an infinite series of universes" (ibid., p. 35). The basic problem, therefore, remains untouched.

Once again, we should conclude that the methodological gap between empirical science and natural theology is all-pervasive. It is possible to bridge it; but the bridge must include philosophical reflections that, although they should be coherent with science, cannot be considered as a mere consequence of it. This conclusion corresponds to the fact that discussions about natural theology, even when science is considered as their source or as a central point, inevitably fall outside science and concentrate on the already classical kinds of philosophical arguments.

4. The Quest for Integration

The possibilities of integration between empirical science and natural theology mainly depend on our ideas about truth. I will return now to Agazzi's ideas about scientific objectivity and truth, as a basis for my views about this final question. Agazzi points out that the crisis in the foundations of the natural sciences around the turn of our century led to a mistrust of truth, so that this idea was substituted by the weaker one of objectivity, conceived as intersubjectivity. It is a merit of the epistemological work of Agazzi that he shows how the analysis of scientific intersubjectivity is the natural path that leads towards the stronger sense of objectivity as truth.

As already noted, scientific intersubjectivity is grounded on the adoption of definitions and instrumental criteria that partly have a conventional character. Even the most strong opponents of the idea of scientific truth would admit that we often reach rigorous proofs; nevertheless, they will argue that proofs are rigorous only within a given presuppositional framework and that, therefore, we can only speak of truth as consisting in relations of coherence. What is then at stake is the possibility of passing from a coherence notion of validity to a correspondence notion of truth.

The way of doing this can be summarized as follows. Once we have established the intra-contextual validity of a construct, which includes intersubjective ways of correspondence with empirical situations, if that construct can be successfully applied to solve concrete problems, this will determine its truth value. We should only be aware of the diversity of meanings and proofs; obviously we do not mean the same thing when we apply the notion of truth to a general principle and to a concrete spatial structure.

Therefore we can speak about a scientific truth which is partial, because it is contextual and approximative. And this implies that it is perfectible, and also that it must be conceived as having a somewhat different value according to the different modalities of constructions and proofs.

This explanation of truth combines the contextual, the semantical and the pragmatical features, which correspond to the theories of truth as coherence, as correspondence and as praxis. Indeed, the notion of truth can be applied to our constructs if they satisfy well established rules and serve to solve the real problems which have provoked their construction.

All this could also be applied, with the necessary qualifications, to the general problems of knowledge. In this way we can integrate the entire set of truths that we can reach. There should be no contradiction among them, if each one is well defined in its own level and the levels are also properly defined. On this basis, it is possible to establish links among the different levels and contexts.

Actually, there is a growing interest among theologians about the applicability of epistemological views to their own work. They realize that the quest for integration should include a notion of truth that may establish a link between science and metaphysics, and that this requires a relation of the contextual, referential and pragmatical features of truth (Murphy 1989). In this respect, Agazzi's epistemological views provide a most adequate insight.

However, other factors should also be considered. Indeed, the quest for integration will depend on our general philosophical and theological views and, although these views can be submitted to rational consideration, they necessarily include personal commitments. In any case, it can be safely stated that empirical science makes sense insofar as it is seen as a quest for truth and as a source of means for the service of mankind, and it can be argued that this view is fully coherent with the monotheist tenets about God, creation, nature and mankind. Further progress in natural theology is possible, but it would require using arguments that go far beyond the scientific and epistemological perspectives.

References

Agazzi, E. (1969) Temi e problemi di filosofia della fisica, Manfredi, Milano (2nd ed.: Abete, Roma 1974).

Agazzi, E. (1978) "Eine Deutung der wissenschaftlichen Objectivität", Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie, 3 (1978), pp. 20-47.

Agazzi, E. (1986) "Vérité partielle ou approximation de la vérité?", in: AA.VV., La nature de la vérité scientifique, Ciaco, Louvain-la-Neuve 1986, pp. 103-114.

Agazzi, E. (1987) Philosophie. Science. Métaphysique, Editions Universitaires, Fribourg.

Agazzi, E. (1988) "L'objectivité scientifique", in: Agazzi, E., ed., L'objectivité dans les différentes sciences, Editions Universitaires, Fribourg 1988, pp. 13-25.

Artigas, M. (1987) "Física y creación: el origen del universo", Scripta Theologica, 19 (1987), pp. 347-373.

Artigas, M. (1988) "Objectivity and Reliability in Science", Epistemologia, 11 (1988), pp. 101-116.

Artigas, M. (1989) Filosofía de la ciencia experimental, Ediciones Universidad de Navarra, Pamplona.

Barbour, I.G. (1988) "Ways of Relating Science and Theology", in: Russell- Stoeger-Coyne (1988), pp. 21-48.

Brooke, J.H. (1989) "Science and the Fortunes of Natural Theology: Some Historical Perspectives", Zygon, 24 (1989), pp. 3-22.

Carroll, W.E. (1988) "Big Bang Cosmology, Quantum Tunneling from Nothing, and Creation", Laval théologique et philosophique, 44 (1988), pp. 59-75.

Casanovas, J. (1982) "Cosmologie et religion", in: Poupard (1982), pp. 54- 67.

Clarke, W.N. (1988) "Is a Natural Theology Still Possible Today?", in: Russell- Stoeger- Coyne (1988), pp. 103-123.

Craig, W.L. (1986) "God, Creation and Mr Davies", The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 37 (1986), pp. 163-175.

Davies, P. (1983) God and the New Physics, Dent, London.

Fennema, J. - Paul, I., eds. (1990) Science and Religion. One World: Changing Perspectives on Reality, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht.

Gilkey, L. (1989) "Nature, Reality, and the Sacred: A Meditation in Science and Religion", Zygon, 24 (1989), pp. 283-298.

Hübner, K. (1985) Die Wahrheit des Mythos, C.H. Beck, München.

Hübner, K. (1987) "La naissance de l'age scientifique, resultat des lois ou du hasard?", Epistemologia, 10 (1987), pp. 27-38.

Jaki, S.L. (1974) Science and Creation, Scottish Academic Press, Edinburgh.

Jaki, S.L. (1978) The Road of Science and the Ways to God, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago.

Jaki, S.L. (1982) "From Scientific Cosmology to a Created Universe", The Irish Astronomical Journal, 15 (1982), pp. 253-262.

Jaki, S.L. (1986) Chance or Reality and Other Essays, University Press of America, Lanham and London.

Laudan, L. (1981) "A Confutation of Convergent Realism", Philosophy of Science, 48 (1981), pp. 19-49.

Leplin, J. (1986) "Methodological Realism and Scientific Rationality", Philosophy of Science, 53 (1986), pp. 31-51.

Mackie, J.L. (1982) The Miracle of Theism. Arguments For and Against the Existence of God, Clarendon Press, Oxford.

McMullin, E. (1981) "How should Cosmology Relate to Theology?", in: Peacocke, A., ed., The Sciences and Theology in the Twentieth Century, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame 1981, pp. 17- 51.

McMullin, E. (1988) "Natural Science and Belief in a Creator: Historical Notes", in: Russell-Stoeger-Coyne (1988), pp. 49-79.

Murphy, N. (1989) "Truth, Relativism, and Crossword Puzzles", Zygon, 24 (1989), pp. 299-314.

Pap, A. (1949) Elements of Analytic Philosophy, MacMillan, New York.

Plantinga, A. (1967) God and Other Minds. A Study of the Rational Justification of Belief in God, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London.

Polkinghorne, J.C. (1986), One World, SPCK, London (Princeton University Press, Princeton 1987).

Polkinghorne, J.C. (1990) "A Revived Natural Theology", in: Fennema - Paul (1990), pp. 87-97.

Poupard, P., ed. (1982) Science et foi, Desclée, Tournai.

Rescher, N. (1987) Scientific Realism, Reidel, Dordrecht.

Rossi, P.A. (1986) "Attuali tendenze dell'epistemologia italiana: la corrente oggettualista", in: Agazzi, E., ed., (1986) La filosofia della scienza in Italia nel '900, Franco Angeli, Milano 1986, pp. 403-458.

Russell, R.J. - Stoeger, W.R. - Coyne, G.V., eds. (1988) Physics, Philosophy, and Theology: A Common Quest for Understanding, Vatican Observatory, Vatican City State.

Russo, F. (1982) "Objectivité scientifique et options religieuses et philosophiques", in: Poupard (1982), pp. 87-102.

Smith, Q. (1988) "The Uncaused Beginning of the Universe", Philosophy of Science, 55 (1988), pp. 39-57.

Smith, Q. (1990) "A Natural Explanation of the Existence and Laws of Our Universe", Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 68 (1990), pp. 22-43.

Swinburne, R. (1979) The Existence of God, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1989 (fourth reimpression).

Zeldovich, Y.B. (1982) "Spontaneous Birth of the Closed Universe and the Anthropic Principle", in: Brück, H.A. - Coyne, G.V. - Longair, M.S., eds, Astrophysical Cosmology, Pontificia Academia Scientiarum, Città del Vaticano 1982, pp. 575-579.